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In the aftermath of the sinking of the oil tankers Erika on December 1999 and Prestige 
on 13 November 2002, the Commission sought to overcome the shortcomings of the 
existing legislation which impeded member states to carry out technical investigations 
in a satisfactory and timely manner. In 2005 it drafted the 3
rd
 Maritime Package (which 
contains two regulations and six directives), intended as a follow up of Erika I and II 
Packages. The proposal contained a directive establishing the fundamental principles 
governing the investigation of accidents in the maritime transport sector. According to 
the Commission, indeed, the aim of technical investigations was not to determine civil 
or criminal liability, but to find the causes of maritime incidents and improve maritime 
safety. In its first reading the Parliament adopted some amendments related to the 
protection of witnesses, the independence and  power of the investigative body, the 
involvement of the European Maritime Safety Agency, the deadline for starting 
investigations, comitology and the fair treatment of seafarers. The common position 
limits the obligation for safety investigations (e.g. mandatory investigations have to take 
place only in case of very serious casualties and incidents) and retained certain 
flexibility and discretion when carrying out safety investigations. Several Member 
States, indeed, believed that the Commission proposal would jeopardize their maritime 
interests. Only few parliamentary amendments were included, namely on comitology. 
The Parliament, then, reinstated most of its amendments in the second reading and 
sought for conciliation. 
Anticipated by several preparatory informal meetings between key negotiators of the 
Parliament and the Council, on 8
th
 December 2008 the Conciliation Committee was 
convened in order to reach a joint text and was co-chaired by the vice-President of the 
Parliament and the French minister on Transport affairs. The most controversial issue 
was on the scope of application, that is the range of incidents covered by an obligation 
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of safety investigations. After long debate, the rapporteur, Jaromír Kohliček 
(GUE/NGL, CZ), gave up to member states’ demands, according to which such 
investigations should be restricted only to very serious incidents  and that a preliminary 
assessment should be made to enable the investigative body to decide whether to 
undertake a safety investigation. Moreover, the directive ensures the principle of no 
parallel investigations by more than one member state. Finally, the Parliament obtained 
appropriate guarantees for the protection of witnesses.  
This example shows how the Conciliation Committee works and how the outcome is 
clearly biased in favour of the Council. The Parliament, indeed, did not manage to 
convince the Council on the main substantial issue of the draft directive, that is to say, 
on the obligation of investigation. This conciliation dossier illustrates some of the key 
aspect of my investigation: the Council has a structurally stronger bargaining position 
than the Parliament, France is an old member state which experienced several times 
conciliation negotiations, the rapporteur comes from a small party (the GUE/NGL 
group), so he can neither express the view of the Parliament’s majority nor issue 
credible veto threats. In other words, this example indicates that the legislative outcome 
is affected by the interactions between the two delegations and the two chambers. The 
study of the Conciliation Committee must focus not only on the substantive features of 
each chamber, but on the impact that these features have on the bicameral relations.  
Starting from basic research questions on who gains more bargaining power in 
conciliation, the present analysis examines a series of factors that may bias the 
legislative outcome in favour of one chamber, rather than the other, in 179 dossiers, and 
then empirical evidence provides the confirmation of my expectations. 
Research Questions 
Most of bicameral legislatures are incongruent. When the two chambers may exhibit 
differences in preferences, resolving this disagreement becomes relevant. As Tsebelis 
and Money (1997) argue, the several procedures for conflict resolution affect legislative 
outcomes. Considering, thus, the final stages of a legislative procedure and the methods 
of how to solve intercameral conflicts is necessary to understand how legislators reach 
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to a compromise. Beside the navette system, the joint session and the ultimate decision 
by one chamber, the conference committee, which acts in a lot of countries and even in 
the European Union, is a unicameral mini-parliament with delegations of the two 
houses. How these committees operate eventually determines the balance of power 
between the chambers. The core of the argument is that ‘the composition of the 
conference committee, its decision-making rule, and the set of bicameral restrictions are 
critically important to the results of bicameral bargaining’ (Tsebelis and Money 1997, 
118).  
A thorough understanding of the dynamics upon which the Council and the Parliament 
negotiate in the Conciliation Committee is interesting and important. Not only it is the 
last chance the two negotiators to reach an agreement, but also such negotiations may 
have an effect backwardly, in the early stages of the codecision. Since the Treaty of 
Maastricht has been signed in 1992, scholars and politicians drew their attention to the 
newly inserted legislative procedure. It increased the parliamentary powers and the 
European Union was claimed to be an effective bicameral system. But, in less than five 
years shortcomings arose. The Voice Telephony directive displayed the power 
asymmetry between the Council’s and the Parliament’s delegation and the Parliament 
reached the absolute majority to reject the Council’s proposal. In Amsterdam member 
states reshaped the last stage of the codecision procedure: the two chambers have veto 
power both in the Conciliation Committee and at third reading. In addition, over the 
course of the last two decades this formal frame where interistitutional relations take 
place has evolved into a more sophisticated system, where even informal processes are 
at work. This short overview of the conciliation stage in the European Union introduces 
the importance to investigate the decision-making when bicameral conflict resolution 
operates. 
In other words, when the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers employ a 
conference committee to settle ultimately the differences that may arise during the 
adoption of legislation, how does this Conciliation Committee operate? The present 
analysis aims at tackling this question, that is, who wins in these negotiations, the 
Council or the Parliament? Moreover, are they on an equal footing? Why and under 
which circumstances can the Parliament be more successful within the committee? 
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I argue that the Conciliation Committee produces outcomes that are systematically 
biased in favour of the Council, but there are factors that may be of benefit for the 
Parliament. First, the Parliament has been more successful after relevant constitutional 
reforms. Second, parliamentary negotiators may influence the decision-making when 
they come from large party and rely on expertise, because they may issue an easily 
executable veto threat or a tough proposal, manipulating the Council’s belief. Third, the 
support from the Commission is crucial to parliamentary success. Fourth, time 
constraint and electoral cycle may strengthen the Parliament’s bargaining position vis-à-
vis the Council. Fifth, the Parliament may manipulate the Council’s belief about its own 
type and it may convey wrong signals to gains more benefits. 
The Approach 
The theoretical framework used throughout the analysis is drawn by the work of rational 
choice institutionalists. Their analytical tools provide the ground for the combination of 
general models of bicameral legislature and the literature on European politics. When 
used in conjunction these two strands of literature, indeed, predict that bicameralism in 
the European Union is biased in favour of one chamber, instead of the other, and that 
the Council and the Parliament negotiate in environments with incomplete information, 
veto threats or belief manipulation. 
Using the combination of these two theoretical approaches is not new (Franchino 2007; 
König et al. 2007; Kreppel 2002; Rasmussen 2011; Tsebelis and Money 1997), but it is 
particularly important for this type of research, because it sheds some light on dynamic 
process of bicameral conflict resolution. The connection between general literature on 
the concept and on the European integration cannot overlook on this last stage of the 
codecision procedure. It is important, indeed, when looking at bicameralism to 
understand fully the impact that both chambers have on the final legislative outcome. 
Literature on Bicameralism and conference committee 
The most comprehensive analysis on bicameralism is Tsebelis and Money’s (1997) 
work. They move from historical development to elaborate spatial theories in order to 
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give account of important differences among bicameral systems. In particular, they 
demonstrate how varieties of bicameralism affect relative chamber power. Conference 
committees play a relevant role in facilitating the compromises among the legislators, 
but the location of the final outcome in a multidimensional bargaining space depends on 
their composition and, consequentially, their preferences. However, some aspects of 
decision-making within conference committee depends on the level of information 
shared by the negotiators and whether the committee members enter into a long-term 
interaction, such as in the United States (Longley and Oleszek 1989).  
A large body of the literature focuses on inter-chamber power, looking at the US Senate 
or the House as winning actors in conference committee (Ferejohn 1975; Gross 1980, 
1983; Kanter 1972; Vogler 1970). The evidence shows that the Senate wins more often, 
because it has a second mover advantage (Strom and Rundquist 1977). 
On the other hand, a second group of studies on conference committee have investigated 
the effects it has on intra-chamber power distribution. Scholars have debated indeed 
whether conferees are able to influence policy by being delegated by their parent 
chambers as a means of promoting bicameral agreement and avoiding the risk of failure 
associated with bargaining between the chambers (Krehbiel, Shepsle, and Weingast 
1987; Ortega and McQuillan 1996; Shepsle and Weingast 1987; Vander Wielen 2013). 
To some extent, these theories do not offer an account on intracameral organization and 
the logic of representativeness behind the policy implications of inter-cameral 
interaction. A recent theoretical model of Gailmard and Hammond (2011) emphasizes 
that the relationship between the parent chamber and the delegates is extremely relevant 
in the definition of representative delegation in order to extract more concession from 
the other chamber. However, the two scholars argue that there is a tension in the optimal 
committee design between the chamber’s desire for a representative and a tough 
(although unrepresentative) delegation.  
On the whole relationship between the two chambers, the literature looks also to the 
distributional effect of concurrent majorities associated with bicameralism. Certainly, 
the main implication derived from the “divide-the-dollar” game of Baron and Ferejohn 
(1989) as well as the extension of McCarty (2000a, 2000b) regards the use of super-
majority requirements. Super-majority, indeed, benefits chamber members as it ensures 
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that many representatives of that chamber are included in any winning coalition. 
Ansolabehere, Snyder and Ting (2003) develop a distributive model of bicameralism 
which relies on dual representation of the chambers. 
Finally, important contributions on bicameralism stress the US executive-legislative 
relation, rather than bargaining between the House and the Senate. Cameron’s (2000) 
influential work suggests that Presidential veto can have a profound influence in inter-
branch bargaining. Even though the President is involved only marginally and at the end 
of the legislative process, its veto threat represents a potential strategy to extract 
concessions in case of divided government in Congress. Consequently, veto threats 
prove to be an effective bargaining tool when legislators negotiate in uncertainty about 
what policy the other chamber will accept (Cameron and McCarty 2004; McCarty 
1997).  
Literature on EU Bicameralism 
Although my main objective is to investigates on how the Conciliation Committee 
works, both formally and informally, the study on bicameralism in the EU, indeed, is 
still in the early stages compared to the themes and concepts investigated by the general 
literature on the subject. 
Bicameral politics in the European Union has developed only recently, since the 
important contributions of scholars from the rational choice institutionalism. This 
approach has shifted the debate from the discussion between neofunctionalism (Haas 
1958) and (liberal) intergovernmentalism (Hoffmann 1966; Moravcsik 1991, 1993, 
1998), to focus on bargaining within the institutions, preference configurations, stages 
of actions and bargaining power. Rational choice institutionalism focuses on formal and 
informal day-to-day decision making inside the European institutions, through the 
development of both theoretical models and empirical analyses. I will review this 
literature, by dividing it into three groups.  
The first strand studies spatial models of legislative politics and the procedure under 
which, after the Commission’s proposal, the Council and the European Parliament 
shape EU law. Upon several assumptions, the models are extremely useful to compare 
different European legislative procedure (Crombez 1997, 2001; Steunenberg 1994, 
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1997; Tsebelis and Garrett 2000). These models are primarily interested in identifying 
an equilibrium and the winset of policies the two legislative actors may enact, but the 
success of a chamber is determined by an arbitrary assumption about the first mover or 
a random recognition rule.  
The second group of literature investigates the factors influencing the decision-making 
process inside either the European Parliament (Häge and Kaeding 2007; Hix, Noury, 
and Roland 2005, 2007; Hix and Noury 2009; Hix 2002) or the Council of Ministers 
(Hagemann and Hoyland 2008; Hagemann 2007; Hosli, Mattila, and Uriot 2011; 
Mattila and Lane 2001; Mattila 2004, 2009) in isolation. In the parliamentary case, 
scholars concentrate on the dimensions of contestation and party coalition across 
different legislatures and using different methods (e.g. NOMINATE and roll-call votes 
as well as expert survey) (Hix and Noury 2009; McElroy and Benoit 2007, 2010; 
McElroy 2007). In addition, the role of the rapporteur has drawn increasing attention, 
since they perform a leadership role within the committee and negotiating role with the 
Council, especially under the codecision procedure (Benedetto 2005; Costello and 
Thomson 2010, 2011; Häge and Kaeding 2007; Hoyland 2006; Mamadouh and Raunio 
2003; Shackleton 2000). On the contrary, in the Council’s case, scholars focus on the 
cleavages and coalitions across legislatures and policy areas, investigating the member 
states’ voting behaviour (Arregui and Thomson 2009; Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider 
2010; Bailer 2006, 2010; Stokman and Thomson 2004; Zimmer, Schneider, and 
Dobbins 2005). Finally, despite the pivotal role of the rotating Presidency, its influence 
on the legislative process is matter of scholarly debate (Tallberg 2003, 2004, 2006; 
Thomson 2008; Warntjen 2007, 2007). 
The last important group includes theoretical models and empirical analysis on 
bicameral conflict resolutions in the EU. Analyses focus on two main instruments: early 
agreements and the Conciliation Committee. The former is not properly a conflict 
resolution method per se but such agreement are reached using informal meetings 
between key negotiators of the Council, the Parliament and the Commission at the early 
stage of the codecision procedure (Farrell and Héritier 2004; Rasmussen 2011; de 
Ruiter and Neuhold 2012; Toshkov and Rasmussen 2012). 
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The Conciliation Committee, on the other hand, is a conference committee, which is 
convened after that the Council failed to adopt the Parliament’s second reading 
amendments. Since Conciliation Committee is not frequently employed in European 
legislature to solve outstanding disagreements over a bill, it has so far received little 
attention. The first contribution, that of Garman and Hilditch (1998), examines the 
informal processes at work during negotiation on four dossiers and demonstrates the 
importance of exploratory meetings in the conciliation process, far in advance of the 
formal conciliation meetings have been established. By contrast, Rasmussen (2005, 
2008) uses the literature on the principal-agent model and considers the chain of formal 
and informal delegation at conciliation stage. Two stages of delegation, indeed, operate. 
The first entails the two chambers with the respective delegation groups, the second one 
entails the conciliation delegations with the key negotiators. Expert interviews 
demonstrate that delegates do not act irresponsively, because they are subject to strict 
control and sanctioning mechanisms as well as they are “driven by a desire to do what is 
appropriate for their legislative body” (Rasmussen 2005, 1029). In the later work with 
roll-call votes, she finds out that, despite a systematic overrepresentation of MEPs 
coming from the standing committees and from big party groups, delegates generally 
are representative of their parent bodies. More interesting for my purposes are the 
analyses of Napel and Widgrén (2003, 2006) and König et al. (2007), since they are 
concerned on the distribution of preference and bargaining power between the two 
institutions. Napel and Widgrén develop a theoretical model on how conciliation works, 
assuming that the Council and the Parliament have complete information, although 
different voting threshold – qualified majority for the former and simple majority for the 
latter. This institutional set-up produces indirect procedural advantage in favour of the 
Council, because its pivotal member is likely to have a higher disagreement value that 
the respective member in the Parliament. As a result, in conciliation there is asymmetry 
of power and different bargaining positions. However, the most systematic empirical 
research on this issue is of König et al. (2007). In the 1999-2002 period, the 
negotiations are biased in favour of the Parliament. Moreover, the Strasbourg assembly 
is more likely to win over the Council when it is more proximate to the status quo and it 
is cohesive. A surprising finding is the role played by the Commission. Having the 
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Commission on the plenary’s side is likely to increase its bargaining power, because 
“the Commission seems to have informational advantages and is an active mediator 
between the two institutional actors” (König et al. 2007: 302). 
Reviewing the literature on European bicameralism, two argumenta are self-evident. 
First, the analyses conducted so far do not assume that both houses affect legislative 
outcomes. Scholars, indeed, rarely focus on interinstitutional bargaining and how the 
Council and the Parliament may negotiate throughout the codecision procedure. Second, 
some of these contributions on the Conciliation Committee are limited to either the 
study of one separate delegation, neglecting the other and their relations, or time-
specific. Others are non-analytical and fact-listing stories. Some are not comprehensive 
or systematic.  
Even though Conciliation Committee is technically speaking a conference committee, 
the haggling dynamics may be read through the lenses of the bargaining theory. The 
bicameral politics of the Conciliation Committee is the ultimate manifestation of the 
legislative politics of the European Union. Conciliation is about bargaining between the 
Council and the European Parliament in order to reach an agreement over “an 
authoritative allocation of resources” (Doron and Sened 2001, 7). Like other bargaining 
settings, conciliation bargaining shares core common elements: at least two players, 
which differ in interests and preferences. Locked in an interdependent relationship, they 
negotiate under a set of constraints, using their ability or specific skills to reach an 
agreement. 
Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the institutional set up of the 
Conciliation Committee. It includes the codecision procedure that the Council and the 
Parliament have to follow before conciliation is convened, analysing the development 
and constitutional reforms of such legislative procedure occurred across the two decades 
since it was established. In addition, I highlight the main negotiators and the role of both 
the delegations and informal meetings. 
10 
 
Chapter 3 develops the main theoretical arguments of bicameral bargaining and the 
Conciliation Committee. The theory combines the institutional approach to the study of 
European integration with the application of game theoretic models to study bargaining 
mechanisms. I proceed gradually in describing the circumstances under which the 
Parliament may be more successful in conciliation than the Council. The two 
delegations may attach different values to the status quo, within a constraint of 
institutional settings. Legal rules and implementing enforcement mechanisms are likely 
to contribute to conciliation bargaining as well as time deadline the negotiators have to 
deal with. Bargaining outcomes are affected by the number and the type of actors 
involved. In conciliation, the Parliament and the Council may have at their disposal 
skills or instruments to strengthen their bargaining power vis-à-vis the other chamber: 
they may issue veto threats and be subject of belief manipulation. A third actor, without 
legislative power though, may exert influence and facilitate the compromise towards its 
own stances: the Commission. The Commission may be involved in the implementation 
process. Finally, the electorate may affect the deputies’ room of manoeuvre. From these 
theoretical argumentations I derive hypotheses that will be tested in the empirical 
Chapters. 
Chapters 4 through 7 provide the main empirical analyses in the research.  
I begin with Chapter 4 with methodological excursus on how I estimate bargaining 
success and institutions’ position in each conciliation dossier using three documents (the 
second reading of the Parliament, the Council common position and the joint text). I 
explain in detail how the original documents have been treated to produce the data on 
which a procedure to estimate the similarity of documents, called Wordfish, is run. A 
significant section of the Chapter is devoted to test the validity of these estimates, by 
comparing them with those produced using five documents (adding the Commission 
proposal and the first reading of the Parliament), hand-coding and expert interviews. 
Chapter 5 provides the quantitative empirical test of my arguments and marks a 
significant departure from previous studies on Conciliation. I test the impact of several 
factors on the bargaining success the Parliament has on legislative dossiers producing a 
joint text from the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht to February 2012.  
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Chapter 6 gives a qualitative insight on some conciliation cases. Since I interviewed 
prominent negotiators of the Parliament as well as of the Council, I take into account as 
many factors as possible, especially related to party membership, experience of the 
Presidency and the role of the Commission. Besides, additional explanatory factors are 
more contingent and specific of certain dossiers, such as negotiator’s personality and the 
attention to the electoral constituency by deputies. 
Chapter 7 focuses on the interesting dynamics of belief manipulation. After developing 
a formal model of conciliation under incomplete information, I select the case of the 
Telecom Package as analytic narrative to explain how Parliament may extract more 
concessions from the member states if it manipulates the Council’s believe on its own 
type.  
In the conclusion, I draw the concluding remarks and review the main findings of the 







2. Towards conciliation 
This Chapter presents the last procedural steps towards conciliation in the codecision, 
now the ordinary legislative procedure. The first section illustrates the legislative 
process and its major changes occurred over the last decades. In particular, it focuses on 
the modification of the conciliation stage under the second version of the codecision and 
on the gradual extension of the qualified majority voting to issue previously subject to 
unanimous agreement in the Council. Moreover, the codecision procedure has expanded 
its scope of application to policy areas previously demanded to cooperation or 
consultation, thus increasing the number of acts concluded under such legislative 
process. The second section sheds light on the conciliation stage, the actors involved 
and the restricted informal meetings.  
2.1. The codecision procedure 
The codecision procedure was introduced with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993 (under  
article 189b) and later amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 (art. 251). With the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009, it was renamed the ordinary 
legislative procedure.  
According to Article 294 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, after 
the submission of a proposal by the Commission, the Parliament issues the first 
reading’s opinion. The Council may either adopt the measure in the wording approved 
by the Parliament or adopt its own common position (or Council’s first reading) if it 
disagrees with its fellow chamber. Within three months, the Parliament can reject or 
amend the Council’s text by absolute majority. If the Parliament fails to act or approve 
the document by simple majority, the proposal is deemed to have been adopted in the 
wording of the Council first reading. After further three months, if the Council does not 
14 
 
approve the parliamentary amendments1, the Presidents of the Council and of the 
Parliament convene a meeting of the Conciliation Committee to resolve the remaining 
differences between the two institutions. In other words, conciliation is necessary when 
either a qualified majority of or, for amendments rejected by the Commission, the whole 
Council has failed to approve the amendments inserted by the Parliament after reading 
its common position. 
The objective of conciliation is to produce, within six weeks, a joint text supported by a 
qualified majority of Council delegates and an absolute majority of parliamentary 
delegates. The Commission takes part to the conciliation negotiations without a right to 
vote. If agreement is found on a joint text, this document is subject to the third reading 
in both chambers. It is voted upon within six weeks, under closed rule and by qualified 
and simple majority in the Council and Parliament respectively. Unless government 
changes have incurred in the meanwhile, the Council vote is perfunctory because the 
composition of this institution and of its conciliation delegation coincides. For the 
Parliament instead, the combination of closed rule with simple majority provides the 
conciliation delegation with a significant agenda setting power vis-à-vis the plenary. A 
conciliation report automatically fails if it is rejected in one legislative body and there is 
no option to call a new conference or to amend the text further in order to overcome 
differences between the two bodies. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates in detail the whole codecision procedure with the voting rule 
employed by the institutional actors at different stages. 
                                                             
1The Commission delivers its opinion on parliamentary amendments, both at first and second readings. 
Council approves by qualified majority those amendments that are supported by the Commission, 





Figure 2.1: The codecision procedure (art. 294 TFEU) 
 
Note: SM = simple majority; AM = absolute majority; QMV = qualified majority 
voting; EP= European Parliament      
First reading (no time limit) 
Second reading (3 months both for the Parliament and Council) 
Commission  
submits the proposal 
Parliament 
amends (SM) or  
adopts the proposal unmodified (SM) 
Council 
approves the EP position (QMV) or 
amends the position and adopts  its first reading (QMV) 
Commission 
informs the Parliament of its position  
Parliament 
rejects the Council's position (AM) and the legislation fails, or 
accepts the Council's position unmodified and the legislation is adopted, or  
fails to act (AM) and the legislation is adopted, or 
amends the Council's position (AM) 
Commission 
delivers its opinion on the EP amendments 
Council 
approves EP amendments accepted by the Commission and adopts legislation (QMV), 
approves EP amendments rejected by the Commission and adopts legislation (U), 
if it does not approve all the EP amendments a conciliation committee is convened. 
Conciliation (6 + 2 weeks) 
Parliament 
adopts joint text (SM) and the 
legislation  is adopted, or 
fails  to act  and the legislation fails 
Council 
adopts joint text (QMV) and the 
legislation  is adopted, or 
fails  to act  and the legislation fails 
EP delegation (SM) and Council delegation (QMV) adopt Joint Text, otherwise 
legislation fails 





The procedure has changed over time. Under the Treaty of Maastricht, the Council 
could not conclude the procedure and adopt a final act after the first parliamentary 
reading, nor could the Parliament do so at its second reading. The definitive adoption 
was a Council prerogative. The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced the possibility for the 
European Parliament and the Council to conclude legislation as early as the first 
reading. The Council, indeed, agrees on first reading amendments of the Parliament, 
without continuing decision-making with a common position. The sheer volume of fast-
track legislation (in the sixth parliamentary term 72 per cent of acts were concluded at 
this stage, as you can see below) increases the demand of comprehensive theoretical 
explanations and empirical investigations. Researches have explained why early 
agreements occur (Rasmussen 2011; Reh et al. 2011) and the influence they have on 
intra-organizational relations in the Parliament and Council (Farrell and Héritier 2004). 
Fast-tracked legislations, though, are the results of informal negotiations among a 
restricted set of institutional actors (the trialogues), who often operate on a non-
transparent mandate from the parent bodies (Farrell and Héritier 2004; Kardasheva 
forthcoming; Shackleton and Raunio 2003).  
More important for my purposes, prior to the Treaty of Amsterdam if negotiations 
within the Conciliation Committee failed, the Council could make a final take-it-or-
leave-it offer to the Parliament, which had to muster an absolute majority to halt 
irrefutably the proposed measure. In other words, in the circumstances where the 
Conciliation Committee did not agree a joint text, the Council could have reinstated its 
common position, without taking into account the parliamentary amendments at second 
reading. This last procedural step strengthened, at least in principle, the negotiating 
hand of the Council (Garrett and Tsebelis 1996; Garrett 1995), but this prerogative has 
been used only once. After the two delegations disagreed over comitology in 
conciliation meetings on the draft directive on Voice Telephony (COD/1994/437), the 
Council re-proposed its common position. The Parliament replied firmly and it 
succeeded in finding the absolute majority (377 members voted in favour of the 
rejection) needed to reject the proposal. In addition, the Parliament introduced a new 
rule of procedure (rule 78), whereby it would ask the Commission to withdraw its 





failed to act and the Council decided to repropose its common position, the Parliament 
would automatically propose a motion to repeal such position. Even though this was 
just an internal rule of procedure, according to Hix (2002) it had effect. When the 
Conciliation Committee failed to find agreement on a bill on Transferable Securities in 
1998 (COD/1995/188), the Council decided not to reconfirm its common position. 
The insertion of rule 78 and the credible threat of the parliamentary rejection paved the 
way to further amendments of Treaty provisions. In the Treaty of Amsterdam, the 
member states adopted a more proper bicameral set-up of the codecision procedure. The 
second version of such procedure, indeed, establishes shared legislative power between 
the Parliament and the Council. 
 
A second, less noted, procedural change was the modification of the voting rule in the 
Council. Depending on the Treaty provisions a policy issue is subject to, the Council 
has to decide unanimously or by qualified majority voting. Next treaties have, however, 
modified the legal bases of policy issues. The Treaty of Maastricht, for instance, 
specified that measures in the fields of culture (art. 128) as well as the multiannual 
framework programme in research and technological development (art. 130i) were to be 
adopted following the codecision procedure, but the Council will have to act 
unanimously. The Council’s bargaining hand was presumably stronger in these cases as 
it could credibly threaten rejection if just a single minister was not happy with the 
proposal at hand. Qualified majority voting was extended to the framework programme 
by the Treaty of Amsterdam and to cultural policy (article 167) by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Even the Treaty of Nice extended the application of the qualified majority voting to new 
issues, such as the measures to facilitate the exercise of the right of free movement and 
residence for European citizens (article 18 of the Treaty of Nice, now in article 21b of 
the TFEU). 
2.1.1. Issues and acts 
From only fifteen in 1993, the number of policy areas that are regulated through the 
codecision procedure has now increased to eighty. In the Maastricht Treaty, the 
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procedure covered areas, such as internal market, public health, consumer protection, 
educational and cultural measures, free movement of workers, framework programme 
for research and guidelines for trans-European networks. The Amsterdam Treaty 
substantially extended the list up to 32 areas, which were previously subject to the 
cooperation procedure. It included a wealth of new areas, namely on transport, the fight 
against fraud, development cooperation, environment policy, customs cooperation, some 
social policy and employment measures (Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton 2007). 
Moreover, the Treaty of Nice in 2003 and the most recent Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 
prescribed that the codecision procedure applies to more than 80 areas under the first 
pillar. The Treaty of Lisbon for instance extended its coverage to several subfields, the 
most important of which relate to trade policy, transport, structural funds, budget and 
agricultural policies. In the area of agriculture, for instance, the reform of the common 
agricultural policy is now subject to the co-legislation of the Parliament and the 
Council.  
Accordingly, the number of bills increased dramatically. From 245 acts adopted in the 
1994-1999 term to 522 in the 1999-2004 term. Table 2.1 illustrates the number of 
dossiers subject to codecision procedure, according to the stage of conclusion. The trend 
towards first reading agreements is clearly visible. After the Treaty of Amsterdam, that 
made early agreements possible, there was a significant increase of first reading 
adoptions. In the fifth legislative term early agreements were employed almost once 
every three adopted acts. In the sixth and seventh legislative term, there is a clear 
increase in the number of files concluded at first reading. More than two third of 
dossiers were early agreements. On the other hand, there has been a significant 









Table 2.1: Codecision dossiers 




 reading Conciliation Total 
1993-1999 11 138 63 245 
1999-2004 159 234 86 492 
2004-2009 358 136 23 522 
2009- 181 34 7 222 
Total 709 542 179 1481 
Source: OEIL database, accessed on 28 March 2013. 
Note: Only completed dossiers are reported. 
The drop in the employment of conciliation dossiers and, conversely, the rise in the 
early agreements could indicate better working of the mechanisms of inter-institutional 
cooperation throughout the entire legislative process. Formal constitutional changes in 
codecision – both the possibility of early conclusions and the bicameral set-up in 
conciliation – lead improvements in the relations between the Council and the 
Parliament from the initial stages of the legislative process. As a result, an even 
reducing and occasionally being used space of bicameral bargaining appears to 
becoming the other side of the coin. Despite the fact that early agreements occupy the 
large share of concluded acts, conciliation still matters, since it is now a proper 
mechanism to settle disputes. 
2.2. The Conciliation Committee 
The Conciliation Committee is composed of members of the Council and Parliament in 
equal number and co-chaired by the President of the Council (the minister, the deputy 
minister or the permanent representative of the member state holding the Presidency) 
and by one of the three parliamentary vice-Presidents. As a result, after the last 
enlargement there are twenty-seven representatives of the member states and twenty-
seven members of the Parliament. Since the size of the two delegations equals the 
number of member states, the Council delegation is essentially the Council, where the 
chief negotiations are normally the deputy permanent representatives chaired by the 
minister holding the Presidency (Rasmussen 2005, 2008, 2012; Tsebelis and Money 
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1997). The parliamentary delegation must include the chair and the rapporteur of the 
committee responsible for the case at hand as well as three vice-Presidents, representing 
at least two different political groups, appointed as permanent members in successive 
delegations for a period of 12 months. This composition represents a compromise 
between two existing models of conference committee's delegates: the US conference 
committee and the German Vermittlungausschuss. The three permanent members who 
handle each and every item coming to the committee, are similar to the German 
committee’s members, since they are experts in the procedure and follow other 
conciliation dossiers during the term. The other members guarantee broad participation 
and continuity with prior stages of codecision, as the US delegates. The non-permanent 
members, indeed, are predominantly drawn from the standing committee responsible for 
the matter. In addition, in the case the matter falls equally within two or more 
committees, the Parliament’s delegation shall include the rapporteurs of any associated 
committee (rule 50). The Parliament's rules of procedure (rule 68) prescribe the 
composition of its delegation to reflect the whole assembly by political groups2, 
following the D’Hondt allocation method. Once the conference of Presidents determines 
the number of members per group, such deputies (and their substitutes) are then 
appointed by the party groups themselves (Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton 2007; 
European Parliament 2012). In the quota of each party group those members whose 
presence is required ex-officio take part (e.g. during the Conciliation Committee for the 
regulation on Financing instrument for development cooperation – COD/2009/0060A – 
the People’s Party provided both the rapporteur and the permanent vice-President, so it 
has only nine more places to fill). 
Lastly, the Commission, which plays a mediating role and frequently proposes 
compromises, is represented in the trialogues by either the Commissioner or the 
                                                             
2 At the beginning of each parliamentary term the conference of Presidents determines the political 
composition of the delegation in line with the relative strength of the political groups. After 2009 
European elections the parliamentary composition is as follows: eleven members from the People's Party, 
seven Socialists, three Liberals, two from the Green group and from the Conservatives, one each from the 
GUE and the EFD. The three permanent members are included in the quota of members laid down for 





Director-General of the department in charge of the dossier, assisted by experts, its legal 
service and Secretariat-General.  
2.2.1. Institutional functioning 
A lot of negotiators are in the conciliation rooms. Aside the official fifty-four members, 
substitute members, advisors and assistants as well as the Commission’s entourage 
provide support to the two delegations. Formal negotiations at conciliation become then 
fairly impractical, as over a hundred people are in the negotiating rooms when the full 
Conciliation Committee meets. As early as 1995 a trend emerged of preliminary 
informal contacts being taken between the relay actors of the Parliament and the 
Council, with the Commissioner responsible, normally no more than 10 people for each 
side (European Parliament 2012). Especially for highly controversial dossiers, 
negotiations are conducted during informal trialogues involving small teams of 
negotiators and they “shall take place throughout the conciliation procedure with the 
aim of resolving outstanding issues and preparing the ground for an agreement to be 
reached in the Conciliation Committee”3. The compromise resulting from the informal 
trialogues is then reported back to each delegation where they need to approve with the 
qualified majority in the Council and simple majority in the Parliament.  
The practice of informal restricted meetings between the three institutions became an 
essential part of the conciliation negotiations and of the legislative process as a whole, 
since the Spanish Presidency in 1995. After the first parliamentary rejection of the 
conciliation agreement for the Biotech directive (COD/1988/159), preparatory 
negotiations for the Conciliation Committee have been organized informally. 
Representatives of the Parliament, the Council and the Commission have started talking 
to each other routinely, strengthening contacts between the institutions. The 1999 and 
2006 formulations of revisited Joint Declarations on practical arrangements for the 
codecision procedure have played useful role in facilitating bargaining, by making 
official the employment of trialogues throughout the whole codecision procedure, rather 
                                                             
3 OJ C145, 30.6.2007, p.5 
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than only in the conciliation phase4. Especially the last Joint Declaration introduced 
detailed provisions concerning first and second reading agreements.    
These informal negotiations are carried only by a subset of key members from the 
Council and the Parliament, according to their competence and leadership position, and 
by the Commissioner or high ranking officials of the relevant Directorate-General. The 
key representatives from the Council are the responsible working group chairman and 
deputy permanent representative (Chair of the COREPER I or II respectively) or the 
Minister of the member state holding the Presidency. The parliamentary negotiating 
team is represented by the responsible vice-President, who co-chairs the Conciliation 
Committee, the rapporteur and the chairman of the responsible parliamentary 
committee. Most of the bargaining occurs between the key representatives of the two 
chambers, but they need to report back to their own delegations once they deem to have 
a solution on a conflicting issue. The negotiating teams shuttle from the restricted 
meeting room to the delegation rooms in order to update their parent delegations on the 
bargained position. This navette system lasts until agreement is reached or the deadline 
is occurred, which is six (or eight) weeks after the Council’s common position. 
However, usually the Conciliation Committee is convened after several preparing 
meetings of the trialogues, because there is a reasonable expectation the agreement 
would be reached. For this reason, the Conciliation Committee meets on the last useful 
day before the time limits.  
Negotiations in trilogues and in the Conciliation Committee follow the principle of 
germaneness in practice. The scope of the joint text, indeed, may not alter the scope of 
the Commission proposal (Rasmussen 2011). According to the opinion of the Advocate 
General before a recent Court ruling, “the joint text should have the same subject-matter 
as the original Commission proposal”5. To the negotiating teams at trialogues a four-
column working document is given. The document sets out the positions of the 
Parliament, its second reading, and the Council, its common position, along with the 
updated positions of the two delegations. Negotiations tend to be germane, with the two 
                                                             
4 In the present research, though, the term “trialogue” refers only to those preparatory and bargaining 
meetings at the conciliation stage. 





delegations bargaining over these positions. Figure 2.2 is a snapshot of one of the 
amendments under discussion during the conciliation meetings for the directive on the 
3rd Maritime Package (COD/2005/0240). Negotiators received the document, with the 
Council’s common position and the Parliament’s second reading, and they fulfilled it 
according to the updates emerging in the bargaining within their own delegations: the 
COREPER and the parliamentary delegation. 
Figure 2.2: Example of the 4-column working document 
 
The codecision procedure as well as the conciliation stage is not only an important step 
toward bicameral legislative making of the European Union, but it also brings elements 
of novelties in the relations between the institutions. Therefore, it has taken some years 
for the institutional actors to get more familiar with the new procedure, and the 1999 
and 2006 formulations of revisited Joint Declaration have played useful role in 
facilitating the workings of the procedure. 
Building on the description of how to get to conciliation in this Chapter, in the next one 
I discuss the theoretical accounts of the potential factors explaining bargaining success 
in the Conciliation Committee. From the theory I derive 14 hypotheses that will be 







3. Theories of bicameral bargaining 
and the Conciliation Committee 
The Conciliation Committee provides a means of reaching bicameral reconciliation, and 
while doing so it reflects aspects of the European decision-making. In this Chapter, I 
investigate several bargaining explanatory factors under which conditions I expect 
actors to be more or less accommodating when they sit at the negotiating table of the 
Conciliation Committee. The actors might tackle the distributive question: who gains 
what in the Conciliation Committee? And why? This Chapter reviews the literature on 
bicameral bargaining and the Conciliation Committee, illustrating the factors that may 
favour or hinder the successfulness of one chamber vis-à-vis the other.  
I begin with a discussion on the disagreement value, exploring its driving mechanism in 
game theoretical analysis – both cooperative and non-cooperative settings – as well as 
spatial models, with special emphasis on European decision-making. Such analyses 
assume that EU bicameralism gives symmetric legislative power to the two legislative 
chambers. Recent researches on the Conciliation Committee, though, highlight the 
structural advantageous position of the Council vis-à-vis the Parliament, because of its 
composition rule, supermajority voting rule and open rule. Then, this discussion 
investigates two institutional factors that may increase the chance of parliamentary 
winning: the reforms to the codecision procedure enacted by the Treaty of Amsterdam 
and the qualified majority voting in the Council. The third section explores how 
deputies may rely on information asymmetry when bargaining with the Council. 
Parliament’s key negotiators can issue veto threats and convey wrong signals about 
their reputation. Under time pressure representative relay actors (and their source of 
power) as well as cohesive chambers may influence the bargaining outcomes. Finally, 
the last section includes the role of the Commission. Based on literature on 
implementation, I consider how the Commission may shape the joint text and how 
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parliamentarians and national administrators are involved in policy execution across a 
variety of measures. The argumentation of each explanatory factor concludes with the 
derivation of a hypothesis and the discussion of the empirical evidence in the literature. 
I subject these hypotheses to empirical testing in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
3.1. Disagreement value 
Bargaining theory is based on the assumption that each player receives a default utility 
or disagreement value. As occurred in interstate bargaining (Moravcsik 1998), the 
location of the status quo is likely to affect the final outcome in negotiations. 
Understanding bargaining through disagreement value or the Best Alternative To a 
Negotiated Agreement – BATNA – is rooted in several models of the rational choice 
approach (McCarty and Meirowitz 2007, 275–286). This section deals with the 
disagreement value and how it affects solutions in cooperative, non-cooperative games 
and spatial models in legislative politics.  
3.1.1. Cooperative and non-cooperative games 
The disagreement value drives the Nash equilibrium bargaining solution in cooperative 
games6. The Nash bargaining solution requires axiomatic conditions negotiations have 
to meet. The bargainers maximize expected utility (Invariance to Equivalent Utility 
Representation); their allocation of the available resource is efficient so that no player 
does worse than her disagreement value (Pareto Efficiency); the allocation depends on 
the player’s preferences and disagreement values (Symmetry); the bargaining solution 
should be unchanged, even if eliminating from consideration other possible bargains or 
                                                             
6 Bargaining cooperative games consider 𝑢𝐴 and 𝑢𝐵  as the utility of two players (A and B), who 
negotiate over the allocation of X units of some resource. The utility is based on the allocation, 
𝑥𝐴 and 𝑥𝐵. If no agreement is reached, player A and B receive a default utility or disagreement 
value, 𝑐𝐴 and 𝑐𝐵 respectively. The gains in utility from agreeing on x are 𝑢𝐴(𝑥𝐴) − 𝑢𝐴(𝑐𝐴) 
for player A, and 𝑢𝐵(𝑥𝐵) − 𝑢𝐵(𝑐𝐵) for player B. To ensure the bargaining problem is far 





allocation (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives). The Nash equilibrium is the only 
possible solution whose utility allocation maximizes both 𝑢𝐴 and 𝑢𝐵, that is to say: 
[𝑢𝐴(𝑥𝐴) − 𝑢𝐴(𝑐𝐴)][𝑢𝐵(𝑥𝐵) − 𝑢𝐵(𝑐𝐵)] 
Even in non-cooperative games, the Nash solution is driven by the BATNA (Dixit and 
Skeath 1999, 523–9), dealing explicitly with different bargaining structures. The non-
cooperative approach allows exploring bargaining behaviour (why do the sides reach 
the bargain they do?) as well as the final bargain reached. One of the simplest non-
cooperative models of bargaining, the Rubinstein model (1982), assumes two players 
offer proposal sequentially and one after the other. The value to carry on bargaining 
increases in one’s disagreement value and decreases in the opponent’s disagreement 
value (McCarty and Meirowitz 2007, 285–6). Roughly following Rubinstein’s model, 
Napel and Widgrén (2006) set up a bargaining model of the Conciliation Committee 
with alternating offers, considered more realistic than an ultimatum game with a take-it-
or-leave-it offer (as proposed by Steunenberg and Dimitrova 1999; and Crombez 2000). 
In order to identify the Conciliation agreement and the codecision outcome, the two 
scholars employ the symmetric Nash bargaining solutions, since they considers the 
European Parliament and the Council as equally impatient and skilled bargainers. More 
specifically, Napel and Widgrén (2006) model the negotiations within the Conciliation 
Committee and predict the Council to be significantly more influential than the 
Parliament. The source of this power resides on the fact that, under symmetric 
preference distributions, the Council pivotal member under qualified majority voting is 
likely to attach a higher value to the status quo (i.e. be more conservative) than the 
median voter in the Parliament. 
But, significant for my purpose, the Nash bargaining solution has a number of important 
limitations. First, by treating negotiators equally, the Nash equilibrium ignores the 
structure of many bargaining environments, which are biased in favour of one side. 
Second, the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition is a strong requirement 
for collective rationality, as it excludes non-chosen alternatives, which may conversely 
affect the bargaining solutions. Third, the Nash bargaining solutions exclude bargaining 
disagreements. Often actual bargaining breaks down even when agreement is possible, 
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because one party decides that continuing negotiations is fruitless (Morrow 1994, 112–
116). All these limits are taken into account in the following sections.  
3.1.2. Spatial models of European legislative politics  
The utility that actors attach to the status quo drives the solutions of spatial models of 
codecision bargaining as well. Legislative spatial models have been extensively used 
since the late 1970s to the study of US institutions and then introduced to the study of 
the European legislative process in the early 1990s. The models formulate conclusions 
and predictions on equilibrium European policies, depending on the preferences of the 
Commission, the Parliament and the Council, and obviously on the location of the status 
quo. The legislative power of the Parliament and the complex nature of a varieties of 
legislative procedures have been focused by several scholars (Crombez 1996, 1997, 
2000, 2001; Garrett and Tsebelis 1996; Steunenberg 1994, 1997; Tsebelis and Garrett 
1997, 2000; Tsebelis and Yataganas 2002; Tsebelis et al. 2001; Tsebelis 1994). By 
comparing different legislative procedures of the European Union (namely, 
consultation, cooperation and codecision), these analyses provide an insightful debate 
on the conditional agenda setting and veto power of the Parliament, and on the power 
balance between the member states and the Parliament. Theoretical models reduce these 
complex processes to simple propositions and assumptions. There is a single dimension 
of legislative bargaining (e.g. pro-anti EU integration). The actors are the Parliament, 
the Commission and seven members of the Council (the qualified majority establishes 
five out seven members). They have ideal policy preferences on this dimension (the 
Commission and the Parliament are more pro-integrationist than most member states) 
and they prefer to minimize the distance between their positions and the adopted 
legislation7. The location of the status quo under the different procedure drives the 
legislative bargaining outcomes, since actors compare the utility derived from the 
outcomes with the utility they attach to the status quo. Having these caveats in mind, I 
formulate the following hypothesis: 
                                                             
7
 Actors’ utility is decreasing in Euclidean distance from that ideal point. The closer the outcome is to the 





Hypothesis 1: Conciliation outcomes are more likely to be biased against the 
Parliament when the Council is closer to the status quo than the Parliament. 
Literature on disagreement value is vast and several studies focus on it, by interviewing 
experts and negotiating actors. Despite the plethora of empirically sophisticated models 
(Mesquita and Stokman 1994; Schneider, Finke, and Bailer 2010; Thomson 2011; 
Thomson et al. 2006), corroborating evidence from European studies is hard to come 
by. Extending and replicating the work of Thomson et al. (2006), Thomson (2011) finds 
that a model based on Nash bargaining solution, which assumes that the disagreement 
outcome is equally and highly undesirable for all bargaining actors, generates more 
accurate predictions than a similar model with a reference point (or status quo). In other 
words, including an estimate of the utility associated with failure worsens the predictive 
power of a model of EU decision-making.  
Closer to my interest, empirical results appear contradictory. On the one hand, Costello 
and Thomson (2011) confirm that being closer to the status quo does not enhance the 
chances of success of the Parliament in codecision. On the other hand, König et al. 
(2007) find that proximity to the status quo allow a chamber to exert greater influence in 
conciliation negotiations. I have reasons to doubt this latter result though. According to 
the scholars, the variable on the location of the status quo may take three values,: the 
value of 1 if the Parliament is located closer to the status quo, -1 if the Council is closer 
to the status quo, and zero if no information was available. Missing data have therefore 
been treated as highly informative, since zero means also that the two institutions are 
symmetrically far away from the status quo. The impossibility to locate the status quo – 
almost 60 per cent of observations in this study – has been considered as univocally 
indicating that Council and Parliament attach the same value to the disagreement 
outcome. I am not sure whether this is the best method to treat missing information, 
especially given the availability of maximum likelihood or multiple imputation 
approaches (Allison 2001). 
How can we explain these results? For Achen (2006, 102) the (negative) utility 
associated with the reference point is far more costly than just the disagreement costs. 
There are analytical and observational reasons as well. Since legislative bargaining has 
significant opportunity costs, a resource-constrained and risk-averse proposer, such as 
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the Commission, has an incentive to initiate only bills on which she is reasonably 
certain that the majority of legislators values more than the status quo. In an information 
rich environment, this estimation should not be too difficult. I, therefore, tend to observe 
mostly proposals where the cost of disagreement is high across the board and, therefore, 
it cannot explain outcomes. 
In my study, Chapters 5, 6 and 7 focus on the impact of disagreement value on the final 
outcome, but distinctions are necessary. As far as Chapter 5 is regarded, I test the 
hypotheses through a proxy of disagreement value legislators have under certain 
dossiers. Withdrawals and rejections of dossiers indicate that misjudgement occurs, but 
failed proposals are excluded from this analysis, because there is no document to 
estimate. In Chapter 6, interviews allow me identifying the location of the status quo 
and the closest actor to it. Finally, in Chapter 7, I estimate the disagreement value from 
an extensive examination of official documents, newspaper articles, press reviews and 
vote declarations. 
3.2. Institutions 
3.2.1. Composition, amendment and voting rules 
Solutions are driven by the disagreement value both in cooperative, non-cooperative 
games and even in spatial analysis. Spatial bargaining models describe the balance of 
power between the institutions – the Commission, the Parliament and the member states 
– and give extensive explanations of the evolution of the legislative policy in the 
European Union, under the consultation, the cooperation and the codecision procedures. 
Notwithstanding the plethora of spatial models on European legislative process, very 
few of them have focused on the agenda setting and veto powers shared by the Council 
and the Parliament within the Conciliation Committee. The success of a chamber, 
indeed, is determined by an arbitrary assumption about the first mover or a random 
recognition rule (Crombez 1997; 2001; Steunenberg 1994; 1997; Tsebelis and Garrett 
2000). In addition, other scholars assume that the Council and the Parliament share 





2006). But how symmetric is the Conciliation Committee? As Chapter 2 illustrates, 
there is no symmetry within the Conciliation Committee. On the Council’s side, the 
delegation fully represents every single member state, since each one has its own 
(deputy) representative and can submit amendments. The agreed text is then subject to a 
perfunctory confirmation vote by the same actors involved in the committee 
negotiation. As Rasmussen (2008, 88) reminds, the Council delegation is the Council. 
On the Parliament’s side, there is a proper appointed subgroup of a collective actor, 
where delegates can propose, individually, amendments during the negotiation and, 
collectively, a joint text to their whole chamber. The assembly is then called to vote the 
text under closed rule. Figure 3.1 synthetizes the structural differences between the 
Council’s and the Parliament’s delegations and their relations with the parent chambers. 
First, the Parliament has as many delegates as the member states in the Council, but 
their composition is different. In the Council’s delegation each member state has its 
representative, which tries to negotiate a joint text closest to its own ideal policy. The 
Parliament, on the other hand, appoints the delegated MEPs following its rules of 
procedure. Second, the different compositions influence the amendment rule of the 
delegations. Both delegations decide the compromise text under open rule and then 
under closed rule at third reading. However, given that the Council is fully represented, 
its final vote follows perfunctorily what has been decided in the Conciliation 
Committee. On the contrary, the parliamentary assembly cannot modify the joint text , 
but it can either accept or reject it. The third difference concerns the voting rule. The 
Council acts by qualified majority (or supermajority voting), while the Parliament acts 






This set up makes the negotiations within each institution (the Council and the 
Parliament) asymmetric, because intracameral negotiations affect the intercameral 
negotiations. Negotiation inside the Parliament, that is, between the parliamentary 
delegation and the whole assembly, is a case of majority-rule bargaining under closed 
rule. Negotiation inside the Council is a case of (super)majority-rule bargaining under 
open rule. These differences are best analysed employing Baron and Ferejohn’s (1989) 
extension of the Rubinstein model. This extended model indicates that members of the 
parliamentary delegation should enjoy significantly more proposal power vis-à-vis their 
colleagues in whole assembly than members of the Council delegation vis-à-vis their 
754 MEPs (7th term) 27 MEPs 
Open rule 
27 Ministers 27 Ministers 
Closed rule sui generis 





Qualified Majority Qualified Majority 
Single Majority Single Majority 
Voting rule 





own colleagues. Council delegates are hampered by both open rule and supermajority.  
Open rule permits the Council to pass amendments on the bill at conciliation, thus 
reducing the agenda setting power of the delegates. The parliamentary delegation is less 
constrained than the representatives of each member state, because they have lower 
majority threshold and closed rule. 
This difference between the two delegations is common knowledge and structural; and 
its consequence can be interpreted through the counterintuitive lenses of the Schelling 
(1960) conjecture. In his seminal work, Schelling argues that constrained negotiators 
might try to exploit their constraint to bargain a more favourable compromise. This 
tactics, as Schelling called it, is an useful bargaining device, since “the power to 
constrain an adversary may depend on the power to bind oneself” (1960, 22). In other 
words, the constrained side results to be better off in bargaining since it can extract 
more concessions. Following the Schelling conjecture, I argue that, despite the 
Parliament enjoys more proposal power in intracameral negotiations (between the 
delegation and the plenary), it has less bargaining power while negotiating with the 
Council. Since members of the Council delegation are significantly more constrained, 
they are likely to demand a more accommodating stance from the more powerful 
parliamentary delegation. Counter intuitively, the power that these delegates enjoy in 
conciliation vis-à-vis their colleagues in the plenary is a source of structural weakness in 
the conciliation negotiations.  
3.2.2. Constitutional reforms 
Voting rule in the Council 
Beside the constitutional rules specified by the legislative procedure, two reforms affect 
the legislative outcome: the voting rule of the Council and the second version of 
codecision.  
The existing literature on the EU bicameralism and the Conciliation Committee agree 
on the fact that the voting rule inside the Council may affect the final legislative 
outcome (Napel and Widgrén 2003; Tsebelis 2002). The Council, indeed, decides either 
by qualified majority or unanimity voting, depending on the legal basis of the 
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Commission’s proposal. Over the twenty years of codecision, the number of issues 
subject to unanimity in the Council has markedly decreased in favour of qualified 
majority voting. As Tsebelis shows, in the bicameral setting of the codecision 
procedure, the size of the core8 depends on the voting rules each chamber applies, all 
else being equal. The core will increase if the Council votes under unanimity rather than 
under qualified majority voting. This has a major consequence. The final legislative 
“outcome shifts in favour of the less flexible chamber” (2002, 247), that is the Council. 
Graphical representation is useful for understanding the dynamics under different voting 
rules. In Figure 3.2 I illustrate the size of the core in the Conciliation Committee, 
following the spatial models discussed above
9
. I assume that the Parliament is unitary 
actor, while the Council is composed by seven members. They are located on a 
bidimensional space and have Euclidean preferences. In addition, they have single-
peaked utility functions. The cross-hatched area includes the Conciliation Committee 
core when the Council decides by qualified majority voting, whereas the hexagon C1-
C2-C3-C4-C5-EP is the core when the Council decides by unanimity. The figure, thus, 
spatially shows the larger core under unanimity than under qualified majority voting. 
The same hypothesis can also be derived from a model in which the Parliament is 
treated as collective actor, as Tsebelis and Yataganas (2002) do, but the illustration is 
much clearer with this assumption. 
                                                             
8
 The core is the set of points that cannot be defeated through the application of a decision-making rule. 
Therefore, there can be the unanimity core or the qualified majority core, according to the voting rule 
used. 





Figure 3.2: Core of the Conciliation Committee 
 
 
For instance, provisions concerning the mutual recognition of qualifications were 
subject to article 47 of the Treaty of the European Communities, which required 
unanimity in the Council (as in the case of the directive for the professional recognition 
– COD/1997/0345). Such legal basis has been changed by the Treaty of Lisbon and the 
newly inserted article 53 applies qualified majority voting. This change in the legal 
basis reduces the core of the Conciliation Committee in case of future legislation on the 
issue. 
Also Napel and Widgrén (2003) note that the distinct internal decision mechanisms 
provide an indirect procedural advantage to the Council, despite the apparent symmetry 
between the two co-legislators. Where the Treaty prescribes unanimity in the Council, 
each member’s proposal power within this institution is even more inhibited, further 
strengthening the Council vis-à-vis the parliamentary delegation (N. McCarty and 
Note: I assume the Council consists of seven members: C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6 and C7. 
Each member has an ideal policy and, in order to reach the qualified majority threshold, 5 
out of seven members need to agree. The Parliament, EP, is a unitary actor. 
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Meirowitz 2007: 294; Tsebelis 2002). Now it is the least accommodating Council 
member that will make demands on the parliamentary delegation. I can therefore derive 
the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: Conciliation outcomes are more likely to be biased in favour of the 
Parliament under qualified majority than unanimity voting in the Council. 
The impact of the voting rule on bargaining success has not been empirically 
investigated yet, in the literature on codecision. This hypothesis will be tested 
empirically in Chapter 5. 
Codecision I and II 
Lastly, the bargaining power enjoyed by the Parliament has changed over the decades 
and across the versions of legislative procedures. Scholars on spatial analysis of 
European legislative politics have variously interpreted the institutional revisions 
introduced by the Single European Act (1986), the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) and the 
Treaty of Amsterdam (1997)
10
. For my purpose, the main constitutional change in 
codecision was introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam with the second version 
(codecision II). The Treaty provides that, in case of negotiation failure in the 
Conciliation, the Council cannot reconfirm its position, as it was under the first version 
of codecision (codecision I). The reforms introduced in 1997 with the Amsterdam 
Treaty, indeed, changed the balance of power between the Council and the Parliament, 
by giving both chambers veto and agenda setting power in the last round of codecision. 
There is large consensus among scholars that, by changing the last round of the 
codecision, the Amsterdam Treaty provides the Council and the Parliament as equal co-
legislators (Crombez 2000; Crombez 2001; Steunenberg and Dimitrova 1999; Tsebelis 
                                                             
10 Crombez (1997), Moser (1996) and Scully (1997a; 1997b) argue that the Parliament has more power 
under the first version of the codecision than what the Tsebelis and Garrett (1996; 2000) model would 
predict. Garrett and Tsebelis (1996), indeed, point out that the Maastricht Treaty entrusted more veto 
power to the Parliament under codecision than under cooperation. The Parliament’s veto power, however, 
was gained at the expense of its ability to influence the Council’s agenda, when conciliation fails to reach 
an agreement. Consequently, the codecision procedure, as introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht, 





and Garrett 2000). Given the fact that the Council could reintroduce its position, without 
taking into consideration the Parliament’s position, codecision I is considered to have 
weakened the bargaining power of the Parliament vis-à-vis the Council in conciliation. 
On the contrary, under codecision II if either the parliamentary delegation fails to reach 
an agreement with the Council or the assembly rejects such agreement, the act shall be 
deemed not to have been adopted. From this consideration I introduce the following 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: Conciliation outcomes are more likely to be biased in favour of the 
Parliament under the codecision version of the Amsterdam Treaty, rather than the early 
version of the Maastricht Treaty.  
Although the Amsterdam Treaty substantially increased the Parliament’s power, 
empirical evidence does not confirm fully the difference between the first and the 
second version of the codecision procedure for the Parliament. The study of Kasack 
(2004) shows only a slight increase in total amendment adoption since the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Amsterdam to early 2002, while Hix (2002) demonstrates that 
codecision two is the result of institutionalization of old rule having worked into 
practice, rather than fully empowerment of the Parliament at the expense of the Council. 
In this research I will investigate whether constitutional reforms influenced the 
intercameral negotiations in Chapter 5. 
3.2.3. The size of the Parliament’s assembly 
An additional factor affecting the legislative outcome is represented by the size of the 
parliamentary assembly. Baron and Ferejohn’s (1989) model indicates that, in majority 
bargaining under closed rule, the size of the assembly matters. The proposer receives, 
indeed, a larger share of resources if the legislature is smaller. In other words, proposal 
power should increase in the size of the assembly because more legislators can be 
played off one another. The Parliament has undergone several enlargements and 
increased in size since codecision has been established. For instance, while the 
European Parliament was composed of 518 deputies from twelve countries in the third 
legislature, in the seventh legislature it comprised 754 deputies from twenty-seven 
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countries. However, the Schelling conjecture should work also here. The larger the size 
of the assembly is and the more proposal power the Parliament has. This increasing 
proposal power of the assembly reflects on the fewer constraints the delegation has. 
Rephrasing Schelling’s (1960) paradox of weakness argument, the delegation has less 
power to constrain the Council since it has less power to constrain itself and the 
assembly during negotiation in the Conciliation Committee. This increased proposal 
power should further weaken the parliamentary delegation in the conciliation 
negotiations with the Council. Consequently, I formulate the following hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 4: Conciliation outcomes are more likely to be biased in favour of the 
Parliament when the size of the assembly is smaller. 
No empirical evidence on the increase in size of the assembly is on offer. The long time 
span under examination allows testing me whether subsequent enlargements have 
decreased the bargaining power of the Parliament. I offer empirical analysis both in 
Chapter 5 and 6. 
3.3. Uncertainty, veto threats and reputation 
Disagreement values and institutions draw attention on the several structural features 
that could work against the Parliament. In this section I examine the instruments at its 
disposal to redress this structural weakness. What can the Parliament do to strengthen 
its position in the conciliation negotiations? 
Given its structural disadvantage, we may wonder what motivates the Parliament to 
move to conciliation. One factor could work in its favour: incomplete information. The 
models discussed previously consider bargaining of completely informed actors. But, 
bargaining in conciliation is uncertain. During negotiations, reciprocal knowledge of the 
counterparts is extremely relevant, especially in the Conciliation Committee where the 
two delegations face each other and have the last chance to produce legislation.  
Uncertainty over the real intentions and positions of the other negotiator may lead to a 
wide array of possible outcomes. In such a situation, uncertainty of one delegation over 
the other’s position may also reduce the possibility of a compromise text. In addition, 





about each other over the course of negotiations, and change their actions as learning 
occurs. In other words, in the circumstances of incomplete information, an actor has 
only the belief about what the other will accept. This leads to an important concept: 
reputation. As Cameron points out (2000, 106–110) reputation and incomplete 
information are intertwined: player’s reputation is the beliefs that other players have 
about his or her incompletely known characteristics. Those beliefs – the reputation – 
affect the other delegation’s actions and legislative proposals. During negotiations in 
conciliation11, beliefs evolve in response to the other delegation’s observed actions. 
Consequently, by choosing one action instead of another, a player may manipulate her 
reputation at her advantage.  
There are several implications about belief manipulation and reputation in the present 
study. Assume a proposer facing, with a given probability, two types of receivers – 
moderate and extremist – with low and high disagreement values respectively. As 
McCarty and Meirowitz (2007: 295) show, the proposer’s take-it-or-leave-it offer is 
more accommodating if the probability of dealing with an extreme receiver is high and 
her utility difference between an aggressive and an accommodating offer is small. A 
moderate receiver is better off if the proposer believes that she is an extreme type.  
The literature on belief manipulation refers mainly on the role of the US President as 
veto player towards Congress’ proposals (Cameron 2000; Cameron and McCarty 2004; 
Matthews 1989; McCarty 1997) and, unfortunately, no theoretical models has been 
developed with the Conciliation Committee in mind. However, these incentives are best 
analysed through signalling models. The important contribution of Matthews (1989) 
emphasizes how veto and veto threats occur regularly during legislative bargaining. The 
model shows that the most informative equilibrium consists of an accommodating 
receiver signalling his true type and other recalcitrant receivers extracting concession 
after they have issued veto threats. 
Importantly, there is no guarantee for this equilibrium to exist. In a dynamic model of 
reputation building and bargaining over multiple bills, McCarty (1997) shows how a 
receiver has an incentive to reject a first-period proposal to build a reputation as an 
                                                             
11 Bargaining within the Conciliation Committee may be considered as a dynamic strategic setting, as the 
legislative outcome is the result of alternating offers and counteroffers occurring in a set period of time.  
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extreme type in order to obtain a better outcome from a second-period proposal. Given 
these incentives, the proposer may be more accommodating in the first period to avoid 
rejection on reputational grounds. This dynamics holds if receiver and proposer are 
sufficiently divergent.  
On this vein, the sequential veto bargaining model of Cameron (2000, 110–122) fixes 
the President’s true type, which varies from round to round. Congress does not know 
the opponent’s policy preferences. This condition is sufficient to transform the strategic 
situation. The Congress learns about the President’s type at the first round and it will 
use the information in the second round. The President has an incentive to build a policy 
reputation in the first round in order to extract a better bill in the following round. 
Moreover, the President would engage in a strategic veto in the first round, so he can 
anticipate what Congress will offer in the second round because he might find the 
second bill more attractive than the first one. The attractiveness of the second bill makes 
the President being willing to risk a breakdown in order to extract the better bill from 
Congress.  
When the legislature faces uncertainty, vetoes and extraction of concession can be 
incorrectly estimated. Relaxing the assumptions of complete information, indeed, 
Cameron and McCarty (2004) reach important conclusion. A moderate President is 
better off if the proposing Congress believes that the President is the extreme type.  
So, roughly following influential models of veto bargaining and veto threats, I apply the 
concept of belief manipulation and reputation to conciliation negotiation. Considering 
that in conciliation there is no predetermined receiver or proposer and uncertainty may 
work either way, some speculations may flourish. Since the Council is fully represented, 
uncertainty about the type of Council the parliamentary delegation is dealing with is 
plausibly lower than the uncertainty about the type of full assembly the Council 
delegation is facing.12 Potential benefits for the Parliament may lie here. The 
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 The speculation does not refer to the transparency the chambers allow when providing information on 
their decision-making. Benedetto (2005) argues that bargaining inside the Parliament is more transparent 
than bargaining inside the Council and this should work in favour of the latter institution, but this is the 
case prior to getting to conciliation. During these negotiations, both sides are involved in informal 





conciliation process can be plausibly described as a situation whereby the Council 
(proposer) makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the full Parliament (receiver), conditional 
to the support from a parliamentary delegation under open rule.  
Since dossiers get to the conciliation stage because the positions of the Council and the 
Parliament differ significantly, even the most accommodating parliamentary delegation 
would have the incentive to issue a veto threat, even at the risk of producing an 
uninformative babbling equilibrium (Matthews 1989). Nevertheless, the following 
sections extensively investigate under which conditions a veto threat issued by the 
Parliament is likely to extract concessions from the Council13. I draw attention to the 
leading players involved in the conciliation negotiations – the President of the Council 
and the rapporteur of the Parliament – because they are widely recognized as being 
influential relay actors (Farrell and Héritier 2004; Rasmussen 2005), even in the 
informal meetings occurring before and at conciliation. Some rapporteurs may have 
bargaining weapons at their disposal, by manipulating the other institutions’ beliefs. 
Member states holding the Presidency, on the other hand, may strengthen their 
reputation at the negotiating table, depending on their skills and know-how on the 
conciliation process. 
3.3.1. The rapporteur 
The rapporteur plays a significant leadership role in European decision-making 
(Benedetto 2005; Farrell and Héritier 2004; Mamadouh and Raunio 2003; Rasmussen 
2005). She is in charge of preparing the discussion on the subject within the responsible 
parliamentary committee, presenting a draft text, amending the Commission’s proposal 
and the common position and taking into account comments raised both in the 
committee and in the plenary. Rapporteurs have information advantage within the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
full view to the parliamentary delegation, which can better recognizes the opponent chamber’s policy 
preferences and actions, whereas the whole assembly is not in full view to the Council. 
13
 Ingberman and Yao (1991) analyse the consequences of a receiver successfully issuing a commitment 
threat of the sort: “I'll veto any bill that is not in the set C” (362), but this model is silent on the 
circumstances under which the receiver has the incentive and ability to make such a threat (C. M. 
Cameron 2000: 197). 
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committee. They know better than other deputies the report and, consequently, perform 
a leadership role. According to Costello and Thomson (2010), the information 
imbalance in favour of the rapporteur may bias the legislative decision-making toward 
individual committee members’ interests. Once appointed, the rapporteur plays an 
important part in the plenary debates, and her report may be subject of the committee’s 
and the assembly’s amendments. 
More important for my purpose, the rapporteur is involved in conciliation negotiations 
by shaping and affecting the final outcomes. In the final stage of the codecision 
procedure the rapporteur is in the parliamentary delegation as ex officio member and, in 
the restricted informal meetings, she represents the Parliament along with the chairman 
of the responsible committee and one of the three vice-President, appointed to lead 
conciliation bargaining. Because of her crucial role in the formulation of the 
parliamentary position within the Conciliation Committee, the rapporteur is constantly 
connected with the delegation and the plenary. The generally acknowledge importance 
of the rapporteur raises the question whether there are some characteristics of the 
rapporteur that may improve the parliamentary successful chance in conciliation vis-à-
vis the Council. Linked to the literature on veto bargaining and information asymmetry 
discussed before, negotiators may exploit their own characteristics in order to gain more 
concessions from the Council. Given the centrality of these relay actors, scholars 
envisage that certain kinds of rapporteur may reinforce or weaken the Parliament’s 
potential gains, for instance, rapporteurs coming from large parties or being in a 
position of leadership (Costello and Thomson 2011; Farrell and Héritier 2004; König et 
al. 2007; Rasmussen 2005, 2008), or rapporteurs coming from party represented in the 
Council (Rasmussen 2011). 
 
Starting from the first characteristics, rapporteurs coming from large parties, such as the 
European People’s Party and the Party of European Socialists, are deemed to be more 
easily in touch with the majority of deputies in the plenary. Formal models on veto 
threat and reputation, on one side, and the literature on European bicameral bargaining, 
on the other side, help us explaining the reasons why large party rapporteurs affect 





rapporteurs from large parties may have an incentive to develop a reputation as a tough 
negotiator in order to extract concessions during conciliation. They are more likely and 
more capable to make good on veto threats because they have more resources to 
sanction defection in the assembly. Credibility goes hand in hand with the capability to 
muster a cohesive veto and, conversely, to sanction defecting parliamentarians.  
According to preference-based explanation, rapporteurs coming from large parties better 
represent the views of the majority in the Parliament, so they are reasonably more 
credible when claiming what will then be accepted by the plenary at third reading. The 
rapporteur would block any further concessions to the Council because she is credibly 
constrained by the assembly (Costello and Thomson 2011). In addition, the Council 
tries to be in contact especially with rapporteurs coming from large groups and exclude 
smaller group from decision-making. (Farrell and Héritier 2004).  
On the other hand, König and his colleagues (2007) argue for the opposite. They reverse 
the causal relationship. Considering the Schelling conjecture, these scholars suppose 
that a smaller party rapporteur would extract more concessions as she would hold more 
extreme views, and this would be advantageous for the median institutional actor.14  
To sum up, two causal mechanisms explain the influence of the rapporteur’s party 
membership on the final outcome: the veto-threat and the preference-based arguments. 
From either explanation I derive the following testable hypotheses, considering also the 
alternative König et al.’s expectation. 
Hypothesis 5a: Conciliation outcomes are more likely to be biased in favour of the 
Parliament when rapporteur comes from larger parties. 
Hypothesis 5b: Conciliation outcomes are more likely to be biased in favour of the 
Council when rapporteur comes from smaller parties. 
Looking at the constitutional setting of the Parliament, it seems reasonable to consider 
the Socialists and the People’s Party, the main party groups, to have the last say in the 
legislative process. Rapporteurs from these two parties may have additional bargaining 
                                                             
14
 Note that they consider rapporteurs from the liberal party as extremists. The preference-based 
interpretation of König et al. (2007) introduces one implication of Schelling’s ‘paradox of weakness’ 
(Schelling 1960). Since smaller parties have more stringent constraints than larger parties, they may be in 
a most favourable bargaining position, once they negotiate with the Council representatives. 
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power in comparison to small party representatives. Unfortunately, no evidence 
corroborates this relationship. Both König et al. (2007) and Costello and Thomson 
(2011) fail to find empirical evidence on the influence a rapporteur choice has on the 
bargaining success of the Parliament. Only Rasmussen (2011) obtains empirical 
support, even though she investigates on the likelihood dossier to be concluded as early 
agreement. The empirical analysis of the two alternative hypotheses will be developed 
in Chapter 5 and 6. 
Second, rapporteurs may occupy leadership position in the party or in the Parliament. 
Two alternative causal mechanisms may operate. Costello and Thomson (2011) extend 
the Schelling conjecture to the leadership role of the rapporteur. Since they may be 
subject of fewer constraints than other negotiators, political leaders “will find it difficult 
to convince their counterparts [i.e. the Council] that they are unable to compromise” 
(Costello and Thomson 2011, 342). The two scholars argue that the Parliament achieves 
less bargaining success when the rapporteur is in a leadership position. On the contrary, 
I apply again the veto threat explanation. The Parliament may be better off vis-à-vis the 
Council, when leader rapporteur drives negotiations, since the personal authority 
attached to leadership figures allows issuing credible threats of veto and sanctioning 
parliamentarians who do not follow the indication of their political group at third 
reading. Leaders, indeed, may be more involved in the bargaining process rather than 
rank-and-file rapporteurs; because they are better informed about the Council’s 
preferences, have more reliable inter-institutional relations and are better in touch with 
the delegates and members of the responsible committee. In conclusion, two 
argumentations refer to the influence of rapporteurs occupying position of leadership. 
Costello and Thomson consider that the few constraints these rapporteurs have reduce 
their bargaining power vis-à-vis the Council. However, these rapporteurs are more 
credible when issuing signals of veto threats. These alternative explanations suggest two 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 6a: Conciliation outcomes are more likely to be biased in favour of the 





Hypothesis 6b: Conciliation outcomes are more likely to be biased in favour of the 
Council when rapporteur is not in a leadership position. 
Although limited to dossiers under codecision II, Costello and Thomson (2011) find 
corroborating evidence that rapporteurs in leadership position in the Parliament decrease 
the chance of winning of the Parliament during negotiations. Chapter 5 and 6 will test 
both hypotheses. 
Third, bargaining uncertainty may be affected when the rapporteur comes from a party 
represented in the Council. According to Rasmussen (2011), party congruence between 
the rapporteur and the national representative in the Council (the minister or the 
permanent representatives) may lead to a better understanding of the negotiators, 
because of common cultural and linguistic background. Uncertainty may be reduced 
when the rapporteur and the Presidency share the same ideological background, that is, 
they belong to the same national party group. For instance, in 1994 Germany was led by 
a coalition government formed by the Christian Democratic Union, the Christian Social 
Union and the Free Democratic Party. A German rapporteur of the Christian 
Democratic Union (which is member of the European People’s Party) may share the 
same priorities and policy preferences of her country’s representatives sitting at the 
negotiating table. Reduced uncertainty, though, weakens the Parliament’s bargaining 
position and the rapporteur’s ability to issue credible threats. Rapporteur from parties 
represented in the Council, indeed, are less credible, because their allegiance is also 
with the national parties in government. Given that the member states are better 
informed about the Parliament’s preferences, when rapporteurs comes from a party 
represented in the Council, the Parliament has less room to manipulate the beliefs about 
its position and, thus, has less bargaining power in conciliation. I consider the following 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 7: Conciliation outcomes are less likely to be biased in favour of the 
Parliament when rapporteur is from a party represented in the Council. 
In her study on early agreement, Rasmussen (2011) empirically confirms that sharing 
ideological background decreases bargaining uncertainty between the rapporteur and the 
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Council, at the expense of the Parliament. Even this last characteristic of the rapporteur 
will be subject to systematic tests in Chapter 5 and 6. 
3.3.2. The President of the Council 
On the Council’s side, the relay actor is the minister (or her permanent representative) 
of the member state holding the Presidency. The Presidency provides the member state 
that is chairing the office a great opportunity to influence legislative decision-making, 
because it gives informational and procedural advantages in comparison to other 
countries and facilitates contacts with the European Parliament.15 There is scholarly 
consensus that member states holding the chair during the final stage of legislative 
proceedings increases the Council’s bargaining success (Warntjen 2008).  
In the Conciliation Committee, negotiations take place among key negotiators of the 
three institutions involved in the legislative process: the Council, the European 
Parliament and the Commission. Trialogues have become the modus operandi since half 
of 1995, though. According to several scholars, the codecision procedure and the 
institutionalization of these informal meetings have further empowered the Presidency, 
that acts on behalf of the Council vis-à-vis the Parliament and the Commission (Farrell 
and Héritier 2004; Tallberg 2006; Warntjen 2008). Even the guide for codecision 
published by the Council asserts that “during trialogues, the Presidency is the single 
voice of the Council and during plenary meetings of the Conciliation Committee the 
Presidency minister is the spokesman of the Council” (European Council 2000, 8). 
Since the Presidency is an active player in the Conciliation Committee, not all member 
states have the same power of initiative in shaping the Council’s agenda and pushing 
forward their claims. In informal settings, having longer experience on how the process 
develops and how to use influence is crucial. If the President of the Council comes from 
new member states, it is plausible to suggest that she would be more easily subject to 
belief manipulation as she is still learning the ropes of negotiation. Newer member 
states should take longer adapt to the informal negotiating environment of the 
                                                             
15 The Presidency can assist to the plenary and parliamentary committee sessions and can give opinions 





Conciliation Committee. They are involved in institutional learning and in mechanisms 
of actor socialization into processes of European integration and decision-making 
(Hosli, Mattila, and Uriot 2011). Moreover, the newer member state holding the 
Presidency may also be facing higher reputational costs of a failed negotiation. The 
outgoing office-holder obtains point of pride whether she is viewed by her colleagues as 
having conducted a “good Presidency”, that is to say it is positively valued to get an 
agreement (Majone 2005, 175).  
As newer member states may be subject of belief manipulation and may face reputation-
building process, I expect that the Council has less bargaining power when such 
members hold the Presidency. I formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 8: Conciliation outcomes are more likely to be biased in favour of the 
Parliament when the Presidency of the Council is from a new member state. 
None of the empirical analyses tests the impact of President state seniority on the 
legislative bargaining success of the Council or the Parliament. Therefore, the 
hypothesis is subject to testing in Chapter 5 and 6. 
3.3.3. Electoral cycles, reputation and audience costs 
Electoral cycle in the Parliament may drive the bargaining outcome at the expense of 
the Council. Reputational incentives may operate within the assembly at large. As 
McCarty (1997) suggests reputation building rests on term dynamics. At the beginning 
of the mandate the value of reputation is higher than at the end of a term. At the same 
time, the Council may be more accommodating at the beginning of the parliamentary 
term, when it is likely to be more subject to belief manipulation by the Parliament.  
This explanation overturns the role the electorate has in influencing the legislative 
chambers, though. Few signalling models formalize two negotiators which send signals 
to a third outside party (Fearon 1994, 1997). In day-to-day decision-making, Groseclose 
and Mcarty (2001) highlight that an important part of the activity of political actors is to 
send signals on their preferences to the voters. This happens more frequently in election 
years and during divided government. They show that gridlock and vetoes occur even 
when there are policy alternatives preferred to the status quo. The signalling incentives 
48 
 
negotiators have towards the electorate (or the audience) discourage them to reach such 
alternatives. In election years the members of the European Parliament are more likely 
to face “audience costs”, which are intended to capture the role that voters play in 
holding their deputies accountable for the compromise they agree on in conciliation. In 
addition, I need to consider that politicians are even more concerned about re-election as 
the legislative mandate is ending, consequently they cannot ignore audience costs. 
However, the Parliament and the Council differs also in the mandate. The Parliament is 
collectively renewed once every five years, while the Council may change its 
composition whenever a member state holds a national election. Since European 
elections are more likely to change the Parliament’s composition, the Parliament is 
more influential in the conciliation outcomes than a new government, when the mandate 
is ending.  
In this section I have discussed how electoral cycle of the Parliament may influence on 
the conciliation bargaining. I focus on the audience costs and reputational incentives 
faced by parliamentarians and I propose two opposite hypotheses follow from these 
explanations. 
Hypothesis 9a: Conciliation outcomes are more likely to be biased in favour of the 
Parliament when audience costs are higher. 
Hypothesis 9b: Conciliation outcomes are more likely to be biased in favour of the 
Parliament at the beginning, rather than at the end of the legislative term. 
No empirical analysis has tested how these temporal dynamics may affect the 
bargaining success of one chamber over the other, because of either audience costs or 
reputation building. I test the two opposite hypotheses in Chapters 5 and 6. 
3.3.4. Personality 
This section takes into consideration other factors having an impact during negotiations. 
Until now, the characteristics of the relay actors refer to tangible resource of power: 
party membership, leadership position, membership seniority as well as the size of the 
assembly. However, at actor-level resources such as bargaining skills and previous 





explain the ability in issuing threats by rapporteur coming from large parties or in a 
leadership position, negotiators can rely on their own individual attributes, such as 
technical knowledge of the specific issue under negotiation (Tallberg 2008), 
perseverance and motivation to reach an agreement. Constructivist scholars emphasize 
persuasion and communicative attitudes in various setting of EU politics, but systematic 
and quantitative studies on bargaining skills are quite contradictory and limited to the 
Council of Minister or the European Council (Bailer 2004, 2006, 2010; Moravcsik 
1998; Tallberg 2008). In addition, as Achen (2006, 101–103) argues, the ability of 
negotiators in establishing stable and efficient relations with the other actors seems to be 
crucial in order to succeed. Having all these caveats in mind, I derive the following 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 10: Conciliation outcomes are more likely to be biased in favour of the 
Parliament when parliamentary actors have more experience on the dossier and on how 
to conduct the negotiations 
Unfortunately, investigations on individual source of power are hard to come by. 
Although restricted on committee appointment, two recent studies of McElroy (2006) 
and Yordanova (2009), show that committee seniority of the deputies has strong impact 
on the distribution of committee seats. In turn it seems to suggest that 
professionalization may strengthen the Parliament’s position in EU politics. On the 
other hand, Bailer (2004, 2006) does not find significant support of the country’s 
bargaining skills in bargaining success. However, these studies focus on the 
intracameral bargaining process, without considering how these skills affect 
intercameral negotiations. My study aims at filling this gap in the literature and 
investigating their role in the Conciliation Committee. The analysis is not easy. 
Operationalization of this variable is fraught of difficulties, since it suffers from the 
problem of measuring skills and idiosyncratic features negotiators have. As a result, I 
test the impact on conciliation bargaining only in Chapter 6. 
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3.4. Representativeness and cohesiveness 
This section explores the implications that intracameral organizations have on 
intercameral interactions. Two related factors need to be considered as explanatory 
variables of the Conciliation Committee’s outcomes: representativeness of the 
parliamentary delegation and cohesiveness of the chambers.  
3.4.1. Cohesiveness 
Tsebelis’s model illustrates how the cohesion of a collective player is extremely 
important for the size of the winset of the status quo (2002). Figure 3.3 is helpful in 
understanding how cohesion is determined. Let us find the winset of the status quo (SQ) 
for collective players. After having sketched the median between the collective actors 
(A, B, C, D), the smallest circle inscribed by the medians with centre Y and radius r is 
called yolk. Take the distance between Y and the status quo, the winset of the status quo 
is within the wincircle. The Y-centred wincircle, with radius d + 2r (where d is the 
distance between Y and the status quo), defines an upper bound – there are no points of 
the winset of the status quo located outside it. Cohesion is, thus, conceived as the 
inverse of the radius r of a Y-centred yolk of a majority-voting collective player. 
Therefore, as the radius of the yolk decreases, cohesion of a collective veto player 
increases. By definition a decrease in cohesiveness increases the wincircle. 
Nevertheless, Tsebelis states that, even though the winset of the status quo is within the 
wincircle, “it is not always the case that an increased wincircle will entail an increase in 
the size of the winset of the status quo” (Tsebelis 2002, 48). Since these propositions are 
highly conjectural, there are possible configurations disconfirming the speculation that 
“policy stability increases as the m-cohesion of a collective veto player increases (as the 
radius of the yolk decreases)” (Tsebelis 2002, 48). Tsebelis provides a counterexample 
of an increase in winset as the wincircle shrinks (i.e. as cohesiveness increases). For 
collective actors deciding by qualified majority, the so-called q-circle determines the 
radius and centre of the wincircle. Lower cohesion (i.e. larger yolk) is actually more 
likely to reduce the size of the wincircle and winset, although one can find 





Figure 3.3: The winset of the status quo in a collective player 
 
 
Hypothesis 12: Conciliation outcomes are more likely to be biased in favour of the 
Parliament when the assembly voted cohesively.  
The Tsebelis analysis has been subject to contradictory empirical evidence in European 
bargaining process. In their work on conciliation, König et al. (2007) find that higher 
parliamentary cohesiveness diminishes Council’s and increases Parliament’s success 
rates, and that lower Council cohesiveness increases parliamentary success. König et al. 
argue that “the winset of less cohesive non-unitary institutional actors is larger. Because 
more cohesive non-unitary institutional actors accept fewer alternatives that beat the 
status quo, the bargaining outcome is expected to shift towards them” (2007, 289–90). 




Albeit anecdotal, the rejection by the Parliament of the joint text on biotechnological 
inventions seems to originate from a diminished cohesiveness (and smaller winset) after 
the European elections. Intra-parliamentary division made impossible for the delegation 
to propose legislation being agreed by the assembly (Bethold Rittberger 2000: 563). To 
some extent, achieving successful intercameral negotiations depends also on the ability 
to ensure intracameral cohesion by representatives both in the trialogues and in the 
Conciliation Committee. Kardasheva (forthcoming) confirms that divisions among 
deputies weaken the bargaining position of the Parliament vis-à-vis the Council and the 
Commission under the ordinary legislative procedure. I will test the above mentioned 
hypothesis only in Chapter 6 for two reasons. First, it is very hard to determine the 
location of the wincircle and m-cohesion, since it ultimately depends on (a speculation 
on) the location of the status quo. Second, due to the lack of transparency within the 
Conciliation Committee, there is limited information to speculate the cohesiveness of 
the Parliament, its delegation and even of the Council. 
3.4.2. Representativeness 
Related to intra-chamber cohesiveness is representativeness. Representativeness 
matters, as Tsebelis and Money (1997, 110–8) remind us. In their seminal work on 
bicameralism, Tsebelis and Money demonstrate how the selection of delegates is “a 
political decision that ultimately affects the conference committee compromise” (1997, 
112) and depends on two factors: the bicameral restriction imposed on the conference 
committee by the parent chamber (i.e. by imposing the inclusion of certain members 
who will skew the majority one way or another), and the committee yolk. The two 
scholars identify that the committee yolk is a function of the composition of the 
conference committee: “whether the delegation of each chamber is a faithful agent of 
the parent chamber or whether the set of conference committee members is a faithful 
representative of the bicameral legislature”. Nevertheless, Tsebelis and Money do not 
investigate misrepresentation of each delegation, but on the whole conference 





The two delegations in the Conciliation Committee differ though. The Council is fully 
represented and each member state has its own delegate, with ministers or permanent 
representatives. The Parliament, on the other hand, has restricted rules of procedure to 
appoint the members. Let us focus on the Parliament. The delegation could be more 
accommodating towards the Council than the whole assembly; or, it could be more 
recalcitrant. However, while an accommodating delegation may be detrimental to the 
assembly by agreeing on a joint document that is farther from the assembly position; it 
is unclear why a recalcitrant delegation should produce the same outcome. Actually, a 
chamber is facing a trade-off in staffing committees, since they play a dual role in 
bargaining: both as proposer and as receiver. The parent chamber may want the 
committee to be a tough veto constraint for the other chamber, but this produces a 
strategic rationale to create unrepresentative committee. The incentive to create a 
recalcitrant committee induces the other chamber to moderate its proposal and to make 
them more favourable to the committee, than to the parent chamber. (Gailmard and 
Hammond 2011). As a result, the assembly has the incentive to create a tough 
delegation to the extent that such delegation may extract more concession and negotiate 
a better legislative outcome. 
A concluding remark on how conciliation operates is crucial. While procedural rule on 
conciliation ensures parliamentary delegation to be representative of the assembly, 
informal meetings in conciliation disregard such prescriptions. On the parliamentary 
side, representatives in the trialogues, indeed, come from the highest offices during the 
dossiers, namely the rapporteur, the chairperson of the responsible committee and the 
vice-President, and there is no prescriptive rule of representativeness in such 
appointment. The three delegates are previously appointed according to parliamentary 
internal rule16, and they frequently come from large party groups. Trialogues, indeed, 
                                                             
16 Rapporteur as well as chairman of the committee responsible is appointed at the beginning of the 
legislative procedure and at the committee’s constituent meeting, respectively. Rapporteur’s appointment 
is the result of a point-based auction among party groups, while chairperson are elected on the basis of 
allocation determined by the D’Hondt system (for details see Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton 2007, 140) 
The three vice-Presidents delegated for the conciliation have a midterm appointment, following the 
unwritten rule: two vice-Presidents from the largest party group and one vice-President from the second 
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allows majority party representatives negotiating more frequently with the Council 
(Kardasheva forthcoming). 
In conclusion, the assembly faces a tension between a representative and a tough 
(although unrepresentative) delegation. Certainly, a tough delegation would be able to 
extract more concessions from the Council than an accommodating delegation, and this 
may be of benefit of the Parliament. Therefore, I suggest the following hypothesis on 
the representativeness of the delegation. 
Hypothesis 11: Conciliation outcomes are more likely to be biased in favour of the 
Parliament when the delegation is recalcitrant instead of accommodating. 
Unfortunately, it is very hard to empirically determine the nature of the delegation 
because it depends on the location of the status quo. Assume that we know the location 
of the median voter in the delegation and in the assembly. To determine whether the 
delegation is accommodating or recalcitrant we need to know the position of the 
(unanimity or qmv-)pivot in the Council. But to determine this, we ultimately need to 
know, or speculate on, the position of the status quo.  
Tsebelis and Money (1997) as well as Rasmussen (2008) agree on the 
representativeness of the parliamentary delegation with its parent chamber. In addition, 
Rasmussen (2008) finds that the delegation tends to reflect the composition of the whole 
assembly by political groups, as prescribed by the delegation-appointing rule. There are 
exceptions though. The largest parties tend to be overrepresented and, in six out of the 
86 procedures analysed, the delegates’ positions differed from those of their party 
colleagues in the assembly. There is also overrepresentation of members from the 
standing committee. For codecision cases in general, Costello and Thomson (2011) find 
that a representative rapporteur is beneficial to the Parliament.  
The hypothesis is tested in Chapter 6, since interviews allow the identification of the 
median voter in the plenary and in the delegation. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
largest party group. As a result, they come from the EPP or PES. As a consequence, most of the dossiers 






I conclude the theories on bicameral bargaining and the Conciliation Committee 
considering how expectations about the implementation of a measure may affect the 
resolve of the Council and Parliament. This factor is ignored by the literature on 
legislative bargaining, but re-election minded politicians are ultimately concerned about 
the outcomes of their decisions: how the implementation of a measure delivers benefits 
to their constituencies. I will consider two issues. 
3.5.1. The Commission’s role 
First, the Commission may be able to exert influence under favourable circumstances, 
when it enjoys some informational advantages or manages to assemble support from 
non–legislative actors (König et al. 2007; Moravcsik 1999; Pollack 2003; Rasmussen 
2003). In conciliation, the Commission plays the facilitating role of proposing 
compromise agreement to the Council and the Parliament. But perhaps, aside from 
informal influence, the views of the Commission matter simply because of its formal 
role in legislative and implementation issues. Throughout the ordinary legislative 
procedure, the Commission produces its opinion on the parliamentary amendments both 
at first and second reading. Its opinion is relevant, especially on second reading. In 
order to overcome Commission’s positions and reinstate the discharged amendments, 
the Council shall act by unanimity on the amendments on which the Commission has 
delivered a negative opinion (art. 294 of the Treaty of Lisbon), instead of qualified 
majority voting. Moreover, the Commission is directly in charge of implementation 
when legislative provisions confer upon it the power to take policy decisions. Even 
when no provisions foresee its involvement, this supranational bureaucracy is entrusted 
with the power to initiate proceedings against possible infringements by national 
administrations (e.g. Börzel 2001; Pollack 2003).  
Although the Commission is not a legislative actor, it may influence the conciliation 
outcomes. The Parliament may increase its bargaining power when the Commission 
takes its side. From these considerations, I expect that: 
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Hypothesis 13: Conciliation outcomes are more likely to be biased in favour of the 
Parliament when the Commission gives positive opinion on the second parliamentary 
reading. 
Empirical explanation focuses mainly on the Commission’s role (König et al. 2007; 
Rasmussen 2003) since it takes the part in favour of one legislative actor or it acts as 
“strategic facilitator”, confirming its influence on bargaining success. König and his 
colleagues find the importance of the opinion of the Commission in determining the 
relative success of the Parliament and Council in conciliation. In addition, Rasmussen 
concludes that the Commission gives a substantive contribution in the drafting of the 
compromise text in conciliation. My analysis further assesses the legislative influence 
of the Commission, both in qualitative and quantitative terms. I employ two of the most 
commonly used ways of measuring legislative influence, namely the use of behavioural 
and reputational indicators. The former calculate the percentage of amendments the 
Commission issues a positive opinion, as proxy of its views on the bill (in Chapter 5), 
whereas the latter refer to interviewing a range of participants about the influence of the 
Commission in the conciliation (in Chapter 6). 
3.5.2. Implementation paths 
Second, the relative involvement in policy execution of the Commission and national 
administrations vary across measures, and the ex-ante and ex-post mechanisms17 for 
overseeing implementation that are available to ministers and parliamentarians vary 
systematically across different implementation paths (Franchino 2007, 240–4). Some 
measures are primarily implemented by national authorities, others by the Commission. 
Where the Commission is the main implementer, each minister must rely on the 
collective will of the Council to exercise control over the supranational executive, for 
instance via the comitology procedures. For national execution, ministers, as head of 
their departments, are instead individually in charge of overseeing implementation and 
                                                             
17
 Legislative design is an ex-ante control mechanism over implementation, while interpellations and 






they have at their disposal a wider array of ex-post control mechanisms. 
Parliamentarians are in the opposite position. They use ex-post oversight mechanisms 
when a law is mostly implemented by the single Commission rather than several 
national authorities. Unsurprisingly, compared to ministers, parliamentarians prefer 
greater involvement of the latter at the expense of the former (Franchino 2007, 285–6). 
Because oversight via legislative design is more important to parliamentarians than 
ministers when national authorities are the primary implementers, they are expected to 
be less accommodating over the content of a law at the legislative stage. Moreover, the 
Parliament can rely more easily on other non-legislative means of implementation 
control (from appointment power to committee inquiries and other police patrol 
mechanisms). On the other side, because ex-post oversight is collective rather than 
individual when the Commission is the primary implementer, we should expect 
ministers being less accommodating at the legislative stage. As the implementation path 
is different, we expect that legislators change their stances accordingly. When the 
measure implies the Commission’s implementation, national governments are more 
recalcitrant in the decision making. Conversely, when the measure implies national 
execution, it is the Parliament that is more recalcitrant at the legislative stage, so it can 
extract more concessions from the Council. Therefore:  
Hypothesis 14: Conciliation outcomes are more likely to be biased in favour of the 
Parliament in the case of measures with greater involvement of national 
administrations. 
This study provides the evaluation on the impact of implementation in the prior 
bargaining process in Chapter 5 and 6.  
Conclusions 
In research on bicameralism of the European Union in general, several hypotheses 
consider disagreement values, the role of institutions and relay actors as affecting the 
process and outcome of codecision. In this Chapter, I discussed the theoretical 
rationales for the impact of these factors on Conciliation Committee’s outcome in detail. 
These factors are derived from formal models of bargaining and signalling. In addition, 
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I discussed the possible impact of several characteristics of the relay actors – the 
rapporteurs and the minister of the member state holding the Presidency. Rapporteurs 
from large parties, in leadership positions or from parties represented in the Council, 
and Presidents from newer member states are primarily involved in these inter-
institutional bargaining where incomplete information and reputation building matter. 
During conciliation negotiations rapporteurs coming from larger party groups as well as 
rapporteurs holding leadership position may rely on several tools to manipulate the 
Council’s belief, such as issuing credible veto threats. On the contrary, rapporteurs 
coming from parties represented in the Council are not so credible because the Council 
may be better informed about the Parliament’s preferences. Finally, newer member 
states are still involved in learning process about how conciliation works and they may 
be object of manipulation. 
Moreover, cohesive delegations and cohesive assembly are likely to enhance the 
Parliament’s bargaining success, since they are more recalcitrant in accepting 
alternatives to the status quo. Finally, the role of Commission, both in its formal and 
informal influence in the legislative mechanism, and in the implementation path across 
measures, is largely recognized as influential factors in codecision bargaining. 
I presented several hypotheses. Some of them are derived from the bargaining theory, 
others, mostly concerning the negotiating actors, are derived from the literature on EU 
politics. In some cases, I have added further hypotheses. The theoretical arguments 
developed in this Chapter will guide the empirical analyses. The three empirical 
Chapters will explore the Conciliation Committee’s outcome and will aim at answering 
the key research question: who wins in conciliation? 
Table 3.1 collects the hypotheses previously formulated and the empirical analyses 
conducted in order to investigate on them. Chapter 5 tests several hypotheses in all the 
conciliation dossiers. However, some theoretical arguments, underlying the influence of 
audience costs, the delegation’s cohesiveness and the individual source of power of the 
relay actors, are only assessed qualitatively in Chapter 6. Lastly, Chapter 7 shows, 
through a formal model, some particularly interesting dynamics operating in 
conciliation, such as the role of belief manipulation and asymmetric information 





Table 3.1: Hypotheses and related empirical analyses 
















Hypothesis 1: Conciliation outcomes are more 
likely to be biased against the Parliament 
when the Council is closer to the status quo 
than the Parliament. 
   
Institutions 
Hypothesis 2: Conciliation outcomes are more 
likely to be biased in favour of the Parliament 
under qualified majority voting of the Council, 
rather than under unanimity. 
   
Hypothesis 3: Conciliation outcomes are more 
likely to be biased in favour of the Parliament 
under the codecision version of the Amsterdam 
Treaty, rather than the early version of the 
Maastricht Treaty.  
   
Hypothesis 4: Conciliation outcomes are more 
likely to be biased in favour of the Parliament 
when the size of the assembly is smaller. 
   
Uncertainty, veto threat and reputation 
Hypothesis 5a: Conciliation outcomes are 
more likely to be biased in favour of the 
Parliament when rapporteur comes from 
larger parties. 
   
Hypothesis 5b: Conciliation outcomes are 
more likely to be biased in favour of the 
Parliament when rapporteur comes from 
smaller parties. 
   
Hypothesis 6a: Conciliation outcomes are 
more likely to be biased in favour of the 
Parliament when rapporteur is in a leadership 
position. 
   
Hypothesis 6b: Conciliation outcomes are 
more likely to be biased in favour of the 
Parliament when rapporteur is not in a 
leadership position. 
   
60 
 
Hypothesis 7: Conciliation outcomes are less 
likely to be biased in favour of the Parliament 
when rapporteur is from a party represented 
in the Council. 
   
Hypothesis 8: Conciliation outcomes are more 
likely to be biased in favour of the Parliament 
when the Presidency of the Council is from a 
new member state. 
   
Hypothesis 9a: Conciliation outcomes are 
more likely to be biased in favour of the 
Parliament when audience submits its costs. 
   
Hypothesis 9b: Conciliation outcomes are 
more likely to be biased in favour of the 
Parliament at the beginning, rather than at the 
end of the legislative term. 
   
Hypothesis 10: Conciliation outcomes are 
more likely to be biased in favour of the 
Parliament when parliamentary actors have 
more experience on the dossier and on how to 
conduct the negotiations 
   
Representativeness and cohesiveness 
Hypothesis 11: Conciliation outcomes are 
more likely to be biased in favour of the 
Parliament when the assembly voted 
cohesively.  
   
Hypothesis 12: Conciliation outcomes are 
more likely to be biased in favour of the 
Parliament when the delegation is recalcitrant 
instead of accommodating. 
   
Implementation 
Hypothesis 13: Conciliation outcomes are 
more likely to be biased in favour of the 
Parliament when the Commission gives 
positive opinion on the second parliamentary 
reading. 
   
Hypothesis 14: Conciliation outcomes are 
more likely to be biased in favour of the 
Parliament in the case of measures with 
greater involvement of national 
administrations. 





4. Quantitative text analysis:  
Wordfish and its validity 
Scholars have variously attempted to overcome the long-standing problem of measuring 
actor preferences in the European Union. There are two approaches for the 
measurement of bargaining success in the EU legislature. The first one relies on 
interviews to experts or key participants in the decision-making process. Scholars 
identify the key controversial issues underlying the adoption of a bill and estimate the 
position of the actors involved, the saliency they attach to the issue and the location of 
the status quo. This approach has been widely used for important contribution in the 
study of EU legislative politics (Costello and Thomson 2011; König et al. 2007; 
Thomson 2011; Thomson et al. 2006). It applies to a large number of cases, but there 
are three main limitations. First, expert-interview estimates measure perceived by the 
interviewers rather than true positions of the actors in the Conciliation Committee. 
Second, it is difficult to go far back in time and produce valid estimates, both because 
memory fades and the availability of experts diminishes. For instance, König et al. 
(2007) select only dossiers reaching conciliation between 1999 and 2002. Third, 
because it is hard to replicate the measurement process, reliability may be a problem. 
Multiple experts and documentary evidence are however used to validate the data.  
The second approach is based on comparing documents and producing measures of 
similarity. The research of Tsebelis et al. (2001), for instance, measures the success of 
parliamentary amendments by comparing documents of the Commission and the 
Council with the first and second reading of the Parliament. Unlike the previous 
method, this technique allows scholars to go far back in time and to replicate the 
measurement process. Reliability, though, may still be an issue.  
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The present study will employ this second approach. I will use legislative texts as 
source to assess the influence each chamber has on the final legislation and I will 
employ the computer-based Wordfish scaling algorithm developed by Slapin and 
Proksch (2009; 2008). This procedure enhances reliability and facilitates replication, 
more systematically and efficiently than the manual text analysis conducted by Tsebelis 
et al. (2001). 
In the following sections, first I explain how documents were collected, treated and 
made feasible for being Wordfish-usable data. Then I highlight benefits and limits of 
Wordfish and I assess its validity vis-à-vis other techniques: the Wordfish estimation by 
employing five official documents, hand-coding and the expert survey conducted by 
König et al. (2007).  
4.1. From official documents to Wordfish-usable data 
The official documents of the Council, the Parliament and the Conciliation Committee 
need to be collected, standardized and processed in order to become usable data for 
Wordfish. Official documents of the institutions and the bicameral body, indeed, need to 
be polished before being processed by Wordfish 
4.1.1. Document collection and data gathering 
Data retrieval has involved several steps, due to the variety of documents. The starting 
point for identifying the sample of cases is the Commission’s website on the codecision, 
unfortunately no longer updated since July 2012. In this website the Commission had 
collected all the proposals concluded by the Conciliation Committee on a joint text 
between 01.05.1999 and 31.12.2011 for a total amount of 116 files. As a matter of fact, 
the archive showed only those dossiers completed under the Treaty of Amsterdam. The 
website was useful, because it contained interesting links to both the European 
Parliament’s and Council’s websites dedicated to the Conciliation as well as reports on 
co-decision files agreed since 1999. In particular, the European Parliament’s website 





which the Conciliation is convened, the rule of procedure of the Conciliation 
Committee, etc.), the on-going and concluded procedures at various steps of the 
codecision. Moreover, the European Parliament and the parliamentary delegations to the 
Conciliation Committee have drawn up detailed activity reports on codecision and 
conciliation for each legislative term from 1993 onwards. Up to now there are five 
activity reports: the first report covers the period from 1
st
 November 1993 until 30
th
 
April 1999 (date of entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty), the second report refers 
to the 5
th
 parliamentary term (from 1
st
 May 1999 to 30
th
 April 2004), the third report is a 
2004-2006 mid-term communication, the fourth report covers the 6
th
 legislature (from 
1
st
 May 2004 to 13
th
 July 2009), finally the last report deals with the 7
th
 mid-term (from 
14
th
 July 2009 to 31
st
 December 2011). Each report provides an overview of the 
codecision dossiers, highlights the main developments of the Treaty provisions occurred 
during the legislature and offers quantitative and qualitative analyses on both codecision 
and conciliation dossiers. Finally and most importantly, the reports list the codecision 
dossiers completed under the periods covered, making possible the identification of the 
whole sample of the legislative text adopted by the Conciliation Committee, with the 
relative code of reference. As illustrated in Table 4.1, 185 codecision dossiers have 
reached the conciliation stage since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty up to 
February 2012. On four occasions, the committee failed to produce a joint text18. During 
the fourth and fifth parliamentary term, the Conciliation Committee has been employed 
frequently, thus indicating significant inter-institutional conflict. The Treaty of 
Amsterdam, that made early agreements possible, did not seem to ease up tensions, at 
least in the first five years. 
 
 
                                                             
18 The dossiers without joint text are: the directive on investment firms and credit institutions 
(COD/1995/0188), the directive on the working time (COD/2004/0209), the regulation on novel foods 
(COD/2008/0002). As far as the directive on the Open Network Provision to voice telephony 
(COD/1992/0437) is regarded, it was negotiated under the first version of the codecision procedure. 
Because negotiating failure at conciliation, the Council confirmed its common position. I eliminate it 
from the sample as well. 
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Table 4.1: The incidence of conciliation 







III (1989-1994) 49 4 8.2 
IV (1994-9) 270 63 23.3 
V (1999-2004) 482 86 17.8 





270 8 2.6 
Total 1612 185 11.4 
On the other hand, there has been a significant drop in the employment of the 
Conciliation Committee over the last two legislative terms. This could indicate better 
working of the mechanisms of inter-institutional cooperation. The lower incidence is 
also a product of the extension of the ordinary legislative procedure to the majority of 
EU policy areas, thus inflating the denominator. 
The second step of the selection procedure is the document collection. Since the text 
analyses I have conducted is based on the documents of the last two stages of the 
codecision procedure, the main task was to find out the parliamentary 2
nd
 reading, the 
Council common position and the joint text for each dossier. In order to get the exact 
reference code of the legislative texts, I employed two different online databases: the 
OEIL – the Legislative Observatory of the European Parliament – and the PreLex 
database. Both databases monitor the inter-institutional decision-making process in the 
EU and their webpages describe the progress of a proposal that has been transmitted by 
the Commission to the other EU institutions. The webpages describe mainly the 
characteristics of the dossiers file (e.g. title, type of document, policy area, legal basis – 
and formal aspects of the decision-making process), type of procedure, reference date of 
each document and its publication on the Official Journal and the rapporteur in the 
European Parliament. In the OEIL database, moreover, it is possible to have a short 
summary on the documents’ content, explaining the differences occurred along the 
procedure. 
From the databases I downloaded in PDF format the parliamentary second reading, the 





and the printable version regarding all the information appeared for each legislative 
procedure. Nevertheless, due to the long observation period, documents were not 
entirely downloadable in either the database. Dossiers of the third and fourth 
legislatures were not available electronically and data collection was conducted 
manually in the respective printed versions of the Official Journal of European Union. 
Even though the legislative texts of the European Parliament and the Council were easy 
to find out in the Official Journal, the joint texts, on the contrary, was quite a 
cumbersome task. Transparency and access to documents of the Conciliation 
Committee are still an issue. The joint text, indeed, is not published in the Official 
Journal until it does enter into force. Since the joint text is conceived as a working paper 
intended as a compromise of trialogues, belonged to the delegations to the Conciliation 
Committee, I requested the non-downloadable joint texts from the public registers of the 
European Parliament and the Council. 
The amount and the type of documents matter. In this analysis, I selected three relevant 
documents for each conciliation dossier, on which the estimates were based: the second 
reading of the Parliament, the Council common position and the joint text. The selection 
of the three documents follows how the Conciliation Committee operates, as illustrated 
in Chapter 2. Document processing involves 537 files. 
4.1.2. Document processing 
Before documents becoming Wordfish-usable data, they need to be processed. 
Document processing entails the correction of texts of mistyped and misspelled words, 
the removal of unnecessary information as well as word stemming.  
I reviewed the documents and corrected the mistyped and misspelt words, employing 
also the spelling and grammar check of Microsoft Word. Extensive review was 
necessary because Microsoft Word tool detects mistyped, rather than misspelt, words. 
For example, a word ‘form’ that should be ‘from’ is not detected because it is correctly 
written, even though it has a different meaning. Moreover, the tool is unable to detect 
words which contain numbers (e.g. ‘col1ect’ instead of ‘collect’), unless not properly 
check in the options of the software. These two kinds of errors are extremely relevant, 
66 
 
also taking into account that a lot of the old collected documents were scanned, 
converted in PDF files, and then translated into machine-encoded text through the 
Optical Character Recognition (OCR). As a consequence, this conversion procedure is 
not fully accurate and produces misspelling and mistaken words, which are undetected 
by Microsoft Word. I checked all the documents manually in order to correct the 
mistyped words, then I used JFreq19. As extensively described later, JFreq create a term-
document matrix, in which all words in the document are counted. The frequency-word 
file lists all the words – also the misspelled and mistaken  – contained in the text, and I 
could correct them thanks to an open-source software for text editing – Notepad ++. 
With this text-editing program, I deleted unnecessary parts, for example references to 
the author (Council, Parliament or Conciliation Committee), the competent directorate-
general or subunit of the Commission and the number of pages, regular expressions as 
well as symbols and abbreviations. Abbreviations referring to units of measurement, 
mathematical or chemical formula, irrelevant footnotes, such as those referring to 
international conventions or EU legislation, and acronyms of international organizations 
or institutions were removed.  
After being corrected, the texts are ready to be processed by JFreq, which can remove 
stopwords and stem words as well as create a term-document matrix in comma-
separated value format (CSV format). Stopwords are words that are so common in a 
language, such as “and”, “then”, “but”, whose information value is almost zero and 
whose estimation would be then inefficient. Other words were considered as stopwords 
in the present analysis: because they are so common that they could have distorted the 
final analysis. These were “article”, “annex”, “paragraph”, “whereas”, “OJ” (meaning 
“Official Journal”) and so on. In order to remove these words in an efficient way, I 
produced a txt file in which I collected all the words having unnecessary information, 
then I uploaded it to JFreq. The removal of unnecessary information can be done with 
                                                             
19 JFreq is an open-source tool, which counts word frequency for text. JFreq contains several data 
preparation features, namely data importation from text documents, conversion to plain text, conversion 






either pattern-matching using PYTHON scripts or JFreq, which has the advantage to 
have a GNU interface.  
The last two features of JFreq – word stemming and the creation a word count dataset – 
can be done also using the text mining packages in R called TM, which have the same 
rationale behind. First of all, both JFreq and TM contain algorithms able to remove 
morphological and inflexional endings from words, fixing a predetermined language. In 
the cases under examination the fixed language was English, so the stemmer reduce the 
words according to the English dictionary. The advantage is that words with the same 
root are captured as one unique word, making the estimation more efficient (Proksch 
and Slapin 2009): “working”, “worker” and “works” are stemmed into the root word 
“work”. Unfortunately the stemming process has two potential disadvantages. Firstly, 
certain compound words are stemmed losing information. Secondly, stemming  based 
on one language dictionary. I employed Notepad++ to delete non-English words 
referring to national institutions, but I maintained those words that are getting common 
also in the English lexicon, as for example Latin or other foreign words, such as “inter 
alia”, “mutatis mutandis” and “Leitmotiv”. 
It is worth noting that the removal of stopwords, abbreviations, legends, footnotes are at 
the researcher’s discretion, others might disagree with one’s decisions. Since the 
objective of this study is to focus on the specific content of the legislative texts, these 
words could interfere in the final analysis. 
Finally, JFreq is run and it produces a term-document matrix containing all words 
employed in the legislative texts in rownames, and the word frequencies for each 
legislative text in columns. Figure 4.1 illustrates the csv files of the codecision dossier 
COD/2005/0239: the first 25 words were here printed as example. The stemmed word 
“accommod” recurred 23 times in the joint text and in the Parliament’s position, 12 
times in the common position. 
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Figure 4.1: The csv file processed by JFreq 
 
In the section on validation, I examine the validity of these estimates comparing them 
with those produced using five documents (adding, therefore, the Commission proposal 
and the first reading of the Parliament), although these first two documents are ignored 
during the Conciliation Committee’s negotiations. 895 documents were then collected 
and processed according to the procedure developed in this section. As a result, 179 
term-document matrices were created, containing three or five columns so to produce 
Wordfish estimates based on three or five documents. 
Once the term-document matrix is created, Wordfish can be run on the word count 
dataset. 
4.2. Text analyses 
4.2.1. Wordfish 
Wordfish is a recently developed quantitative text analysis, that estimates positions 
from texts on a predefined single policy dimension by relying on word frequencies. It is 





hand-coding techniques. Wordfish is an automated scaling technique, developed to run 
with the R statistical software. This technique has already been employed to several 
textual documents (manifestos, speeches, statements and pledges) in order to measure 
policy positions of political parties and interest groups in Germany, Japan, Italy and the 
European Union (Ceron 2012; Klüver 2009; Proksch, Slapin, and Thies 2011; Proksch 
and Slapin 2010; Slapin and Proksch 2008).  
Wordfish assumes that relative word frequencies of textual documents provide 
information about actors’ placement in the policy space, since they determine the 
differences between several documents scaling on a latent single dimension. 
Frequencies are assumed to be generated by a Poisson process (following an extensive 
literature on textual analysis20), which has the merit of having a single parameter    , 
mean and variance coinciding. 
Hence the stochastic component of the model is  
            (       ), 
Where     is the count of word j in actor i's document (e.g. manifesto, speech, 
legislative text, etc.). The systematic component is estimated through an expectation 
maximization algorithm, which allows computing maximum likelihood estimates for 
latent variables. The algorithm involves two steps: in the first step the expectation of the 
latent variable is calculated as if it were observed; in the second step the log-likelihood 
is maximized conditional to the expectation. The systematic component is 
     𝑥 (          ). 
Where α is a set of actor fixed effects and controls for the length of the documents under 
examination, that is to say, the possibility that some actors write or talk more. ψ is the 
word fixed effects and capture the fact that some words such as prepositions, articles, 
stopwords, etc. are more often used than other words by all actors without substantive 
                                                             
20 For a review see Slapin and Proksch (2008, 708) 
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meaning. β is an estimate of a word specific weight capturing the importance of word j 
in discriminating between positions, and ω is the estimate of actor i's policy position.  
The two parameters of interests are β and ω. ω represents the policy positions of textual 
documents. Studies employing Wordfish have analysed party, faction or interest group 
positioning along a policy latent dimension, which is not estimated  a priori. The actors’ 
ideal points are then located along this scale whose meaning is deduced according to the 
political content of the documents. For instance, Slapin and Proksch’s (2008) work 
aimed at identify a generic left-right dimension, by using the entire party manifestos of 
Germany’s post-reunification era. They captured also party positions on specific policy 
issues – economic, societal and environmental policies – by running the algorithm on 
policy-specific sections. Since the present analysis deals with institutions’ legislative 
documents, Wordfish estimates the institutions’ positions. The institutions’ positions are 
scaled along a single bargaining dimension, that should not be interpreted as a Euclidian 
policy dimension.  
The other parameter, β, captures the importance of a word and, through the log-
likelihood estimated for every word, the algorithm reduces the weight given to words 
that are mentioned very infrequently which might discriminate across texts. As a result, 
words with large weights have a politically relevant connotation. Moreover, highly 
frequent words have a discriminating power close to zero, while words that appear in a 
few documents have higher values of β.  
Wordfish has advantages and drawbacks, when comparing with other techniques of text 
analysis. As Slapin and Proksch (2008) explain, the usefulness of computer-based 
analysis implies replicable and reliable estimates as well as a straightforward and fast 
technique to implement, in comparison of hand-coding analysis, such as the 
Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge, Robertson, and Hearl 1987; Budge et al. 2001). 
In addition, Wordfish has other advantages vis-à-vis other computer-assisted 
techniques, such as Wordscore (Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003). Wordfish assumes the 
word usage remains constant over time and randomly distributed, by producing time 
series estimates. A manifesto from party A at time t+1 is simply treated as a new 
document and it is assumed to be unrelated to party A’s manifesto at time t. As a result, 





usage remains constant, the position of that actor would be unaltered. Moreover, 
Wordfish does not require, unlike Wordscore, the use of reference texts and reference 
values to anchor the documents in order to fix the underlying policy continuum. Instead 
of estimating manually the extremes of the political space, word usage of political actors 
provides information about their placement. This feature is extremely relevant for the 
present analysis. Reference values as well as the reference texts21 would have been 
problematic when considering the identification of the reference text and the appropriate 
extremes of the political space for the conciliation files. In other words, it would have 
been impossible to recognize both the underlying political dimension for each proposal 
and the respective extremes of those dimensions, which is what Wordscore requires. 
Finally, Wordfish has also some problematic features though. It constrains positions on 
a single dimension, estimated by the parameter ω. In their analysis, Slapin and Proksch 
(2008) find an underlying left-right dimension in political manifestos22, but I cannot 
have the same expectation for the documents under examination in this study. The 
extraction of policy position in my case derives from legislative documents of 
institutions and not from party manifesto or parliamentary speeches. The documents, 
therefore, are not sample of ideological statements in which is possible to identify 
words and lexicons of a particular ideological area of reference. On the contrary, the 
legislative texts are institutional positions and thus do not contain reference to a likely 
left-right dimension, rather they can distinguish themselves on a specific dimension 
according to the policy issue at stake. The fact that there tends to be a privileged 
dimension of conflict in bicameral bargaining brings some solace (Tsebelis and Money 
1997, 90), although more than one dimension may persist in these negotiations (König 
et al. 2007).  
 
                                                             
21 Wordscore obtains reference value and the reference texts from previous expert survey (Laver, Benoit, 
and Garry 2003).  
22 To obtain specific policy positions, researchers have to run the model only on manifesto sections 
regarding that specific policy. In this sense, if researchers want to estimate positions on economic policy, 
they have to isolate the manifesto sections on economic policy only. 
72 
 
Wordfish has been run for each legislative dossier at one time, so it produces estimates 
of the three (or four) institutions’ position. The documents contain on average more 
than 600 unique words when three texts are analysed together, and around 750 unique 
words when five texts are analysed. Table 4.2 synthetizes the descriptive statistics of 
each dossier’s unique words, appearing on the document matrices, in case of three and 
five documents. According to Proksch and Slapin (2009), the documents are long 
enough to avoid concerns about the stability of word parameters. They are unlikely to 
produce infinite weight for words.  
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics on unique words. 
4.3. Does Wordfish produce correct estimates? 
In this section I report the results of a validation exercise of the text analysis. The trade-
off between validity and reliability is central to the debate over hand-coding or 
computerized techniques, since usually hand-coded measuring is associated with low 
reliability but high validity, while computer-assisted technique has the advantage of 
having high reliability, but low validity. The validation exercise consists of an 
investigation of Wordfish as a valid technique for extracting information from texts, as 
well as the generalizability of the measures (external and internal validity) and the 
extent to which the procedure yields the same results on repeated trials (Neuendorf 
2002, 112).  
Despite Krippendorff (2004, 211) refers to qualitative text analysis, his definition of 
reliability is crucial.  
A research procedure is reliable when it responds to the same phenomena in the 
same way regardless of the circumstances of its implementation [...] In content 
analysis, this means that the reading of textual data as well as of the research 
Dossier Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
With 3 documents 179 636.5642 337.84 86 2451 





results is replicable elsewhere, that researchers demonstrably agree on what they 
are talking about.  
Reliability of policy positions estimated through computer-assisted text analysis is not 
an issue, though. In order to guarantee the reliability of Wordfish output over time, I 
extensively explain the procedure I employed for document collection and processing.  
Does Wordfish ensure the validity of estimates? “are we measuring what we want to 
measure?” (Neuendorf 2002, 112)23. Validity, indeed, might be problematic in Wordfish 
estimates. Many scholars adopting Wordfish rely on the β estimators – which 
discriminate policy positions in the text drawing on word weights – to verify the 
validity of the results with hand-coding approaches. The higher the word weight (β), the 
more the word is responsible for the estimation of the text’s policy position. On the 
contrary, word fixed effects ( ) capture the word frequency. The higher word fixed 
effect, the more frequent the word is used in the text and the less such word 
discriminates across policy positions. By contrast, words mentioned very infrequently 
carry on high political meaning. This is the essence of the “Eiffel Tower of the Words” 
(Slapin and Proksch 2008), which plots the estimated word fixed effects and the word 
weights. As an illustrative case, in Figure 4.2 I plot the β and   estimators regarding the 
dossier on Banana Accompanying Measure (COD/2010/0059).  
As expected, the scatterplot takes the shape of an “Eiffel Tower of words”. Frequent 
words (as banana, European, environment, etc) have large fixed effects associated with 
weights close to zero.  
However, I decided to test the validity of Wordfish differently, for two main reasons. 
First, many words have the same β and  , and it is hence difficult to assess validity. 
Second, I performed Wordfish in 179 dossiers and I cannot reproduce here the analysis 
for each dossier. In the next sections, Wordfish will be tested for its validity, by 
                                                             
23 According to Slapin and Proksch (Slapin and Proksch 2008), the stability of the word parameters 
improves if the estimation is performed using more and longer documents. I do not have a problem of 
length in my case and in the following section I consider the possibility in including five documents in the 
estimation procedure. On the other hand, using documents from different dossiers is meaningless because 
it implies applying a single dimension to different policy areas. Moreover, this process cannot be 
sustained by Wordfish, since it is not able to run all the documents at the same time. 
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comparing its estimates with those derived from three alternative procedures: Wordfish 
estimation employing five official documents, hand-coding and expert surveys. 
Figure 4.2: Word weights vs. Word fixed effects in COD/2010/0059 
 
4.3.1. Comparison with EP success estimates based on five documents 
In this section I consider the addition of two more documents in the estimation process 
through Wordfish: the Commission proposal and the first reading of the Parliament. 
Note that this is not how the Conciliation Committee operates. The first two documents 
are ignored. Despite some freedom of manoeuvre (Tsebelis and Money 1997, 176–9), 
negotiations tend to be germane, with the two delegations bargaining over a four-
column working document listing the second reading of the Parliament and the common 
position of the Council, along with the updated positions of the two delegations. 
In Chapter 5, I will extensively clarify how I obtained such variables and the 





though. Through Wordfish, I have produced the ω estimates of the second reading of the 
Parliament, the common position of the Council and the joint text using five documents, 
and computed the dependent variable, EP success, which measures the bargaining 
success in a given dossier d: 
    𝑢𝑐𝑐      {
     |    −    |   |   −    | 
     |    −    |   |   −    |
 
This variable measures the differences between the two legislators’ positions and the 
final agreement of the Conciliation Committee and it takes the value of 1 when the 
Parliament’s second reading position is closer to the joint text than the Council common 
position, otherwise it takes the value of 0. As extensively explained in the next Chapter, 
ω estimates allow the operationalization of EP success. This variable is positively and 
significantly correlated with the EP success measure based on three documents, but the 
correlation is not substantively large (Spearman's correlation coefficient rho is 0.3380, p 
< 0.001). 
As Chapter 1 illustrates, conciliation negotiations are likely to be structurally biased 
against the Parliament. Findings reveal that the Council is in a successful bargaining 
position, not only according to the three-document measure, but to this five-document 
one as well. The five-document estimates of the joint text are closer to the position of 
the Parliament in only 74 of the 179 dossiers. In Table 4.3, I show the results of 
binomial tests with an epiphenomenal Conciliation Committee as null hypothesis. The 
probability that the expected frequency of success, in case of an epiphenomenal 
committee, exceeds the observed frequency is above 99 per cent in the full sample and 
the fourth legislative term. There are some important differences as well though. The 
probability of parliamentary success is not significantly less than 0.5 in the fifth and 
sixth terms. The five-text estimation procedure picks up then a strengthening of the 
Parliament over time (not because of the second version of the codecision procedure24 as 
                                                             
24 The second version of the codecision procedure was introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and 
the most substantive provision, for the purpose of this study, regards the reform in the conclusive stage. 
Under the Treaty of Amsterdam, in the case the Conciliation Committee does not reach any agreement, 
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its effect is insignificant) or, perhaps, finds it harder to distinguish between the last three 
documents as legislators interact more closely (with trialogues) as they are approaching 
to conciliation. 
Table 4.3: Frequency of parliamentary success (ω estimates based on 5 documents) 
    EP legislative term 
    IV V VI 
EP success 74 18 41 10 
N 179 59 86 23 
z-statistic -2.32 -2.99 -0.43 -0.63 
Pr (k>= EP success) 0.992 0.999 0.705 0.798 
Note: One-sided binomial probability tests; k is the expected frequency in case of 
H0=0.5 
What else can explain these differences? And, more importantly, which measure is more 
valid? If changes have occurred during a procedure, the first two documents may be so 
different from the last three that it would be meaningless to impose a single dimension 
upon all five texts. The validity assessment of Wordfish estimates, measured upon three 
documents instead of five ones, needs to investigate under which conditions the 
estimated difference might occur. 
Determinants of the difference 
I examined several variables, which might have an impact on the different bargaining 
success estimate upon three or five documents. These variables measure changes 
occurring throughout the legislative process, such as changes in the type of procedure 
(from cooperation to codecision), in rapporteur, in the Commission (from Delors, to 
Santer, Prodi and Barroso Commissions) or even in the Commissioner responsible (for 
example, the directive on the quality of bathing water, COD/2002/254, was bargained 
under the lead of Margot Wallström, first, and Stavros Dimas, later, both Commissioner 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
the act is dismissed. The Council can no more reinstate its prior position, as occurred under the Treaty of 
Maastricht. In the fifth Chapter I will explain how the Treaty of Amsterdam is likely to have changed 





for Environment) as well as the number of months passed between the parliamentary 
first reading and the Council common position.  
The variables are operationalized in the following way. The dependent variable,  
EPsuccess_3_5, compares the results from the EPsuccess measured with three 
documents or with five documents. It takes the value of 1 whether the two measures 
coincide. Changes in the type of procedure, Changed procedure, takes the value of 1 if 
the dossier was subject to the cooperation or consultation procedure and then it was 
subject to codecision, while it was negotiated at various stages of the legislative process. 
Changed rapporteur measures changes in the rapporteur over the legislative process, so 
it takes the value of 1 if the change occurred. Finally, Changed Commission and 
Changed Commissioner take the value of 1 if the Commission and the Commissioner 
responsible, respectively, have changed between the adoption of the first reading of the 
Parliament and the joint text. Finally, the last variable concerns the length of the 
legislative process, in particular the monthly time span between the parliamentary first 
reading and the Council common position.  
Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics of the independent variables 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Dependent variable 
Differences in success 179 0.687 0.465 0 1 
      
Independent variables 
      
Changed procedure 179 0.168 0.375 0 1 
Changed rapporteur 179 0.140 0.348 0 1 
Changed Commission 179 0.341 0.475 0 1 
Changed Commissioner 175 0.417 0.495 0 1 
Procedure length 179 0.299 0.432 -0.11 3.34 
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In order to better understand the validity of three-document estimates, I consider as 
control variables also the three explanatory factors, which will be better examined in 
Chapter 5: institutional features, factors concerning uncertainty and veto threats, and 
implementation of the measures. I show four models with the variables identified as 
determinants in explaining outcomes of the Conciliation Committee’s negotiations.  
Table 4.5 summarizes these explanatory variables and gives their concise description 
and operationalization, to which I dedicate Chapter 5.  
Table 4.6 shows the four models and the likely determinants of the differences in 
parliamentary success between the Wordfish estimates based on five documents and 
three documents. The five explanatory variables on changes cannot explain these 
differences. However, including the three factors on institutional features, uncertainty 
and veto threats, and implementation, two seem significantly relevant. In model 3 and 4, 
indeed, the shares of parliamentary amendments and the unanimity rule within the 
Council are statistically significant when both the change of the Commission and of the 
Commissioner responsible are included. First, when the Commission decides to reject 
all the parliamentary amendments at second reading, rather than half of them, the 
chances that the two measures based on three and five documents increase their 
divergence by 25.4 percentage points. This could indicate that in the circumstances 
where the Commission accepts all the second reading amendments, the greater 
Parliament’s intervention on the final legislative outcome means substantive difference 
across the five legal texts. Given that Wordfish imposes a single underlying dimension 
upon which the actors bargain, such divergence across the five legislative documents 
might be problematic.  
Second, the two measures diverge when the Council decides by unanimity. The five-
document estimate displays a split-the-difference outcome (six parliamentary wins out 
of fourteen cases), while the three-document estimate displays a poor parliamentary 
performance (only one parliamentary win). Certainly, selecting a measure on the basis 
of whether it corroborates the expectation is questionable, but I have doubts how valid a 
measure is, if it indicates equal power between Parliament and Council even when the 





In the next section, I discuss how hand-coding estimates also correlate more with 
Wordfish estimates based on three rather than five documents. On balance, the former 
procedure seems to produce more valid measures. 
Table 4.5: The explanatory variables 
Variable Description Operationalization 
 Institutions  
 
Unanimity 
Unanimity prescribed by the 
Treaty for Council’s decisions 
= 1 if unanimity is 
required, 0 otherwise 
Codecision II 
Committee negotiations have 
taken place after 1 May 1999 
= 1 if 2
nd
 version of 
codecision, 0 otherwise 
MEPs 
The size of the assembly at the 
time of the adoption of the joint 
text  
Number of MEPs 





Rapporteurs from large parties 
may service better their 
assembly 
= 1 if rapporteur in 
leadership position, 0 
otherwise 
Large party rapporteur 
Rapporteurs in a position of 
leadership within the Parliament 
may service better their 
assembly 
= 1 if rapporteur from 
EPP or PES, 0 otherwise 
Government rapporteur 
Rapporteurs from national 
parties that are represented in the 
Council 
= 1 if rapporteur from 




Belief manipulation when 
President comes from a new 
member state 
ln(no. of membership 
years of President 
country) 
Term length 
Belief manipulation at the 
beginning of term 
No. of months into 
parliamentary term 
 Implementation  
 
Commission rejection 
The influence of the 
Commission  
Share of EP amendments 
rejected by Commission 
Directive 
The relative involvement of the 
two sets of implementers 
= 1 if directive, 0 
otherwise 
 Other factors  
 
New act 
Parliament empty-handed when 
failure occurs 
= 1 if new act, 0 
otherwise 
Package 
Deals within the Council and 
compromise level with the 
Parliament. 




Table 4.6: Determinants of differences in parliamentary success 
 Model_1 Model_2 Model_3 Model_4 
Changes     
Changed procedure -0.103 -0.138 -0.395 -0.446 
 (0.298) (0.304) (0.387) (0.387) 




 reading -0.200 -0.110 -0.0629 0.136 
 (0.265) (0.262) (0.341) (0.308) 
Changed rapporteur -0.180 -0.0194 -0.131 0.0376 
 (0.312) (0.297) (0.342) (0.319) 
Changed Commission 0.170  0.393  
 (0.252)  (0.348)  
Changed commissioner  -0.137  -0.0962 
  (0.223)  (0.274) 
Institutions     
Unanimity   -0.971** -0.858** 
   (0.397) (0.405) 
Codecision II   -0.292 -0.254 
   (0.266) (0.264) 
MEPs   0.264 0.246 
   (0.231) (0.232) 
Veto threats and reputation     
Leader rapporteur   0.208 0.222 
   (0.241) (0.243) 
Large party rapporteur   0.0590 0.0573 
   (0.226) (0.223) 
Government   0.259 0.222 
   (0.221) (0.228) 
President state seniority   0.125 0.103 
   (0.139) (0.139) 
Term length   0.104 -0.200 
   (0.352) (0.330) 
Implementation     
Commission rejection   0.786** 0.773** 
   (0.368) (0.383) 
Directive   -0.323 -0.326 
   (0.244) (0.252) 
Other factors     
New act   0.296 0.222 
   (0.248) (0.236) 
Package   -0.339 -0.320 
   (0.252) (0.256) 
     
     
Constant 0.535*** 0.603*** -1.817 -1.274 
 (0.128) (0.139) (1.608) (1.595) 
     
Observations 179 175 179 175 
Log-pseudolikelihood -110.5 -108.1 -102.4 -101.4 
Wald chi2 1.439 1.694 19.27 16.11 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     





4.3.2. Hand-coding text analysis 
Because Wordfish has never been used to extract policy positions from legislative 
documents, I have compared its estimates with those derived from hand-coding. I 
randomly selected twenty legislative dossiers25 and compared the joint text with the 
second parliamentary reading and the Council common position.  
The twenty procedure proposals were analysed qualitatively, by tracking amendments 
through the last three stages of the legislative procedure. Amendments reflect 
differences between the institutions’ positions, upon which some forms of bargaining 
among the EU institutions – Council of Ministers, European Parliament and 
Conciliation Committee – can take place. As Tsebelis et al. (2001) point out, 
amendments are the solution institutions give to cases of manifest disagreements: “once 
such disagreements exist they are resolved one way or another mainly because of the 
influence that different actors exercise in the law-making process”. Consequently, 
amendments and changes assess empirically the influence of each actor on the final text 
of the European legislation. 
I coded more than five hundred modifications, roughly following Tsebelis et al. (2001). 
These include Parliament’s and Council’s amendments as well as changes produced by 
the joint text. I determined whether the wording of the joint text provisions could be 
easily associated with the wording of the relevant provisions in either the reading of the 
Parliament or the Council common position. Hereafter, the guidelines I followed to 
apply the classification of the provision modifications. 
First, for each procedure files a spread-sheet was created in which each row refers to 
amendments and changes, while the column represents the last three stages of the 
procedure, namely the Council common position, the Parliament’s position at second 
reading and the joint text. Each amendment and each change generates a profile, 
indicating the actions taken. Second, a judgement is made as to the degree to which the 
                                                             
25 These are COD/2005/0239; COD/2005/0191; COD/2004/0175; COD/2003/0168; COD/2001/0257; 
COD/1998/0336; COD/1998/0289; COD/1998/0195; COD/1997/0370; COD/1997/0176; 
COD/1997/0067; COD/1996/0085; COD/1997/0146; COD/1995/0209; COD/1995/0080; 
COD/1994/0222; COD/1994/0135; COD/1993/0471; COD/1992/0426; COD/1992/0415. 
82 
 
provisions in the joint text are more similar either to the second reading of the 
Parliament or the Council’s common position. 
If the joint text was adopted verbatim either version of the text, this amendment was 
labelled EP2 adopted or CP adopted. If the joint text modified either the Parliament’s or 
Council’s version without altering its substantive meaning, I labelled this amendment 
EP2 partially adopted or CP partially adopted.  
Where I could not determine easily whether the provision in the joint text was more 
similar to either one of the other two documents’ versions, I used three coding 
categories: a) Partially changed for circumstances where the joint text provision 
modified by less than 40 per cent of the wording of both the parliamentary and Council 
variant, b) Largely changed if the joint text provision modified by more than 40 per cent 
such wording, and c) New/deleted when a new provision was introduced or both the 
Council’s and the Parliament’s variants were deleted. This classification scheme is 
illustrated in Table 4.7. 
This classification scheme errs on the side of caution. It is worth noting that the 
assessment of the degree of adoption is based on subjective judgements. Two coders 
can disagree on the degree of adoption because of very slight differences that can occur 
in those texts. 
Table 4.7: Classification scheme for hand-coding modifications 
Can the joint text provision be easily associated with the relevant provision in either 
the reading of the Parliament or the Council common position? 
Yes 
Substantive meaning Labels 
EP2 Amendment is adopted verbatim EP2 adopted 
CP Amendment is adopted verbatim CP adopted 
EP2 Amendment is partially adopted EP2 partially adopted 
CP Amendment is partially adopted CP partially adopted 
No 
Less than 40% of the words of both texts modified  Partially changed 
More than 40% of the words of both texts modified Largely changed 
New text or both Council’s and EP’s versions removed New/deleted 
Given the complexity of some legal texts, determining whether the changed provisions 





Starting from a straightforward example, take article 1 of the draft directive establishing 
a Community vessel traffic monitoring and information system (COD/2005/0239). The 
common position read: 
Article 1 point 9(2-c) - information on the coastline of the Member States, 
which will assist the assessment of a ship in need of assistance in a place of 
refuge, including the description of environmental, economic and social 
factors and natural conditions. 
In its second reading, the European Parliament added the bold sentence and deleted the 
italicized text of the common position: 
Article 1 point 14(2-c) - information on the coastline of Member States and 
all elements facilitating a swift assessment and a rapid decision 
regarding the choice of place of refuge for a ship in need of assistance, 
including the description of environmental, economic and social factors and 
natural conditions. 
In the end, the Conciliation Committee agreed on the following provision in the joint 
text. The delegations modified slightly the previous parliamentary position, deleting the 
text in italics above and adding the word in bold. 
Article 1 point 11(2-c) - information on the coastline of Member States and 
all elements facilitating a prior assessment and rapid decision regarding the 
place of refuge for a ship, including a description of environmental, 
economic and social factors and natural conditions. 
In this occasion, the joint text changed marginally the article of the Parliament and it is 
easy to determine that the final provision is partially associated with the parliamentary 
second reading. The Conciliation Committee took a position as close as possible to the 
Parliament’s position, even though with slight modifications. I coded, therefore, the 
provision as EP2 partially adopted because less than forty per cent of the Parliament’s 
text was changed. 
However, a lot of provisions entail substantive changes in the positions of the 
Parliament or of the Council, and their labelling was difficult. Take the following 
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example. Article 6(1) of the draft decision on AIDS prevention (COD/1994/0222) was 
subject to several modifications throughout legislative procedure.  
The common position read: 
Article 6(1) In the course of implementing this programme, cooperation 
with non-member countries and with international organizations competent 
in the field of public health, in particular the United Nations, the World 
Health Organization and the Council of Europe. 
The Parliament at second reading deleted the italicized text above and added the bold 
text below: 
Article 6(1) In the course of implementing this programme, cooperation 
with non-member countries and with international organizations in 
particular the United Nations, the World Health Organization, the Council 
of Europe, and non-governmental organizations competent in the field 
of public health or particularly involved in the fight against AIDS and 
the prevention thereof. 
Finally, the joint text deleted the italicized text of the EP position, restated the Council 
text previously removed (underlined below) and added the bold text: 
Article 6(1) In the course of implementing this programme, cooperation 
with non-member countries and with international organizations competent 
in the field of public health, especially the United Nations and in particular 
the World Health Organization, the Council of Europe and non-
governmental organizations, competent in the field of public health or 
particularly involved in the fight against AIDS and other communicable 
diseases and the prevention thereof. 
Another example highlights that to determine the provisions of the joint text in 
comparison with the two prior positions of the Council and the European Parliament 
was not an easy task. 
Article 4(1) of the regulation on common rules for civil aviation security 
(COD/2005/0191) was substantially modified in the last stages of the legislative 





Article 4(1) - The common basic standards for safeguarding civil aviation 
against acts of unlawful interference shall be as laid down in the Annex. 
Then, the European Parliament at second reading added the text in bold:  
Article 4(1) - The common basic standards for safeguarding civil aviation 
against acts of unlawful interference that jeopardise its security shall be as 
laid down in the Annex. 
Finally, the joint text introduced changes, even though it maintained the amendment 
suggested by the European Parliament position, with a little modification, stressed in 
italics, as illustrated below. 
Article 4(1) - The common basic standards for safeguarding civil aviation 
against acts of unlawful interference that jeopardise the security of civil 
aviation shall be as laid down in the Annex. Additional common basic 
standards not foreseen at the entry into force of this Regulation should 
be added to the Annex in accordance with the procedure referred to in 
Article 251 of the Treaty. 
In this case, determining in which category of the classification scheme the provision is 
located appears difficult: did the joint text partially adopt the second reading of the 
Parliament (according to the category Partially adopted)? Or did it change what 
occurred in the Council and EP position, adding new text (according to the category 
Partially changed or Largely changed)? The parliamentary reading was not amended in 
the final text, neither its intent was totally changed, but neither the position of the 
Council was ignored. On the contrary, the joint text has introduced amendments for 
more than forty per cent of the entire text. For this reason I determined the provision 
vis-à-vis the wording of both the parliamentary and Council variant as Largely changed. 
Recital 27 of the common position of the decision for a multiannual programme on 
promotion of renewable energy sources (COD/1997/0370) provides another excellent 
example. The texts of the Council’s and the Parliament’s position were: 
Recital 27 - This Decision establishes a financial framework which should 
be the principal point of reference, within the meaning of point 1 of the 
Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission 
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of 6 March 1995 for the budgetary authority for the purposes of the annual 
budgetary procedure; account should be taken of the fact that a new 
financial perspective will be negotiated during the course of the ALTENER 
programme;  
The italicized text was deleted by the joint text and the additional text in bold was 
added: 
Recital 31 - This Decision lays down for the entire duration of the 
programme a financial framework constituting the principal point of 
reference, within the meaning of point 33 of the Interinstitutional 
Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission of 6 May 1999, on budgetary discipline and improvement of 
the budgetary procedure, for the budgetary authority during the annual 
budgetary procedure; 
In this situation, the joint text changed to a great extent the recital of the Council and the 
Parliament by deleting some parts and adding new ones, and I could not determine 
whether the Conciliation Committee took a position closer to either of the two 
institutions’ position, since they had the same. I coded the joint text response as Largely 
Changed because more of the forty per cent of the two institutions’ texts was changed. 
I did not examine whether the joint text brought changes according to the content of 
either the institutions’ position. As stated above, judgements on the degree of adoption 
may be quite subjective; coders may disagree about the substantive significance of the 
word meaning as well as the distinction between categories. The assessment of the 
degree of adoption does not get into the heart of the content question: the technicalities 
of some legislative texts are so complex that coders cannot understand completely the 
matter in question. I was therefore rather conservative in deciding whether a text was 
closer to the position of one chamber in order to ensure an acceptable degree of 
intercoder reliability. I also replicated the coding several times in order to reduce 
subjective judgment and to make the procedure the most transparent and replicable as 
possible. As a result, reliability and reproducibility go hand in hand: subjective 
measurement, particularly evident in hand-coding text analysis, can invalidate any 





may sometime be highly technical, so that it is difficult for researchers and coders to 
understand the content and to identify the exact classification scheme in order to 
allocate the text units to the predefined categories.  
For each dossier, I then produced three values: hEP2 is the sum of the number of 
modifications that have been coded EP2 adopted or EP2 partially adopted, hCP is the 
sum of the modifications coded CP adopted or CP partially adopted, hU is the sum of 
the remaining modifications. For each dossier d, bargaining success is determined as 
follows: 
            𝑢𝑐𝑐      {
       a  (           )     
      a  (           )      
𝑢               a  (           )    
 
Success is assigned to the institution that managed to insert in the final document a 
relative majority of amendments that are identical or highly similar to its version of the 
text. Success cannot be determined if a relative majority of changes cannot be easily 
associated with the version of either the parliamentary reading or the common position. 
Table 4.8 illustrates the results of this exercise. Wordfish estimates coincide with the 
hand-coding estimates in nine out of eleven dossiers where we can easily determine the 
winning institution through the hand-coding procedure. Seven joint texts have more 
similar provisions to the Council common position than to the second reading of the 
Parliament. Nine dossiers were difficult to determine unequivocally, since many 
modifications largely or partially changed the Council’s and the Parliament’s 
documents. Take the example of the directive on resale right for the benefit of the 
author (COD/1996/0085). Several amendments were changed, both partially and 
largely, while a lot of provisions were newly inserted or deleted in the final text, causing 
large discrepancies between the joint text and the two prior positions.  
Wordfish estimates based on five documents perform instead more poorly. Only six 
dossiers display the same outcome as the one produced through hand-coding. 
Hand-coding and Wordfish based on three documents produce therefore similar 
estimates. Certainly, there is a group of dossiers where hand-coding is difficult but, in 
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Table 4.8: Validity analysis through hand-coding. 
 


















COD/2005/0239 4 15 28 1 6 5 11 CoM CoM² 
COD/2005/0191 5 6 67 3 11 7 7 CoM CoM 
COD/2004/0175 11 3 2 1 11 9 3 undetermined EP² 
COD/2003/0168 0 1 15 1 4 6 2 CoM CoM 
COD/2001/0257 8 4 2 0 9 1 1 EP EP² 
COD/1998/0336 0 0 10 1 5 6 4 undetermined EP 
COD/1998/0289 2 1 10 1 1 4 4 CoM CoM² 
COD/1998/0195 2 1 7 2 4 5 3 undetermined CoM² 
COD/1997/0370 0 2 3 0 1 4 2 undetermined CoM² 
COD/1997/0176 5 2 1 0 2 0 0 EP EP² 
COD/1997/0067 0 6 11 1 5 0 2 CoM CoM 
COD/1997/0146 3 2 4 0 6 0 2 undetermined CoM 
COD/1996/0085 4 14 25 1 23 14 16 undetermined EP 
COD/1995/0209 0 0 5 0 2 0 0 CoM EP 
COD/1995/0080 2 0 2 1 4 0 0 undetermined EP 
COD/1994/0222 4 3 7 0 7 1 3 undetermined CoM 
COD/1994/0135 1 8 11 0 3 1 0 CoM CoM 
COD/1993/0471 0 0 6 1 1 0 0 CoM CoM 
COD/1992/0426 4 0 0 0 2 2 0 undetermined CoM 
COD/1992/0415 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 EP CoM² 
¹ EP if EP success = 1, CoM otherwise. ² Wordfish estimate employing five documents differs from the three-document estimates
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4.3.3. Comparison with expert-interviews estimates 
Finally, I have compared our estimates with those derived from expert surveys 
conducted by König et al. (2007). Their analysis is the first systematic empirical 
research on the Conciliation Committee and aims at investigating the bargaining success 
of the legislative actors and the factors explaining such success. This study is based on 
54 dossiers that reached conciliation between 1999 and 2002 and used a standardized 
questionnaire to interview rapporteurs or parliamentary administrative advisers and 
conciliation secretariat officers. They were asked to identify the contested issues, the 
location of actors’ positions and distances to the status quo and the outcome. 
Interviewers identify that the dossiers have more than one policy issue on which 
negotiators bargain in conciliation. Then, the scholars cross-checked the validity of 
these issues with document analysis using the activity report and the legislative 
observatory (OEIL) of the Parliament. These dossiers comprise 74 issues on which there 
was disagreement between the two chambers. If we consider issues only, König et al. 
(2007) find that the Parliament has succeeded in 56 per cent of times, while the Council 
only in 26 per cent. As we shall see in Chapter 5, my findings show that the Council is 
successful in more than sixty per cent of dossiers that reached conciliation from the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht to February 2012. Even though my analysis 
collect a broader number of cases than König et al’s, even studying the overlapping 
dossiers results are different. My Wordfish estimates, indeed, for these 54 dossiers 
indicate that the Parliament is successful in only 39 per cent of the cases. However, in 
order to validate the findings of the expert survey with the Wordfish estimates, I select 
only dossiers where interviewers identified only one conflicting issue. In this sample the 
Parliament is slightly less successful: about 38 per cent of times.  
Although König et al. tell us another story about conciliation bargaining and the 
successful actor within the Conciliation Committee, there are some doubts on the 
validity of such work. They have cross-validated their estimates with the data available 
from the Decision-making process of the European Union (DEU) project (Thomson et 
al. 2006), but the two datasets overlap only on seven issues, from five dossiers. 





dossiers: the directive on civil liability for motor insurance – COD/1997/264 – and the 
directive on takeoverbids – COD/1995/341. In both draft directives König et al. (2007) 
find the Parliament was successful, while Wordfish estimates that the Council 
provisions are closer to the joint text than the European Parliament’s positions.  
Conclusion 
I devoted the whole Chapter to the analysis of Wordfish as valid and reliable measure of 
estimating institutions’ positions from official legislative documents. Producing usable 
Wordfish data is a long and complex process which entails accurate attention to the type 
of documents I shall use for the analysis. Several steps occurred to polish the data: from 
correcting mistyped and misspelled words to deleting stopwords and highly frequent 
words that might bias the ultimate analysis. Wordfish, indeed, relies on word 
frequencies in the text to estimate policy positions. 
Because Wordfish was not tailored to extract policy position from legislative 
documents, I performed a validation exercise comparing the estimates with three 
different techniques and samples. First, differences between the three- and five-
document estimates are pretty relevant and the determinants of such differences were 
investigates. Actually, despite having inserted additional variables, which could have 
explained changes throughout the codecision procedure, unanimity and rejection of 
parliamentary amendments from the Commission are the only factors which explain 
such differences, but doubts on the validity of the measure remain. Second, hand-coding 
analysis conducted upon a twenty-dossier sample produces similar estimates to 
Wordfish. These results entrust that it is better to rely on more reliable and easily 
replicable computer-assisted technique, as Wordfish does. Third, I compare Wordfish 
estimates with those produced by the expert survey of König et al. (2007). The findings 
are not satisfying: while the former indicates the Council, the latter finds the Parliament 
as the most successful actors in conciliation bargaining. But, I am concerned about how 
reliable are König et al.’s data, since few dossiers were cross-checked with the 
Decision-making of the European Union dataset. 
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In conclusion, the results from the comparison with the three alternative procedures 
indicate that my estimates based on three documents are valid and shall be reliable data 
to conduct the quantitative analysis upon the determinants of the bargaining success in 





5. Bargaining success in conciliation 
This Chapter examines the extent of the Conciliation Committee’s decision making. It 
introduces the data and the variables I employ as well as it inspects the possible 
determinants of the Parliament’s bargaining success in conciliation. More precisely, the 
Chapter contains two broad sections. In the first section, I discuss the features of the 
dossiers having produced a joint text, namely, the legislative terms under which it was 
discussed, the type of measures, the policy area, the member state holding the 
Presidency at its adoption in the Conciliation Committee and the party membership of 
the rapporteur. Then, I provide the descriptive statistics on the variable of bargaining 
success, analysing Wordfish estimates of the official documents, and the explanatory 
variables, derived from the hypotheses in Chapter 3. In the second section, I examine 
whether these explanatory factors show statistical relationship with the Parliament’s 
bargaining success, by providing the results of the inferential analysis. 
5.1. Conciliation Committee dossiers 
The analysis on the Conciliation Committee recognizes that this dispute settlement body 
has been used only occasionally in the last two legislative terms. Figure 5.1 illustrates 
the distribution of conciliation dossiers for each legislature. 
During the fourth and fifth parliamentary term, indeed, the Conciliation Committee has 
been employed once every five Commission’s proposals and almost half of the joint 
texts were concluded in the fifth legislature, indicating significant inter-institutional 
conflict. In the sixth and seventh term, on the contrary, the Conciliation Committee was 
used in order to ease up tensions on divisive and salient dossiers, not solved by early 
agreements. Of the four dossiers, where the Conciliation Committee was unable to 
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reach an agreement, two were bargained in the fourth legislature and one each in the 
sixth and seventh.  
Figure 5.1. Codecision files per parliamentary term 
 
Conciliation dossiers vary in the legislative instruments, as well. As  
Figure 5.2 shows, directives are involved more than the half of the times (63.7 per cent), 
followed by decisions (18.44 per cent) and regulations (17.32 per cent). Interestingly, 
there is a shift in the instrument selected. Decisions were mostly used in the fourth and 
fifth legislatures (20 and 12 decisions were adopted at conciliation, respectively), while 
legislators have only adopted regulations as joint texts since the fifth parliamentary 
term. 



































Another feature of the legislative dossiers regards the policy area of the act (see Figure 
5.3). A first group of dossiers concern the most divisive policy issues: environment and 
health protection; internal market; and transport policy. The Conciliation Committee is 
mostly called to settle differences concerning environment (pollution, conservation of 
wild flora and fauna, use of natural resources), consumers and health protection, which 
represents more than 26 per cent of all dossiers. Then, more than one fifth of dossiers 
are acts on industrial policy as well as the single market and the movement of goods, 
persons and services.  
Figure 5.3: Policy areas of codecision files 
 
Finally, shipping, inland and air transport is the third most conflicting issue: almost 18 
per cent of dossiers. If these three policy issues are summed up, the number of the 
measures consists of almost two thirds of the conciliation dossiers, represented in all the 
parliamentary legislatures. Second, issues on free movement for workers, of services, 
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the fifth legislature. A bunch of policy issues represents the third group of conciliation 
dossiers. They have to do especially with relations with third countries, energy and 
energy supply, intellectual and company law (each 2.23 per cent) as well as the 
European Union borders, customs, cooperation in judicial and police matters or free 
movement of goods (1,12 per cent). 
 
Dossiers were concluded under different Presidencies of the Council. Given that 
member states joined the European Union at different years, some countries have held 
the Presidency in conciliation more frequently than others. Of the six founding 
countries, France, Germany and Italy have held the Presidency of the Council less than 
one third of all the dossiers reached at Conciliation. On the other hand, Poland, the 
Czech Republic and Hungary, which joined the European Union with the 2004 
Enlargement, presided over few conciliation meetings (only 3.3 per cent).  
Figure 5.4 shows under which Presidency dossiers reached conciliation.  











































The main characteristic of the other key negotiator – the rapporteur – is his party 
membership. Rapporteurs coming from large party group are more involved in 
conciliation dossiers. As Figure 5.5 shows, undoubtedly Socialists and EPP members 
were responsible of the majority of the measures, 38.5 and 28 per cent respectively. The 
remaining 33 per cent of dossiers is split by the Liberals and the Greens, as a first step, 
and then by deputies of the extreme left and of the Union for Europe of the Nations 
(UEN). 
Figure 5.5: Codecision files per party group of the rapporteur 
 
This introductory section offers an overview on the type of dossiers that reach the 
conciliation stage. It highlights that codecision files deal with several policy issues in 
cross-temporal dynamics and through different instruments, bargained by a large variety 
of players. As these differences among the legislators and the legislative and temporal 
characteristics of the dossiers may be important to explain when the Parliament or the 
Council, are successful in the Conciliation Committee, the next sections will explain the 
operationalization of the variables, starting from the distinction between the dependent 
and independent variables.  
5.2. Bargaining success 
The dependent variable concerns the measure of the bargaining success in a legislative 


















the other. Since the bargaining outcome might be in favour of either the Council or the 
Parliament, I use the ω estimates of documents generated by Wordfish in order to 
produce a proxy of bargaining success.  
From Figure 5.6 to Figure 5.9 I plot the Wordfish document estimates, where the 
vertical axis indicates the underlying dimension and the horizontal axis distinguishes the 
conciliation dossiers. They illustrate each document’s position for each legislative 
dossier reached at Conciliation, according to the parliamentary term under which the 
joint text was agreed upon. The results of the analysis are different by Parliament’s 
legislatures. In each figure the position of the Conciliation Committee’s tend to be 
closer to the lower end of the document scale than the Council’s and the European 
Parliament’s documents, and closer to the Council’s position than to the Parliament. 





legislatures, the Parliament and the Conciliation Committee have opposite ω estimates. 
In the following legislatures, instead, the joint text is more similar to the European 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The estimates of the document i’s position might be better analyzed through three 
indices, indicating the Conciliation Committee’s compromising or revolutionary 
locations. Compromise positions of the Conciliation Committee happen when the joint 
text is situated in between the European Parliament’s and the Council’s positions, see 
the shaded area in Figure 5.10. In this sense, because of the bicameral nature of the 
Conciliation Committee, most of the Conciliation Committee’s estimates should be 
compromise positions. On the contrary the Conciliation Committee may assume 
positions that are closer to one of the two institutions. The Conciliation Committee 
should be placed in the two shaded areas illustrated in Figure 5.11, on the right of the 
European Parliament and on the left of the Council. 
The third index measures revolutionary positions of the Conciliation Committee. 
Positions are defined as revolutionary when the distance between the Conciliation 
Committee and both the institutions is larger than the distance between the Council and 
the Parliament. The Conciliation Committee assumes revolutionary positions when it is 
placed in the shaded areas in Figure 5.12. In these cases, the final joint text brings so 
many changes and amendments that it is difficult to determine the closeness both to one 




Figure 5.10: The compromise position of the Conciliation Committee 







Figure 5.12: The revolutionary position of the Conciliation Committee 
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As Table 5.1 shows, the joint text has managed to be closer to either institution in 
almost half of all the files reaching the conciliation stage. Revolutionary positions 
represent more than one third of dossiers and, surprisingly, compromise positions of the 
joint text occur in less than one fifth of the times. Anyway, a learning process of how to 
manage the rope of negotiations within the Conciliation Committee seems at stake here: 
revolutionary positions happened more under codecision I (almost 60 per cent of the 
revolutionary dossiers) than under the Treaty of Amsterdam, while almost 90% of the 
compromise dossiers were bargained under codecision II. 
Table 5.1: Incidence of Conciliation's positions 
Positions of the Conciliation 
 
Legislative term 
 III and IV V 
VI and 
VII 
Compromise position 31 4 21 6 
17.32% 6.35% 24.42% 20.00% 
Revolutionary position 
68 40 24 4 
37.99% 63.49% 27.91% 13.33% 
Position closer to either institutions 
80 19 41 20 
44.69% 30.16% 47.67% 66.67% 
Total 
179 63 86 30 
100% 100% 100% 100% 
As already mentioned in Chapter 4, the dependent variable – EP success – is 
dichotomous and takes the perspective of the Parliament. The EP bargaining success in 
a given dossier d is the following one: 
    𝑢𝑐𝑐      {
     |    −    |   |   −    | 
     |    −    |   |   −    |
 
EP success takes the value of 1 if the absolute difference between the ω estimates for 
the second parliamentary reading and the joint text is smaller than the difference 




extensively illustrated in Chapter 4, this bargaining success variable does not deal with 
the content of the legislation, but it estimates simply the relative word usage of 
documents in order to provide information of the legislators’ positions in the bargaining 
space. Figure 5.13 shows that the Council is more successful vis-à-vis the Parliament in 
conciliation bargaining. From an overall perspective, the estimate of the joint text is 
closer to the second reading position of the Parliament in only 54 of the 179 dossiers. In 
each legislative term, the joint text has been on average more similar to the common 
position than to the second parliamentary reading. The best performance for the 
Parliament was during the fifth term where 33 out of the 86 dossiers reaching 
conciliation produced joint texts that were more similar to its reading. 
Figure 5.13: Parliamentary success, by legislative term and in total. 
 
EP success can be alternatively operationalized as (   −    )
 
− (    −    )
 
. 
Instead of being dichotomous, this alternative operationalization defines an interval 
variable and takes increasing positive values with greater success of the Parliament. 
Nevertheless, this estimate presents drawbacks. Let consider two values of    , closer 
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[        ] range (this has occurred in my data,   should not be interpreted as 
distributed along a Euclidean policy dimension). Because (   −    )
 
 is larger, this 
measure produces a higher degree of EP success in the first case even though the two 
    are equidistant from     .  
For instance, assume     −  and       . Take three different estimates of the 
joint text,     {
   
−   
 
. Consequently, EP success measured dichotomously will take 




. Therefore, only in the second case the Council 
has closer position to the joint text, while the other two cases are treated in the same 
way. On the contrary, EP success measured as an interval variable will take the 




. In other words, the continuous variable has more 
similar values in the first two cases than the third one, although the “winning” 
legislators are different. This operationalization, indeed, is biased in favour of 
revolutionary positions of the joint text, while it treats equally compromise positions, 
without distinguishing the bargaining winner. As a result, I have decided to keep only 
the dichotomous variant of bargaining success as the key dependent variable of my 
quantitative analysis. 
5.3. Determinants of parliamentary success 
This section highlights the operationalization and the descriptive statistics of the 
determinant factors of parliamentary success at conciliation. First, it focuses on the 
variables expected to affect the bargaining success according to the literature and the 
hypotheses previously investigated in Chapter 3: the institutional features, the factors 
concerning veto threats and reputation, and implementation. Then the section explores 





Three institutional features should affect the parliamentary bargaining success: the 
Council voting prescribed by the Treaty, the version of codecision and the size of the 
assembly. As shown in Chapter 2, the two delegations in conciliation structurally differ 
to each other and may affect both negotiations between delegations and negotiations 
within each institution. Although formally the Council is likely to obtain more success, 
some institutional features are likely to increase the Parliament’s bargaining power. 
Qualified majority voting for Council’s decisions, instead of unanimity, may positively 
affect the parliamentary success, because the core of the Conciliation Committee is 
larger. The variable Unanimity takes the value of one when the Treaty legal basis upon 
which the act is discussed prescribes unanimous voting, otherwise it takes the value of 
zero. Conciliation dossiers were voted by Council under unanimity in only 14 cases 
(7.82 per cent), also due to the subsequent revision of Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon 
Treaties on the procedural voting. More and more policy issues, indeed, have been 
turned to qualified majority voting and actually under the Lisbon Treaty no issue 
prescribe unanimity in the Council. The Council, indeed, has voted an even diminishing 
share of dossiers under unanimity, as Figure 5.14 shows.  
Only one of the 14 dossiers where the Council has voted under unanimity is successful 
for the Parliament and 67 per cent of the acts negotiated with qualified majority voting 
has sucessfully consolidated the Council’s bargaining position. 
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Figure 5.14: Voting in the Council, by legislative term and in total 
 
The other relevant procedural change was the substantive modification of the 
conciliation end by the second version of codecision. Reform of the codecision 
introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty may have strengthened the Parliament, because 
under Maastricht provision the Council could make a final take-it-or-leave-it offer after 
the failure of the conciliation negotiations (Garrett and Tsebelis 1996). Codecision II 
takes the value of one if the joint text has been negotiated after 1 May 1999.  
Although the first version of codecision was into force for a limited period of time – 
from 1992 to 1999 – the dossiers reached the conciliation stage are substantial, 63 
(35.20 per cent of the 179 dossiers). The impact of this institutional feature should be 
further analysed, since the descriptive statistics may encourage biased outcomes in 
favour of the Council under the Treaty of Maastricht. There is, indeed, a substantial 
reduction of dossiers successfully concluded for the Council in the first version of 
codecision (almost 80 per cent), compared to the second version (65 per cent).  
 
Finally, larger size of the assembly should work against the Parliament (Baron and 
Ferejohn 1989), because it would increase the proposal power of the parliamentary 
delegation, which become less constrained in the bargaining vis-à-vis the Council. The 
feature is relevant, as new member states have been joining the European Union, the 
Parliament has enlarged the number of deputies. I include the variable MEPs, measuring 
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committee. Figure 5.15 illustrates the distribution of dossiers reached the conciliation 
stage as the size of assembly increases. As Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU 
in the 1995 Enlargement, 626 Members of the European Parliament voted 70 per cent of 
codecision files. After the last enlargement, that has increased the size of the assembly, 
the Conciliation Committee has dealt with almost 17 per cent of the dossiers.  
Figure 5.15: Share of codecision files per size of the parliamentary assembly 
 
5.3.2. Uncertainty, veto threats and reputation 
As illustrated in Chapter 3, asymmetric uncertainty is likely to affect the conciliation 
bargaining outcomes. Some actors, as the rapporteur and the President of the Council, 
may appeal on incomplete information in order to extract more concessions from the 
other chamber. In particular, rapporteurs coming from larger party group or in a position 
of leadership within the Parliament are expected to service better the assembly. They are 
more credible to Council when they issue veto threat from the plenary. Therefore, large 
party or leader rapporteurs are more successful to extract concession from the Council. 
The existing literature on EU politics relies on preference-based explanations (Costello 
and Thomson 2011) or on the Schelling’s paradox of weakness (König et al. 2007) to 
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The variable Large party rapporteur measures the party membership and takes the 
value of one if the rapporteur is from either the European People’s Party (EPP) or the 
Party of European Socialists (PES)26. Rapporteurs coming from the two largest party 
groups deal with 67 per cent of conciliation dossiers. In each legislative term, EPP and 
PES’s rapporteurs are assigned to the largest amount of reports, with the exception of 
the sixth legislature, when smaller parties’ rapporteurs presented the majority of 
dossiers. Reasonably, most of these latter dossiers were discussed in the committee for 
Transport and Tourism chaired by the liberal Paolo Costa. Under his chairmanship 
seven out of twelve dossiers were appointed to rapporteurs coming from smaller parties, 
especially from the ALDE and the GUE group. 
Following Costello and Thomson’s (2011) measurement, I code the variable Leader 
rapporteur as one if the rapporteur held a leadership position, namely whether she is 
either (vice-)President of the party or of the European Parliament, committee  
(vice-)Chairperson at the time of the adoption of the joint text. Most of the dossiers 
were tracked by rapporteurs not in a leadership position (74 per cent of cases), both 
from an overall overview and in each legislative term.  
In addition, rapporteurs may come from parties represented in the Council. Under this 
circumstance, though, the rapporteur may instead be less effective in extracting 
concessions, because country congruence between negotiators reduces the level of 
uncertainty and, consequently, the Parliament’s favourable condition at conciliation 
(Rasmussen 2011). The variable Government rapporteur aims at testing the influence of 
rapporteurs from national parties represented in the Council. The variable is 
dichotomous: it takes the value of one if the rapporteur belongs to a national party that 
is in government at the time of adoption of the joint text. Since there were mostly 
coalition governments, all the political groups forming the coalition were taken into 
account. The reason to look at the entire composition of the coalition government, rather 
than at the biggest party, lies on the fact that most of the negotiations at the conciliation 
phase are conducted at COREPER’s level and not by ministries or deputy ministries. 
The political line adopted in the Conciliation regards that of the government as a whole. 
                                                             
26 In the 7th parliamentary term the Socialists and Democrats group substituted the Party of European 




In the case of non-partisan governments, as the case of Italy from January 1995 to May 
1996, no partisan allegiance between the Italian rapporteurs and government existed. 
Nevertheless, only 26 per cent of dossiers were conducted by rapporteurs represented in 
the Council. 
 
The Council’s President is equally involved in belief manipulation about parliamentary 
reputation. When a Council President comes from a newer member state, she may be 
more easily manipulated about the counterpart’s type, to be either an accommodating or 
a recalcitrant Parliament, and she is not completely aware about the rope of 
negotiations. The variable President state seniority is operationalized as the natural 
logarithm of the number of completed years the country of the President has been an EU 
member at the time of adoption of the joint text, because it operationalizes the learning 
curve of the member state.  
Even on the Parliament’s side, reputational incentives may work. The reputational 
incentives as discussed by McCarty (1997) are more valuable at the beginning of the 
term rather than at the end. However, electoral cycle may have an opposite effect. 
Election-minded politicians are more likely to pander their electorate at the end of their 
mandate and they may be more constrained in the bargaining vis-à-vis the Council. 
Since electoral cycle matters, I measure the variable Term length as the number of 
completed months between the beginning of the parliamentary term and the adoption of 
the joint text. The variable should be negatively associated with success if these 
incentives are more powerful at the beginning of term, vice-versa if politicians are 
concerned about re-election.  
5.3.3. Implementation 
In Chapter 3 I highlighted expectations about implementation of a measure. Two 
hypotheses were derived. First, conciliation bargaining outcome may be affected by 
what politicians expect the measures to produce on their constituencies. In other words, 
re-election minded politicians are concerned about implementation and the influence of 
the Commission throughout the decision-making is important in determining the 
Parliament’s success at conciliation. The Commission, indeed, may formally influence 
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the final legislation, by accepting or rejecting parliamentary amendments. The Council, 
conversely, needs unanimity to overcome the Commission’s opinion.  
Commonly, scholars use expert interviews to infer the role of the Commission in 
determining legislative outcomes. For instance, König et al. (2007) collect information 
on the Commission’s support across 74 issues between 1999 and 2002, based on 
interviews with MEPs and Parliament’s officials. The method does not seem suitable to 
measure the Commission’s preferences for all the dossiers at conciliation. It does not 
allow examining each conciliation dossier but only salient and relevant issues for some 
files. Therefore, in the present analysis I employ a different method to estimate the 
Commission’s orientation in conciliation. First and second readings of the Parliament, 
indeed, are subject to Commission’s opinion, which may accept or reject them. The 
influence of the Commission in conciliation is measured by the share of parliamentary 
amendments that are fully rejected by this institution – Commission rejection.  
Second, national administrations and the Commission concur to the implementation of 
measures, in different way. As explained in Chapter 3, oversight on implementation 
may occur through ex-ante and ex-post mechanisms, according to the legislative 
instruments. Where national administrations are the main implementer, the Parliament 
and the Commission may issue tough proposals, because they rely on legislative 
oversight rather than ex-post controls (Franchino 2007). The opposite occurs when the 
Commission is the main implementer.  
Since governments are more involved in implementation than the Commission in case 
of directives, I use the indicator Directive. It takes the value of one whether the 
instrument is a directive, while it takes the value of zero in the other cases, mainly 
Regulations and Decisions. According to this operationalization, 63.7 per cent of 
proposals at conciliation are directives, while the other types of instrument are the 
remaining 36.3 per cent, as illustrated by Figure 5.16. The only legislative term when 
the largest amount of other measures occurs is the last one. In the seventh term, indeed, 






Figure 5.16: Share of directives, by legislative term and in total 
 
5.3.4. New laws and package laws 
Finally, other factors, relating to the type of measures under bargaining, may affect the 
outcome at the conciliation stage. As extensively argued in Chapter 2, disagreement 
value negotiators attach to the existing situation would drive the bargaining. To some 
extent, negotiating failure is the result of high disagreement value. However, when a 
new, rather than an amending law, is on the negotiating table, the European Parliament 
may be in a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis the Council. The reason lies on the fact 
that, while national government would lose the benefits of EU-wide harmonization but 
their regulatory capacity would be unalterated, the assembly would be left without any 
EU law regulating the issue. Therefore, dossier providing a new legislation is a proxy of 
the disagreement value the actors attach to the dossier. I include the variable New act, 
which takes the value of one if the measure is not amending prior legislation. Figure 
5.17 shows that, with the exception of the seventh legislature, new acts constitute the 















Figure 5.17: Share of new acts, by legislative term and in total. 
 
Measures may be part of the same legislative package and are likely to share common 
features, i.e. the same Commission’s proposal, the same responsible EP committee, the 
same policy issue. Deals within the Council across measures of the same package could 
make this institution less amenable to compromise and thus less prone to deliver 
concessions to the Parliament. To control for this aspect I insert a variable, Package, 
that takes the value of one if dossiers either specifically mentions that are part of a 
package or have the same date of adoption of the joint text and same responsible 
parliamentary committee. Since the fourth legislative term, the cases of conciliation 
dossiers included in packages have significantly increased over time, as shown by 
Figure 5.18. The report of the Commission (European Commission 2009), indeed, 
reveals that there is an increase, in the last two legislature, in presenting policy 



















Figure 5.18: Share of package laws, by legislative term and in total 
 
5.4. A summary of the variables 
Before proceeding to the second part of the Chapter, few remarks are necessary. The 
previous sections have introduced to the determinants of the Conciliation Committee’s 
outcomes. The dependent variable highlights the parliamentary bargaining success, by 
resulting from the document comparison through Wordfish. The independent variables 
include the factors that may affect the bargaining outcome at this legislative stage, and 
in particular, the likelihood that the Parliament may enjoy a successful performance in 
the conciliation negotiations. According to the hypotheses previously presented in 
Chapter 3, three factors may encourage or obstruct the Council’s success, biased by the 
asymmetric game occurring within and between the two legislators. First, the impact of 
the institutional framework is tested through three variables: unanimity voting in the 
Council, acts voted under the Treaty of Maastricht and the size of the parliamentary 
assembly. Second, the threats of non-acceptance at third reading as well as manipulation 
process are tested by five variables related to key players involved in the bargaining. 
These variables test how influential rapporteurs are to issue threats, once they fulfil 
leadership roles, they come from large party groups and are represented in the Council. 
Reputational incentives may occur and affect the bargaining outcome, especially when 













mandate. Some of these variables are likely to corroborate alternative causal mechanism 
(e.g. large party and leader rapporteur and term length). 
Finally, the third group of determinants concern implementation, tested through two 
variables, which are connected to the role of the European Commission. I include 
variables related to the type of measures they are negotiated on, and the share of 
parliamentary amendments the Commission accepted.  
Table 5.2 provides a summary of these variables with their features and the expected 
relation with Parliament’s bargaining success. Table 5.3 shows the descriptive statistics 




Table 5.2: Variables and expected relations with parliamentary success. 
Variable Description Hp Sign 
    
Dependent variable 
Parliament’s success = 1 if |    −    |   |   −    | , 0 
otherwise 
  
     
Independent variables 
    
Institutions    
Unanimity = 1 if Council unanimity is required, 0 
otherwise 
2 - 
Codecision II = 1 if Amsterdam Treaty procedure, 0 
otherwise 
3 + 
MEPs Number of MEPs 4 - 
    
Veto threat and reputation   
Large party rapporteur = 1 if rapporteur in leadership position, 0 
otherwise 
5a/5b +/- 










ln(no. of membership years of President 
country) 
8 - 
Term length No. of months into parliamentary term 9a/9b +/- 
    
Implementation    
Commission rejection Share of EP amendments rejected by 
Commission 
13 - 
Directive = 1 if directive, 0 otherwise 14 + 
    
Control variables    
New act = 1 if new act, 0 otherwise 1 - 
Package = 1 if part of package, 0 otherwise  - 
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Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables. 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Dependent variable 
Parliament’s success 179 0.302 0.460 0 1 
      
Independent variables 
      
Institutions      
Unanimity 179 0.078 0.269 0 1 
Codecision II 179 0.648 0.479 0 1 
MEPs 179 6.391 0.547 5.18 7.85 
      
Veto threat and 
reputation 
     
Large party rapporteur 179 0.665 0.473 0 1 
Leader rapporteur 179 0.263 0.441 0 1 
Government rapporteur 179 0.402 0.492 0 1 
President state seniority 179 3.106 0.804 1.099 3.932 
Term length 179 80.84 41.69 8 147 
      
Implementation      
Commission rejection 179 0.4626 0.309 0 1 
Directive 179 0.637 0.482 0 1 
      
Control variables      
New act 179 0.559 0.498 0 1 






5.5. Explaining the bargaining success in the Conciliation Committee 
In the following two sections I inspect how these factors may influence parliamentary 
success in conciliation through a multivariate statistical analysis. First, I look at the 
systematic effects and I explore whether the parliamentary bargaining success occurs by 
chance. Second, I test the hypotheses illustrated in Chapter 3. 
5.5.1. Systematic effect of the parliamentary success 
In 30.2 per cent of conciliation dossiers, the joint text results to be closer to the 
parliamentary second reading than the common position. This proportion has been on 
average constant throughout the period under examination, with slight increases in the 
fifth legislative term (almost 40 per cent). In Table 5.4, I show the results of binomial 
tests with an epiphenomenal conciliation committee as null hypothesis (i.e. where the 
probability of parliamentary success is 0.5, a split-the-difference outcome), even when 
legislators negotiate over new measures (i.e. non amending law). The probability that 
the expected frequency of success (k) in case of an epiphenomenal committee exceeds 
the observed frequency of success is above 99 per cent in most cases. In other words, 
the Parliament significantly underperforms in these negotiations. If I consider only non 
amending laws the probabilities are similar with the exception of the fifth term. In this 
term, the probability that the expected frequency of success exceeds the observed 
frequency is slightly above 60 per cent. 
Table 5.4: Frequency of parliamentary success 
   Legislative term 
   IV V VI 












EP success 54 30 13 6 33 20 6 3 
N 179 79 59 21 86 42 23 10 
z-statistic -5.31 -2.14 -4.30 -1.96 -2.16 -0.31 -2.29 -1.26 
Pr (k>= EP success) 1.000 0.988 1.000 0.987 0.989 0.678 0.995 0.945 
Note: One-sided binomial probability tests; k is the expected frequency in case of H0=.5 
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5.5.2. Results from inferential analysis 
I perform a logistic regression with a probit link function27 to examine the relationship 
between the independent variables and the parliamentary success at conciliation. Table 
5.5 presents the results. Model 1 tests only hypotheses on institutional features 
(hypotheses 2, 3 and 4), controlling for specific characteristics of the dossiers, namely 
the inclusion in package deals and the novelty of the measure. Model 2 tests additional 
hypotheses on uncertainty about negotiators’ preferences by the main actors involved in 
conciliation (hypotheses 5a, 5b, 6a, 6b, 8, 9a and 9b). Finally, model 3 tests all the 
hypotheses, including those on implementation (hypotheses 13 and 14). Table 5.6 
shows that just a few of these factors have a substantive influence on the chances that 
the Parliament is successful in conciliation. Let us examine now the impact of each 
variable.  
The results of the statistical analysis are mixed. Table 5.5 shows that institutions matter. 
The parliamentary success is likely to increase both when the Council decides by 
qualified majority voting and after codecision reforms introduced by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. The highest Council’s voting threshold confers a veto power to the Council 
member that is the least accommodating towards the demands of the Parliament, as the 
spatial models of Tsebelis (2002) as well as Napel and Widgrén (2003) predict. This 
weakness clearly emerges from the data, since, under unanimity, the probability of 
parliamentary success decreases by between 24 to 26.5 percentage points. 
In addition, when the dossier is bargained in conciliation, according to the reform 
introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, the chance of parliamentary success increases 
by between 15.3 and 18.9 percentage points. Despite evidence to the contrary (Hix 
2002; Kasack 2004), it seems that these changes have actually strengthened the 
Parliament’s hand. This is in line with Garrett and Tsebelis’ (1996) analysis of 
parliamentary powers under the first version of codecision. These results are very 
robust. The correlation between the two independent variables and the likelihood of 
parliamentary success is statistically significant in each model: at 0.05 level in model 2 
and 3, and at 0.10 in the first model. 
 
                                                             
27 I employ a probit link, instead of a logit, because EP success reflects an underlying interval variable. 




Table 5.5: Determinants of parliamentary success 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Institutions       
Unanimity -1.043* -1.222** -1.200** 
  (0.541) (0.560) (0.546) 
Codecision II 0.471* 0.606** 0.634** 
  (0.251) (0.259) (0.266) 
MEPs -0.153 -0.175 -0.195 
  (0.217) (0.231) (0.234) 
Veto threats and reputation       
Leader rapporteur   0.190 0.257 
    (0.242) (0.256) 
Large party rapporteur   0.497** 0.476** 
    (0.225) (0.236) 
Government rapporteur   0.0417 -0.0483 
    (0.215) (0.240) 
President state seniority   -0.198 -0.269* 
    (0.140) (0.151) 
Term length   0.456 0.582* 
    (0.281) (0.300) 
Implementation       
Commission rejection     -1.015** 
      (0.396) 
Directive     0.706*** 
      (0.251) 
Other factors       
New act -0.364* -0.362* -0.433* 
  (0.208) (0.216) (0.246) 
Package -0.237 -0.318 -0.328 
  (0.244) (0.262) (0.282) 
Constant 0.460 0.362 0.596 
  (1.334) (1.547) (1.646) 
        
N 179 179 179 
Log-pseudolikelihood -102.8 -98.49 -90.74 
Wald chi2 11.79 21.16 38.01 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Dependent variable: EP success. 
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Unanimity -0.251 -0.265 -0.240 
  (0.075) (0.061) (0.057) 
Codecision II 0.153 0.189 0.185 
  (0.076) (0.073) (0.070) 
MEPs -0.052 -0.058 -0.061 
  (0.074) (0.077) (0.074) 
Leader rapporteur  0.065 0.084 
   (0.084) (0.087) 
Large party rapporteur  0.156 0.141 
   (0.066) (0.065) 
Government rapporteur  0.014 -0.015 
   (0.072) (0.075) 
President state seniority  -0.066 -0.085 
   (0.047) (0.048) 
Term length  0.152 0.183 
   (0.094) (0.094) 
Commission rejection   -0.320 
    (0.127) 
Directive   0.206 
    (0.066) 
New act -0.121 -0.121 -0.138 
  (0.072) (0.073) (0.080) 
Package -0.078 -0.101 -0.098 
  (0.078) (0.079) (0.079) 
Note: change in the probability that the Parliament is successful when a variable 
increases by one unit, all the other values being set at their means. 
Standard errors in the brackets. 
a 
The predicted values are estimated from model 1 in Table 5.5. 
b 
The predicted values are estimated from model 2 in Table 5.5. 
c 




Therefore, the two hypotheses on the voting rule inside the Council and the reforms on 
the codecision of the Amsterdam Treaty find substantive corroboration. Following 
Baron and Ferejohn (1989), in Chapter 3 I formulate the hypothesis that when the size 
of the assembly is smaller, the conciliation outcomes are more similar to the 
Parliament’s position than to the Council’s. Unfortunately, this hypothesis is not 
confirmed empirically, since there is no statistical significance. 
Moving to the large set of hypotheses on uncertainty and reputation (hypotheses 5a to 
9b), the results weakly support my expectations. Rapporteurs with certain 
characteristics may benefits the Parliament, because they are able to extract more 
concession from the Council during negotiation within the Conciliation Committee. 
Rapporteurs coming from large party, indeed, may be more credible when issue veto 
threats and may rely on larger support in the plenary, as motivated in Chapter 3. Both 
explanations may hold and are corroborated. The Parliament, indeed, is better off when 
rapporteurs come from large party and its bargaining success increases by between 14.1 
and 15.6 percentage points. 
When including other factors (in Model 3), two hypotheses are tested: the learning 
process faced by the member state holding the Council’s Presidency and dynamics 
involving the electoral cycle of deputies. First, there is weak evidence that Council 
Presidents coming from newer member states are more accommodating toward the 
Parliament, perhaps because their beliefs are more easily manipulable. If I compare two 
member states having joined to the European Union in later enlargement groups – 
Greece and Austria – the chance of parliamentary success would be lower in the former 
case. Indeed, in 1998, Greece has been a member of the EU for seventeen years, while 
Austria just joined the three years earlier. If a Greek rather than an Austrian minister 
presided over the Council in the second semester of that year, the likelihood of 
parliamentary success would lower by 13.2 percentage points. Second, despite my 
expectations, reputational incentives clearly do not seem to operate within the assembly 
at the beginning of a term as McCarty’s (1997) model suggests. The sign of the 
correlation is contrary to my expectation and it has even weak statistical significance. A 
Parliament facing elections in six months is 7.9 percentage points more likely to win in 
conciliation than a Parliament six months into its term. A weak learning process may be 
at place here or, as the interviews would suggest in Chapter 6, election-minded 
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politicians may pander the electorate. This further constraint strengthens the negotiating 
hand of the Parliament vis-à-vis the Council.  
The other hypotheses on belief manipulation and reputation are not corroborated. I do 
not find evidence that rapporteurs in a position of leadership can extract more 
concessions from the Council, although the sign is positive. Costello and Thomson’s 
(2011) opposite expectation is even so disconfirmed. Moreover, despite Rasmussen’s 
(2011) evidence, the hypothesis on party allegiance is not empirically verified. The 
Parliament is not systematically disadvantaged if the rapporteur is from a party 
represented in the Council. 
The results in Table 5.5 highlight that expectations on implementation are corroborated 
and very robust. The coefficient of Commission rejection is statistically significant at 
0.05 level and negative. When the Commission decides to reject all of the second 
reading amendments of the Parliament, rather than only half of them, the chances that 
the Parliament would win in conciliation diminishes by 32 percentage points. Of whom 
the Commission takes side matters because its role in implementation is far from trivial. 
Politicians cannot ignore the effective delivery of a measure’s benefits. This is in line 
with the finding of König et al. (2007), although I prefer a causal explanation based on 
the formal role entrusted upon the Commission in implementation rather than on 
informal bargaining resources. Certainly, the two causal stories are not mutually 
exclusive and may be related.  
The influencing role of the Commission reveals also in the implementation procedure, 
according to the type of measure. Results indicate that the probability of parliamentary 
success increases by 20.6 percentage points when national administrations are more 
involved in implementation than the Commission. Ministers are more accommodating 
because they can rely on a wide array of ex-post control mechanisms, such as public 
disclosure requirements, evidentiary standards and appeal procedures. On the contrary, 
parliamentarians are less accommodating because legislative design is the primary 
control mechanism at their disposal. In other words, parliamentarians value legislative 
design as control mechanism much more than ministers do. 
Finally, new act is considered as a proxy of the cost of disagreement value. My 
expectation is confirmed, because the Parliament’s chance of winning diminishes by 12 




accommodating Parliament may indeed indicate that its members attach a lower 
disagreement to the measure at hand than the one assigned by ministers. In other words, 
a negotiating failure is more costly to parliamentarians. On the other contrary, the 
empirical evidence does not corroborate hypothesis on package laws and even the sign 
does not confirm my expectation, that the Council, being more constrained by deals 
with among member states, may be more successful in conciliation bargaining. 
Conclusions 
In light of the descriptive and inferential statistics in the present Chapter, getting to 
conciliation is not a foregone conclusion for the Parliament. Despite the structural 
weakness, the results highlight that the Parliament have some opportunities to increase 
its chance of success in conciliation. In particular, the current setting seems to be 
favourable for the assembly: the post Amsterdam reforms as well as an ever increasing 
number of policy issues subject to qualified majority voting significantly enhance the 
probability of winning by the Parliament. Moreover, I find that the Commission exerts 
an influential role during the decision-making process, when it releases its opinion on 
the Parliament’s position. The importance of implementation is evident. The asymmetry 
in the availability of ex-ante and ex-post control mechanisms for ministers and 
parliamentarians, when the Commission or national administrations are the main 
implementers, explain the more and the less accommodating attitudes of the two groups 
of legislators. Very robust results indicate, indeed, that the Parliament is more 
successful when the Commission is at its side and national administrations are the main 
implementers. Finally, the Parliament could take advantage of other weapons but weak 
support occurs in veto threats and belief manipulation hypotheses. Only partisanship of 
the rapporteur finds enough empirical corroboration, confirming the hypotheses that 
rapporteurs coming from larger parties increase the chance of Parliament’s success. 
However, both the explanation based on veto threat and the preference-oriented 







6. Conciliation and negotiators 
In this Chapter I offer a qualitative contribution to the analysis of the factors 
determining the negotiations in the Conciliation Committee based on extensive 
interviews with key negotiators from the institutions, both in the Council, Parliament 
and the Commission, directly involved in the procedure. The interviews explored the 
influence of some of the most important theoretical arguments for more than 80 cases, 
without precluding close analyses of certain specific dossiers. There is no case 
selection: discussions involved eleven key actors, both of the Council and Parliament, 
civil servants as well as politicians about a lot of dossiers that reached conciliation. 
Some interviewees have experience over many conciliation negotiations. They know 
how legislative outcomes were affected by different factors, leading to more 
generalization. Other interviews focus on specific dossiers, therefore ignoring 
contingent factors. The interviewed negotiators broadly illustrated how the conciliation 
works and what factors determine a successful resolution of the negotiations. This 
qualitative analysis corroborates the explanatory power of some factors, and shed lights 
on other relevant mechanisms previously ignored. 
This qualitative analysis supports some of the decisions taken in the quantitative 
empirical tests. It investigates the role of the rapporteur’s party, the learning process of 
the Council President and the role of the Commission. Unfortunately, the narrow focus 
on the more recent files precludes from exploring the impact of institution. Indeed, I 
cannot control the relevant influence by institutional features, such the difference in 
terms of parliamentary power occurred between the Treaty of Maastricht and the Treaty 
of Amsterdam and the voting rule of the Council. The former was not explored because 
no interviewee dealt with dossiers so far back in time, while the latter displays no 
variation since no file prescribed unanimity. Despite these two variables were identified 
as central to our theory, the institutional setting reveals to be an influential factor in 
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determining the parliamentary success. Interviews were useful to identify two additional 
aspects: the different deadlines negotiators face and the new provisions of the Lisbon 
Treaty. 
The in-depth analysis of the dossiers accomplishes other significant, otherwise 
neglected, objectives. First, the personality of the relay actors can be examined 
qualitatively. Because of measurement difficulties, it was ignored in the quantitative 
analysis. Second, I study the role of other parliamentary actors which are involved in 
the conciliation along the rapporteur: the EP delegation chair, the party coordinators, the 
chairperson of the responsible committee. Third, public opinion may exert constraints 
on parliamentarians and has an impact on the disagreement value they attach to dossier. 
However, this last factor is likely to have implications only to those dossiers relevant for 
the public opinion.  
Finally, the qualitative analysis serves as an important reminder that the conciliation 
stage is crucial in the resolution of sharp conflicts between and within the legislative 
institutions. Conciliation is likely to be used only occasionally, but it is a mechanism of 
last resort in order to settle dispute. Even though the lion’s share of recent research on 
European legislative politics has centred on early agreements, the analysis highlights the 
importance of this instrument, as Paolo Costa (ALDE, IT) the former chairman of the 
Transport committee, pointed out: 
Conciliation was not a casual fact, it was one of the elements, one moment of the 
process [...]. We have seen it as a whole process, because it is from the beginning to the 
end, so you must take into account that there could be three levels of negotiations, being 
aware that they are. Conciliation was not a possible fact, but it was the normality. It 
was not dramatic to get to conciliation, we should not avoid it, but we used it. 
6.1. Who is more successful? 
My interviews with key negotiators probed the successfulness of the two institutions in 
the last round of this legislative procedure. All the high-ranked civil servants and 





favourable position at the last stage. Reasons rely on the different institutional 
structures. Since the Council has no deadline to issue its common position, member 
states may delay the agreement until they do not have reach a strong consensual 
position to bring to conciliation. It is of high relevance that interviewees having an 
experience over a lot of dossiers assert that the Council is in a more advantageous 
position. This corroborates the quantitative findings with Wordfish estimates, for which 
the Council is successful in almost 70 per cent of conciliation negotiations. On this vein, 
Nikolaos Tziorkas, a high-ranked bureaucrat of the Parliament, says: 
[I]f a file reaches the conciliation this is very important for the Council and therefore 
the Council has an interest in getting an agreement and therefore the Council will be 
willing to compromise. Otherwise, if something is not important for the Council, it 
remains frozen in the Council [at the first reading] for years and then it is forgotten. 
In other words, at first reading the Council may block those dossiers on which member 
states cannot reach a consensual common position. Therefore, in conciliation there are 
dossiers that are extremely important for an overwhelming majority in the Council. On 
the contrary, the Conciliation Committee has a very strict timetable and only the 
remaining underlying issues of conflict are on the negotiating table. Even though more 
parliamentary amendments than of the Council are literally adopted in conciliation, 
these treat mostly with secondary issues, strengthening the idea among key negotiators 
that the Parliament is in a weaken position vis-à-vis the Council. The same official, 
indeed, highlights this consideration. 
The last statistics says: 30% Parliament, 20% Council and 50% compromise of the 
amendments. I can tell you for numbers that we tend to have more amendments 
approved than the Council in the conciliation phase. But very often they are not so 
important, the actual provisions. 
Alejo Vidal-Quadras (EPP, ES), one of the vice-President for conciliation, went even 




[W]hen you look just to this step, if Parliament wants 100 and the Council wants 100, 
normally what the Parliament gets is 30 or 40 over 100, in the last step. That’s true. 
Even Antonio Tanca, on behalf of the Council’s Secretariat for Conciliation, 
substantially confirms the Council’s successfulness vis-à-vis the Parliament.  
The permanent representatives of COREPER 1 are involved in more than one dossier 
for an extensive period of time, unlike the parliamentarians of the responsible 
committee. The permanent representatives can develop throughout the years a more 
cohesive esprit de corp and collaboration among colleagues. Although this capacity 
cannot be measured and corroborated quantitatively, the statements of these three 
interviewees are relevant since they have negotiated many dossiers at conciliation. 
However, not every institutional and leader member of the Parliament agreed on the low 
parliamentary success. For instance, Caroline Jackson, former Chairman of the 
European Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety 
– one of the busiest legislative committees of the Parliament – pointed out that: 
[I]n the environment the Parliament was always in a powerful position, because the 
Environment Council always wanted that the legislation goes through in some shape or 
form. [...] I think that Conciliation is quite a success, because indeed involved the 
Parliament in detailed negotiations on matters of great importance. Where I was 
conscious that things were not running well was when the Parliament was asking for 
changing the legislation on the basis of the amendments passed in the committee and in 
the plenary. 
Interestingly, the successfulness of the Parliament during Jackson’s chairwomanship 
between 1999 and 2004 is confirmed by Wordfish estimates. Under her chairpersonship, 
the Council and the Parliament have tied in Conciliation Committee’s negotiations. 
While the overall statistics on bargaining success using Wordfish estimates show a 
weaken bargaining position of the Parliament vis-à-vis the Council, in the files 
bargained under Jackson’s chairwomanship the Conciliation Committee produced joint 
texts more similar to the EP readings. The joint text, indeed, results to be closer to the 





dossiers, but, if I consider only the dossiers bargained under Jackson’s chairwomanship, 
Wordfish estimates that in 18 out of 38 dossiers the Parliament is successful. 
6.2. Disagreement value 
Ending bargaining depends on the disagreement values of negotiators. Who can afford a 
negotiating failure? And who can afford to reach conciliation? The answer is 
straightforward. The institution closest to the status quo can better afford a lack of 
legislation. König et al. (2007) find that being closer to the status quo leads to more 
success at the negotiating table, because this negotiator is less accommodating. In 
Chapter 5 I find that the Parliament’s chance of winning diminishes when new acts, 
considered as a proxy of disagreement value, are negotiated. A negotiating failure 
results to be more costly to the Parliament than to the Council. 
Only few files have failed either to reach an agreement in conciliation or to be adopted 
at third reading by the plenary, bearing in mind that the Council and the Parliament 
differ on their capacity to stop bargaining. In all the dossers that fail to produce a law, 
the Council has never formally blocked the proposal, rather the Parliament has. On the 
contrary, the Parliament rejected the bills, either by its delegation in the Conciliation 
Committee, or by the whole assembly at third reading. To some extend I can distinguish 
negotiation failures as the results of interinstitutional conflicts, when the Council and 
the parliamentary delegation fail to produce an agreement, or intrainstitutional 
conflicts, when the plenary rejects the joint text, denying the agreement voted by its 
own delegation. In this section, I focus only on those dossiers that failed to reach a 
compromise either at conciliation or at third reading. 
6.2.1. The Working Time Directive 
In 2009, for the first time under the second version of the codecision, conciliators failed 
to reach an agreement
28
. The parliamentary delegation took the decision by unanimity to 
                                                             
28 Under the provisions of the Treaty of Maastricht two dossiers were rejected at the Conciliation 
Committee: the draft directive on the application of open network provision to voice telephony 
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reject any joint text. Why did the Parliament vote against it? After nearly five years of 
negotiations, the proposal for the Working Time Directive (COD/2004/0209) was not 
adopted in the Conciliation Committee. No compromise between the Parliament and the 
Council was possible because of three controversial issues: opting out clause, on-call 
time and multiple contracts. First, the opt-out clause refers to the possibility for member 
states not to apply the maximum weekly working time (48 hours) if the worker accepts 
to work longer. While the Parliament limited the opting out clause to three years after 
the entry into force of the law, the majority of the Council and the Commission were 
opposed to such a solution. Second, the definitions of on-call time and inactive part of 
on-call time were a matter of dispute
29
. Cercas, the rapporteur, pointed out that 
excluding inactive time from the period of on-call time, as the Commission and the 
Council proposed, would have been detrimental for many categories of workers, who 
have on-call duties, such as medical staff. Third, the issue deals with multiple contracts. 
Unlike the Council, the Parliament supported workers covered by more than one 
employment contract: the working time should have been calculated as the sum of the 
periods of work undertaken under each contract. The Working Time Directive was a 
collection of political considerations and institutional reasons. All the parliamentary 
members argued that it would represent a step backwards, or a “cosmetic adjustment”30, 
in comparison to the existing legislation on the working time organization and the 
European Court of Justice’s rulings. To some extent, the failure of the Conciliation 
Committee to reach the agreement was a demonstration of the Parliament’s institutional 
power in front of the Council and the Commission. As Alejandro Cercas (S&D, ES) 
argues: 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
(COD/1992/0437) and on capital adequacy and securities field of investment firms and credit institutions 
(COD/1995/0188). 
29 The Commission proposal makes the distinction. 'On-call time' means a period during which the 
worker is obliged to be available at the workplace in order to work if called upon to do so. 'Active' periods 
are the periods during on-call time when the worker is effectively carrying out his/her duties in response 
to a call. 'Inactive' periods are the periods where the worker remains on-call at the workplace, but is not 
effectively engaged in carrying out his/her duties. 





They were convinced that I did not have the absolute majority I needed for the second 
reading. [...] The Parliament felt injured and despised, but the original directive is still 
in force. 
The case of the Working Time Directive sheds light on the strong bargaining power the 
Parliament has vis-à-vis the Council. Delegates of the Parliament believed that letting 
negotiations collapse was less costly than accepting a law considered as “cosmetic 
adjustment”. Not only the parliamentary delegation attached higher value to 
disagreement than the Council, but it was more willing to take risk. As McCarty and 
Meirowitz emphasize, negotiators who are more risk tolerant should be more successful, 
because “they make tougher demands and reject more offers” (2007, 279). Similarly, 
the parliamentary delegation rejects the Council’s proposal and prefers the current 
legislation rather than the offered bill, because as Cercas, the rapporteur of the Working 
Time Directive, says: 
If we do a directive is to improve, not to do a cosmetic thing. This common position is a 
make-up, there is no change, neither in the definition nor in the opting out. There is 
nothing. [...] if it is like this we are not [in the] game. 
6.2.2. The Novel Food Regulation 
The latest dossier that failed to produce an agreement in conciliation regards the 
amending proposal on Novel Food Regulation (COD/2008/0002). The most 
controversial point was on excluding food derived from cloned animals and their 
offspring from the scope of the legislation. While the Parliament wanted a more 
constrained food labelling and expressed concerns about the use of cloned animals and 
nanotechnology for food, the Council supports a more permissive approach, backing a 
case-by-case authorisation process. Also in this circumstance the two delegations were 
in conflict and, at the same time, the EP’s delegation offered firm and tough proposal to 
the Council, by deciding unanimously. The EP vice-President in charge of conciliation, 
Gianni Pittella (S&D, IT), pointed out the non-adequated willingness of ministers to 
find compromise, even though food safety represents one of the main pillars of the 
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European Union. Pittella said the Parliament would not have been reassured by generic 
statement of the Council: 
It is not enough a little spray of face powder to satisfy consumers. The European 
Parliament asked for a credible solution. [...] Governments are keeping thinking that all 
decision are up to them. Still it is not clear that there is an institution – the European 
Parliament – that codecides. [...] [the ending] was not your fault [the Hungary 
Presidency], but it was the fault of the governments’ impasse, between different 
positions. 
Even in this dossier, parliamentary key negotiators believed the act would have been a 
façade measure, without improving the existing legislation on novel food. Since 
deputies attached a higher disagreement value to the draft Regulation than the one 
assigned by ministers, the negotiating failure was not considered as a cost. 
Sándor Fazekas, Hungary's minister for rural development, who led negotiations on 
behalf of the Council, accused the Parliament of failure “because of [its] inability to 
compromise on its request for mandatory labelling for food derived from offspring of 
cloned animals irrespective of the technical feasibility and the practical implications of 
such mandatory labelling” (Council of the European Union 2011). Nevertheless, even in 
the Council the temptation for disagreement was very high, since some member 
expressed relevant reservation on the act. According to one high-ranked bureaucrat in 
the Council’s COREPER, the opposing faction says: “If this is the price, it is better not 
having anything.” 
6.2.3. Third reading rejections 
In addition to the four cases where the Conciliation Committee did not find an 
agreement, three joint texts were not adopted by the parliamentary assembly. Aside 
from the draft directive on biotechnological inventions (COD/1988/0159), which was 
rejected according to the provisions of the first version of codecision, and the one on 
takeover bids (COD/1995/0341), the last dossier rejected at 3
rd
 reading was the draft 
directive on port services (COD/2001/0047). As far as this last dossier is concerned, the 





argued that the directive would allow workers from boats, and not only professional 
dockers as the existing legislation provided, in harbour to load in European ports. The 
EP delegation to the Conciliation Committee adopted the joint text but with sharp 
divisions, resulting with 8 votes in favour and 7 against. The Socialists, Greens/ALE, 
and GUE/NGL groups strongly opposed the idea of crew being used for cargo-handling, 
because it would have jeopardized safety standards. The parliamentary vice-President, 
Renzo Imbeni (PES, IT), instead of following his party instructions and rejecting the 
compromise, voted in favour in order to give the chance to vote to the plenary. The head 
of the codecision and conciliation unit of the Parliament, Nicolaos Tziorkas, remembers 
that:  
The German rapporteur of the EPP group wanted to find an agreement and the chair of 
delegation was Renzo Imbeni [...], who was of the Socialists. Although the rapporteur 
wanted to find an agreement and he had the support of his political group, almost half 
of the delegation,[among which] the socialists, didn’t want to have an agreement. Then 
he [Imbeni] decided to support at the very end the agreement in order to give the 
possibility to the whole Parliament to vote and decide what to do. [...] He was defending 
the prerogatives of the Parliament, not to block an agreement at the level of the 
parliament delegation, of 15 people, but then bring this to the plenary, although this 
went against the interest of his party. He did so and he explained that, he was criticized 
by his own party. But after all in the plenary there was a majority against the 
agreement, but so he felt he defended his institutional role. [...] 
In the plenary 229 MEPs (chiefly members of the PES, Greens/EFA and GUE/NGL 
groups) voted against the joint text and the bill was rejected. 
 
As a result, the few cases the legislative procedure failed to be enacted, either at 
conciliation or in the plenary, are explained by the incomplete information actors 
manage when they bargaining with each other. The value of disagreement allows 
investigating who is more likely to reject or to accept the counterpart’s proposal. In the 
four cases the Conciliation Committee failed to reach a compromise, the parliamentary 
delegation voted unanimously against the solution proposed by the Council. The drafts 
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were amending proposal to existing legislations, so the failures have left the Parliament 
with the existing EU law. Was the ministers’ disagreement value higher than 
parliamentarians’ in these cases? As far as the dossiers on Working Time and on Novel 
Foods are concerned, parliamentarians expressed clearly their rejection for the 
proposals, since they would not be better off, in comparison to the existing legislation. 
In these cases, I can state that the Parliament had high disagreement value. On the 
contrary, in the cases where joint texts were rejected by the plenary the disagreement 
value of the Parliament was rather high and discrepant between the delegation and the 
plenary. It is worth noting that, with the exception of the draft directive on the legal 
protection for biotechnological inventions, the two joint texts were reached fraught of 
tensions in the parliamentary delegations. Both dossiers, discussed under the provisions 
of the Amsterdam Treaty, faced sharp divisions in the delegations and a narrow 
majority approved the joint texts in conciliation and in the plenary
31
. 
The Parliament, in different institutional forms, attached to these files higher 
disagreement values than the Council because it discharged the dossiers. But, how does 
disagreement value affect the legislative outcome in cases of positive resolution of the 
process? It is difficult to find evidence from interviews whether there is corroboration of 
the analyses conducted both by Napel and Widgrén (2006) and König et al. (2007). 
Through a formal model, the former predict that the Council attaches a higher value to 
the status quo than the median voter in the Parliament. The empirical analysis of König 
et al. (2007) confirm the positive impact of the proximity to the status quo on the 
bargaining success of one chamber. However, in Chapter 3 I express doubts on the 
validity of such results. 
                                                             
31 The proposal for the directive on company law concerning takeover bids (COD/1995/0341) ended up in 
conciliation with 8 votes in favour, 6 against and 1 abstention; in the plenary 273 deputies voted yea, 273 
nay and 22 abstain. In conciliation the draft directive on Market Access to Port Services 
(COD/2001/0047) received 8 yea votes and 7 nay, while in plenary it counted 229 votes in favour, 209 






In Chapter 3, I discuss the structural differences between the Council and the 
Parliament. Conciliation outcomes are more successful for the Council, thanks to its 
composition, voting and amendment rules. However, other constitutional factors bias 
the legislative outcome in favour of the Parliament, such as the qualified majority 
voting and the second version of the codecision procedure, as I find in Chapter 5.  
Interviews with high-ranked bureaucrats and key participants of the Conciliation 
Committee’s negotiations do not provide sufficient information on the impact of the two 
procedural features: the modification of the codecision by the Treaty of Amsterdam and 
the gradual expansion of the qualified majority voting. Therefore, considering the 
impact of institutions on the legislative outcome is difficult. The two procedural 
changes are, unfortunately, disregarded as no interviews were performed on the dossiers 
concluded under the Treaty of Maastricht or unanimously voted by the Council. 
Nevertheless, the negotiations between the two delegations are asymmetric, in terms of 
different opportunities to affect legislation and room of manoeuvre. Interestingly, even 
though restricted to the dossiers on the Working Time Directive and Passengers’ Right 
Regulation, the two rapporteurs lend support to the Schelling conjecture. As mentioned 
in Chapter 3, constrained negotiators may obtain a more favourable outcome, because 
they have limited alternatives to their proposed policy (Schelling 1960). Members of the 
Council delegation are more constrained and cannot move their positions in favour of 
the Parliament. In other words, as two rapporteurs – Cancian (EPP, IT) and Cercas 
(PES, ES) – emphasized, they are less accommodating towards the Parliament’s stance. 
The Council wins because of how the work is set up. At the end the Council decides and 
this Europe is still hooked and addressed to the States. [...] The opening assumption is 
that the Council is stronger, no matter, in the Council [the legislation] cannot pass, 
while here it certainly goes further. 
There is a huge insistence in the whole conciliation system in order to say yea. The 
problem is that in this relation the weakest party is the Parliament. [...] The dynamic 
generating within the Conciliation Committee is all in favour of the Council, because 
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the Commission knows that either the Council positions are winning out or there is no 
conciliation. The Council has no mandate of manoeuvre.
 
The two rapporteurs affirm that the tactic adopted by the representatives in the Council 
was to invoke the binding relation with the national governments. They could not set 
different policies than what they offered because of the constraints national interests 
imposed on them. In the case of the Working Time Directive, few member states, 
among which the United Kingdom, considered the issue of the opt-out clause on the 
maximum 48-hour working week very important and defined it as the building block of 
the directive proposal. The scope of application of the Regulation on Passengers’ Rights 
marked the difference between small and big countries. Spain, sustained by a powerful 
lobby on coach transport, fixed the coverage over 250 kilometres, to exempt regional 
transport. Because of such substantial threshold, the directive would not apply to certain 
small countries, as Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg, while other countries are exempted 
as they lack of a regional transport network with routes longer than 250 kilometres. 
Spain, instead, was particularly inflexible in order to accomplish national demands. 
6.3.1. Implementing and delegated acts 
One institutional feature may affect the parliamentary success in conciliation’s 
bargaining, though. It regards new provisions introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. The 
Lisbon Treaty set down more power for the European Parliament with the newly 
inserted article 290 prescribing a new category of acts – the delegated acts. 
There are two possible avenues for delegating powers to the Commission. The 
implementing and delegated acts, laid down by articles 290 and 291 of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, repeal the comitology system established under the previous Treaties. The 
legislator may grant to the Commission the power to take either delegated acts or 
implementing acts. The former are described as supplement or amendment of certain 
non-essential elements of the legislative acts, while the letter set out uniform conditions 
for implementing EU legally binding acts. The crucial distinction between the two types 
of measure matters because, unlike implementing acts, delegated acts are subject to 





and the Council to delegate to the Commission the power to adopt "non-legislative acts 
of general application to supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of a 
legislative act" or to revoke the delegation.  
On the other hand, implementing acts are required in circumstances where the measures 
need uniform implementation across the European Union. Until the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Lisbon, implementing power was held by the Council, which delegated the 
adoption of implementing acts to the Commission. Article 291 (TFEU) directly 
authorises the Commission to adopt implementing acts, without any further involvement 
of the European Parliament. In sum, delegated acts strengthen parliamentary power: 
Parliament's veto right allows it to block a draft measure it objects, by requiring the 
Commission to present an amended proposal. 
The first circumstance the delegated acts could be employed occurred for the package 
on the External Financial Instruments
32
 in 2009. Especially during the legislative 
process of the Banana Accompanying Measures, the Council and the Parliament harshly 
debated on whether to admit delegated or implementing act. In contrast to the 
Parliament, the Council argued that the measures did not imply delegated acts, since 
strategy papers and multiannual programmes implement the broad guidelines set out in 
the regulations. These texts do not supplement or amend the basic regulations, but they 
aim at implementing the guidelines set out in the regulation. Furthermore, these 
programmes are not acts of “general application”, since they are addressed to third 
countries. The Parliament considered this interpretation as an attempt to limit the new 
powers of the Parliament. Both the EP vice-President (Alejo Vidal-Quadras) and the 
rapporteur (Charles Goerens) of the Banana Accompanying Measures agreed. 
The Council was not willing to find any compromise. They simply refused an 
appropriate interpretation of article 290. [...] They have not well understood the new 
provisions under the Lisbon Treaty [...]. Article 290 is a new article, and a new spirit of 
the convention. In that spirit all the members of the European convention aimed at 
                                                             
32 The package, which amends previous regulations, includes financial instruments for development 
cooperation: with industrialized countries (COD/2009/0059), for external actions (COD/2009/0060A), for 




giving to the EP increasing power, […] concerning the definition of strategic aspects in 
external policies. And the Council was not inspired by this spirit. It [the Council] is not 
in line with the provision of the Treaty, is not in line with the provision of the equal say 
between the Council and the Parliament. 
[W]e have now codecision in many more area. The Lisbon treaty is strengthened very 
much the power of the Parliament, and of course we need a period of adaptation. 
Because in the first post-Lisbon period Council is extremely resentful of the new powers 
of Parliament and Parliament is very keen to show the new power. In the case of 
banana was a test for this. 
Interviews to Charles Goerens and Alejo Vidal-Quadras confirmed that the new 
provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon would have strengthened the bargaining power of the 
Parliament, when measures prescribe delegated acts for the implementation. However, 
the two deputies pointed out that the Council tries to limit this application in as many 
dossiers as possible, adopting intransigent positions vis-à-vis the Parliament. According 
to the two interviewees, the Council may become more accommodating after a period of 
learning and adaptation of the new rules introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
In conclusion, in the long run measures prescribing delegated acts may be a factor that 
biases the conciliation outcomes in favour of the Parliament. 
6.4. The Negotiators 
6.4.1. The rapporteur 
Affiliation of the rapporteur to a large party is likely to increase Parliament’s success in 
conciliation. In Chapter 5 I find empirical evidence that, since rapporteurs coming from 
large parties issue more credible veto threats and can represent better the views of 
assembly, they affect the final legislation in favour of the Parliament. Similarly, in the 
interview-based analysis I find that large party rapporteurs may strengthen the 





Interviewees emphasize that these rapporteurs can muster more easily rank-and-file 
deputies than those from smaller groups, so they represent a large majority in the 
plenary. Consequently, they are expected to be more successful in conciliation 
negotiations.  
As chairwoman of the ENVI committee, Caroline Jackson came in conciliation thirty-
eight times. Twenty-three of these dossiers were entrusted to rapporteurs from large 
party groups. Her experience confirmed that rapporteurs from large party group have 
more chances of being successful in conciliation, because of her capacity to reach more 
consensus among parliamentarians in the plenary
33
. She said:  
I think that big figures like that [referring to the MEP Karl Heinz Florenz
34
] are more 
successful in leading the delegation in the trialogues than somebody that is 
inexperienced and from small party groups […], so he knew that if he did a deal in the 
Conciliation Committee, he automatically could rely on the support of his political 
group in the final analysis, in the 3rd reading and there wouldn’t be surprises. 
Rapporteurs from large parties may influence the legislative outcomes, since they have 
a large perfunctory support of a wide majority of deputies. On the other hand, 
rapporteurs from small party groups need to gather consensus from a varieties of 
deputies. In this sense, the influence of the rapporteur as key actor relay simply vis-à-vis 
other members of the parliament, as Caroline Jackson pointed out: 
The reason why it is important that you come from a big political group is that you 
don’t always have to make compromises. If you are a representative [...] of the United 
Left or the Greens or whatever, [...] in the committee and in conciliation and in the 
plenary you got find friends from other political groups and you have to alter your 
opinion in order to reach consensus with a lot of very different people. If you are from a 
                                                             
33 Under Jackson’s chairwomanship, Wordfish estimates shows that the joint text was more similar to the 
European Parliament’s position than to the Council common position. Indeed, more than 80% of the 
successful dossiers for the Parliament were followed by a rapporteur coming from large party.  
34 Karl Heinz Florenz was at that time EPP coordinator of the committee for Environment, Public Health 
and Food Safety and rapporteur of the directive on the restriction of the use of certain hazardous 
substances in electrical and electronic equipment (COD/2000/0159). 
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major political group, you have numerically big basis, big number of supporters on 
which to count anyhow. If you do a deal with the Socialists you don’t need to go around 
to the smaller political groups, you have one.  
The consensus-based argumentation is preferred by one of the current vice-Presidents 
responsible for conciliation, Alejo Vidal Quadras, who stressed also the twofold issue of 
being influential as rapporteur towards the delegation and the Council. Rapporteurs 
from the Socialist or the People’s Party groups are largely recognized as influential by 
the delegation, because their party groups are numerically consistent. Even the Council 
indicates rapporteurs from large parties as being more reliable in getting an agreement 
than rapporteur from small groups. The Council can better rely on the support of 
rapporteur from a large party because it is more likely that, once the joint text is 
reached, it will be accepted both by the delegation and the plenary. 
For the rapporteur, if he belongs to one of the two big parties, it helps, because you 
have more capacity of manoeuvre inside the house. In the sense if you have a big group 
behind you, in the Conciliation Committee you have already a large number of 
members. And also if the two big groups agree the other members become irrelevant. 
[...] You are much more influential if you belong to a group of 280 members than if you 
belong to a group of 50. 
The rapporteur’s room of manoeuvre as agenda setter and veto player was emphasized 
by Antonio Cancian, the rapporteur of the dossier on the Regulation on the passenger’s 
right of coaches and buses. He stated: 
[Being from the EPP] was extremely of advantage, because if you are a rapporteur and 
you have the EPP behind you, this is helpful […]. Not [because of] the bureaucracy, but 
for the support in terms of votes. [You have] the numbers in the assembly and in the 
committee, so you need to agree with the liberals or the socialist and you can bring 
back home the dossier. You are more relaxed. Otherwise, if you are from a small party, 
with few seats, you must find the agreement, and you have less solidity and ability. 
When you are from the EPP, the Council, the Commission, the other MEPs have a 





The power of agenda setting in the delegation is more limited in the case of rapporteurs 
from small parties. They have fewer resources to find support among the other 
parliamentarians, because they are more likely to be in a minority position vis-à-vis 
their colleagues in proposing alternative amendments to the legislation and to face 
disagreement within the EP delegation. As Rasmussen emphasizes (2005), divergent 
preferences and information asymmetry may exist between the rapporteur and the 
delegation. Rather than “a risk of undermining the credibility of the conciliation 
delegates in future rounds of policy negotiations” (Rasmussen 2005, 1026), the main 
risk concerns the agent-principal problem between the rapporteur and her own 
delegation. Rapporteurs from smaller parties may propose policies deviating from what 
the majority of the delegation prefers. A small party rapporteur is more likely to have 
less support in the delegation and less credibility in threating the Council with a 
parliamentary veto. The head of unit of the EP secretariat on conciliation – Nikolaos 
Tziorkas – illustrated the example of a rapporteur coming from a small party group. He 
stated: 
[S]ome years ago there was a rapporteur coming from a middle-sized small party, a 
German from the GUE, the left communist group. And I think he knew the file quite 
well, but the fact that he was from the small party, for example he was the only member 
in the parliamentary delegation, of course it didn’t help very much in achieving what he 
had in mind. And in the very end the position of the two bigger parties prevails. [...] It 
was clear that the two bigger parties wanted to have an agreement and when they saw 
that the time was pressing and the rapporteur wanted still to negotiate more and more, 
they said ‘now it’s enough, now we find an agreement here, thank you very much’. 
Charles Goerens (ALDE, LU), rapporteur on the Banana Accompanying Measures 
(COD/2010/0059), confirmed: 
I was put in a minority situation during the Conciliation process. I explained the 
argument with the support of all the Member of the Development Committee [...]. 
During the Conciliation process, Members of the other committees didn’t vote in the 
same way. Because it was a package deal, I couldn’t agree on this package because I 
think the result is not in line with the provision of the Treaty. 
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Rapporteurs coming from small parties have limited credibility to issue threats on the 
parliamentary rejection. Goerens declared that he would have voted against the joint 
text, because “the outcome [was] extremely unsatisfactory” (European Parliament 
2011a), but the assembly voted in favour of the measure. At third reading, with the 
exception of the Liberals, the extreme left and the Greens, parliamentarians did not 
follow the voting indications of the rapporteur. The Popular and the party of the 
Conservatives and Reformists voted in favour, while most of the Socialists abstained. 
In which sense can rapporteurs coming from small party hamper the Parliament? The 
case of the Banana Accompanying Measures is useful here. According to the rapporteur, 
the joint text was a “shadow of what was voted on and adopted at second reading” 
(European Parliament 2011b). The final act, thus, was extremely far away the positions 
at second reading of the Parliament, while more similar to the Council. Whereas the 
second reading of the Parliament is likely to be the result of extensive negotiations 
within the responsible parliamentary committee, other actors are involved in 
conciliation. If the rapporteur has less support both in the delegation and in the plenary, 
the other key negotiators try to find an agreement that is much closer to the position of 
the median voter in the Parliament, therefore sidelining the rapporteur. The 
parliamentary vice-President, the committee chair as well as the party coordinators may 
restrain the rapporteur by threatening the acceptance of what was proposed at the 
second reading and concluded in the trialogues. Rapporteurs from small parties cannot 
sanction defecting parliamentarians well as big party rapporteurs can. Rather, they are 
sanctioned by relevant actors. The vice-President responsible for conciliation on the 
Banana Accompanying Measures, Vidal Quadras, emphasized that he took over the 
negotiations from the rapporteur: 
Goerens [the rapporteur] was impossible, very difficult. At the end we succeeded finding 
an agreement in plenary and until the last minute Goerens fought to kill it, to kill the 
agreement. And I was the chair of delegation and I tried to save the agreement. Goerens 
forced everything to take to the plenary. He made a speech to kill it, I made a speech in 
favour of respecting agreement. And at the end the agreement won for a large majority 





and a more flexible part of Council. This was a coalition that won. And the most 
demanding part of Parliament and the most reluctant part of Council were defeated. 
The ability of the EP vice-President to influence the delegation and the plenary occurs 
mainly in the conciliation negotiation. He plays an institutional role in order to defend 
the parliamentary prerogatives. However, other files indicate the importance of another 
actor: the committee chair. The head of the EP conciliation unit of the secretariat, 
Nikolaos Tziorkas, was rather explicit in pointing out the involvement of the committee 
chair in finding an agreement, sometimes bypassing the rapporteur: 
The Greek vice-President [who] at that time chaired the delegation played a secondary 




Interestingly, the chairman of the committee on Transport and Tourism, Paolo Costa, 
said: 
The vice-President of the Parliament chairs the process, but the negotiation is 
concretely done by the committee chair, I did the trialogues.  
These statements revealed the idea that once the rapporteur’s position is in minority and 
does not reflect the position of the EP median voter both in the delegation and 
assembly, other actors, notably parliamentarians in leadership position, may 
significantly affect the final outcome. This is more likely the case of rapporteurs coming 
from small party group. These rapporteurs are less able to issue credible threats, because 
they have fewer resources to sanction defection in the assembly and are less influential 
than other relay actors. 
 
The theoretical discussion in Chapter 3 emphasizes that rapporteurs and representatives 
of member states, who may belong to the same national party groups, share cultural and 
linguistic background. Since uncertainty may be reduced, it weakens the Parliament’s 
bargaining position and the rapporteur’s credibility when it issues veto threats. The 
                                                             




quantitative analysis in Chapter 5 does not corroborate the hypotheses. Unfortunately 
the interview-based analysis does not corroborate it either. Caroline Jackson, the 
chairwoman of the ENVI committee in 1999-2004 period, agreed on the better 
knowledge they had on the Council’s position, when they were from a party represented 
in the Council, but they do not think that the Council enjoy more success in conciliation 
as a result of this.  
It gives you one way of getting into the Council, I should say this. As British member of 
the European Parliament going to conciliation I was always in deepest touch with the 
British diplomats of the British permanent representative in Brussels. If there was 
something of particular interest of the United Kingdom I was always in touch with the 
British ministers, it didn’t actually matter if they were Labour or Conservative. I’m a 
Conservative but I was always in greatest touch with the Labour ministers at that time. I 
am not sure how far that was true of all the nationalities; I think it was true for some of 
them. Certainly the Germans were in touch with their government and the French with 
theirs. 
6.4.2. The Presidency 
The Council relay actor is its President. Being from a newer member state may affect 
the legislative outcome. The Council President has to understand the extent to which it 
has room of manoeuvre to reach its priorities. In his broad experience of codecision and 
conciliation negotiations, a permanent representative of the Council illustrated how the 
President may use its power. 
At some point, when there are only two or three countries bashing on an issue, there is 
no blocking minority. The clever President interprets this position with a certain degree 
of flexibility, because in the circumstance these three member states are in the way, the 
President has a majority [...]. It depends on the situation and on the meetings the 
Presidency has with the countries. 
Caroline Jackson and Charles Goerens complained that such room of manoeuvre is 





positions. Interviews suggest that Presidents from newer member states have fewer 
capabilities to secure agreement and to play a crucial role in preventing failure. 
The mandate was, to some extent, very clear: no accommodating position towards the 
Parliament. That was very clear, and that was the reason why we were not satisfied [...]. 
But nevertheless, it was a clear signal to the Council that there was a clear opposition 
in the parliament. 
The Council comes with a close mandate, there is no approach, all the efforts are from 
the Parliament [...]. The Presidency did well its job, he was very skillful at it. The truth 
is that he has a close mandate, but he was not flexible. [...] Therefore the Czech 
Presidency was very responsible because it took the position of the Council majority, he 
stops moving. I don’t criticize the Presidency [...] The Presidency is a very institutional 
actor, but the whole mechanism of the Council block any movements. He has a very 
rigid mandate.  
However, as I have argued in the theoretical Chapter 3 Presidents coming from newer 
member states may be more easily manipulated in conciliation and may face higher 
reputational costs when the delegations fail to reach an agreement. In addition, this 
President is still learning the negotiating process. Although I do not find quantitatively 
empirical evidence, Alejo Vidal-Quadras, one of the fourteen Parliament’s vice-
President, confirmed this interpretation and went even further in explaining the extent to 
which a newer member state is involved and faces such reputational costs. 
There is one psychological component: if it is a new member state that is taking the 
Presidency for the first time, they take the Presidency very seriously, they want to 
succeed and they are more cooperative with the parliament than France, Italy or the 
Netherlands, that they are founding members and they tend to be less emotionally 
enthusiastic. I remember the Presidency of Slovenia, which is minuscule member. But 
they were so enthusiastic, so committed because that was their first experience. Imagine 
what was for them, the Presidency of the council. So they really want to succeed in 
conciliation and they were so active trying to convince the other member states. And 
also I suppose that for new member states, maybe if it’s a small one, it’s easier for them 
to deal with more European position than for the big member states as France or 
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Germany that they want their power. Slovenia, Slovakia or Hungary they are ready to 
be more European. 
Because an agreement is judged as a ‘success’ and enhance a state’s reputation, a new 
member state is more accommodating towards the Parliament. Moreover, a newer 
member state would be more easily subject to belief manipulation, because it is less 
experienced. A high-ranked bureaucrat of the Parliament stated: 
It’s very important which Presidency you are negotiating with, because they can make 
the difference. [...] The old member states know how the system works, while the new 
member states tend to be inexperienced. 
The ability to influence the bargaining outcome depends also on the national 
representation within the European bureaucracy. Newer member states rely on fewer 
high-ranked bureaucrats in the institutions, they get less information, they have weak 
network connection with the other national representatives at Council level, and less 
administrators at top levels. This aspect is strongly emphasized by the former chairman 
of the Committee on Tourism and Transport – Paolo Costa (ALDE; IT). He argued that: 
Lithuania can be the President in office, but it has no civil servant in the Parliament or 
in the Commission. That is to say the all apparatus […] Germans or French are 
everywhere. […] It is not that the country is important per se, ‘this is important because 
Germany says so’, it is because Germany is de facto important […] ten out of 15 
Committee’s chairpersons are Germans  […] so each time there is a meeting, they are 
almost always there. It is obvious that all the others together are more than Germany, 
but it is difficult to get together all the others.  
As a result, a newer member state may be less informed and less involved in informal 
process of negotiations and it may affect less the legislative outcome in conciliation, 
because of the paucity of high-ranked bureaucrats and politicians at European level. 
6.4.3. Impatience and the strategic use of time horizons 
The structural advantage of the Council may vary from case to case. Following 





today over an agreement tomorrow” (1997, 99). Impatience may drive the negotiating 
process and legislative outcomes, and even different time horizons. In conciliation 
timing is a very strict constraint and impatience is not symmetrically distributed 
between the two delegations. Some actors may be more impatient that a bill will enter 
into force. Especially because the conciliation phase is time-limited, the Council’s 
Presidency may be more impatient. The President is in office for a limited period of 
time and she desires to report positive legislative record at the end of its mandate. 
Because it must show to be efficient and to have realized those policies established in 
the six-month agenda, the President would like to speed up the negotiations and to reach 
significant results. As a result, the Presidency’s position vis-à-vis the key negotiators of 
the Parliament may be more constrained by the brevity of the term (Thomson 2008, 
595), thus benefitting the Strasbourg assembly. In the circumstance in which the 
positions of the legislators are so far away from each other, the parliamentary 
negotiators may exploit the different time horizon of the President in order to reach a 
successful agreement for the Parliament. Costa explained the tricky mechanism he 
employed for several dossiers when he was chairman of the Transport committee: 
In the trialogue three persons should say yea: the Commissioner, the President in office 
and the vice-President of the Parliament or the chairperson of the responsible 
committee. Where is the difference? Conciliations expire in the six-month Presidency, 
while the President of the Parliament has a two-and-half year of mandate. So if we do 
not agree today, what do I receive? He [the Council’s President] pays the fact that he 
does not bring back home nothing, he fails, his semester has produced nothing, while I 
bargain with the next one. 
All things considered, when I faced a Presidency contrary to my positions, I have been 
evaluating to wait the next Presidency. For example, as far as that [dossier] on air 
security is regarded, we finished with the Greek, instead of the Danish in 2002. 
So the Parliament is less impatient to pass the legislation than the Council and it may 
exploit the negotiation deadlines set in the Treaty. Time is a source of power that key 
negotiators of the Parliament exploit in the conciliation vis-à-vis the Presidency in order 
to get outcomes biased in their favour, by threatening to postpone conciliation 
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negotiations. We are not sure, however, whether this practice was largely adopted also 
by other parliamentary negotiators, or only by Paolo Costa (who followed twenty-five 
dossiers).  
6.4.4. The electoral cycle 
One of the factors increasing the propensity for negotiators to be more demanding and 
less accommodating is called audience cost (Fearon 1994, 1997; Groseclose and 
McCarty 2001). Negotiations may be biased in favour of one chamber because 
negotiators have incentives to send signals to a third party (the audience or, as I prefer 
to refer to, the electorate), even leading to a break-down of the negotiations. 
The case of the Working Time Directive I discussed in the previous section sheds some 
lights on an actor – the electorate – and the signals the Parliament send to it. This was 
an excellent example of the bicameral conflict between the Council and the Parliament, 
when the latter is concerned about the electorate. Many interviewees, among which the 
head of unit for conciliation and codecision in the Parliament, insisted on the fact that 
the Working Time Directive was “a politically difficult file”, both in the trialogues and 
in the Conciliation Committee:  
It was the first time we had so many trialogues, I don’t know how many trialogues we 
had, seven or eight. Normally we have roughly four. And the Conciliation Committee 
met at least three times, when normally meets once. So from organizational point of 
view we did the best we could in order to reach an agreement, but the political 
difficulties were so big that was not possible to reach an agreement. 
The negotiations were difficult due to the impact the public opinion and the electorate 
had along the entire legislative process, which substantially determined the negotiation 
outcome. We will consider two issues linked to the electorate. 
The first issue concerns the internal cohesion of the party groups. The content of the 
draft directive applied to many categories of workers, especially in the health sector, 
which was the most involved category. So, trade unions of the health sector, one of the 
most powerful lobbies all over Europe, “were on a war footing”, as remembered Donata 





described the situation between the European Parliament and the public opinion as 
extremely intertwined. Trade unions of doctors were able to exercise influence 
especially on their main supporters at political level and to break up the cohesiveness of 
the European People’s Party. He stated: 
I got a lot of votes from the right-wing deputies, because doctors in Europe were 
against to this rule [the on-call time]. [Since] many deputies felt trapped by trade 
unions across Europe, voted for my report, and the right [the EPP] broke up. […] The 
fracture in the right-wing party of the Parliament was because there was a very 
singular element in the Working Time Directive [that is] the relationship between 
physicians and deputies of the European right [was breaking up]. Doctors are very 
important in the political life of countries.  
This leads us to the second issue. The ability of the trade unions to exercise pressure on 
the parliamentarians was facilitated also by electoral deadlines. The conciliation of the 
Working Time Directive took place few months before the 2009 legislative turn. At the 
end of the electoral period deputies want to be re-elected and desire to have a successful 
legislative record for their constituencies. Negotiators are fraught with impatience to 
adopt a successful legislation. In the case of the Working Time Directive elections 
change the parliamentarians’ voting behaviours, by being more sensitive to the 
electorate: election-minded politicians are ultimately concerned about the outcomes of 
the conciliation. MEPs’ priorities changed as the European elections were approaching, 
according to Tziorkas Nikolaos, head of the conciliation and codecision unit in the 
Parliament. He said: 
On our side, the whole conciliation took place few months before the legislative turn, 
before the European elections. So the politicians have the tendency to think more in 
political than in legislative terms. In the sense that, if we reach a compromise now with 
the Council, so this will look very very bad for our citizens, that are going to vote for us 
in a few months. 
At the same time, Cercas, the rapporteur, emphasized what the risk deputies would have 
taken in the short-term period, that is not being re-elected. 
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Proximity to the elections leads chamber’s decision closer to the public opinion  
It was crucial we were at the end of legislature. I knew that as we were approaching the 
end of the term, the deputies were more sensitive to public opinion. [...] A lot of deputies 
are hunting up votes. The legislative process takes into consideration more the citizens 
when the elections are close than when they are far away.  
Members of the Parliament would have preferred the current situation – the status quo – 
rather than being sanctioned because of a legislation that would not have produced 
benefits for their voters. Bargaining before an audience was an incentive for 
parliamentarians not only to send signals about Council’s type, but also about their own 
type of politicians. Consequently, being at the end of the electoral cycle has increased 
parliamentarians’ disagreement value and the likelihood of negotiations’ breaking 
down, as the rapporteur clarified: 
This proposal for a directive is therefore worse than the directive currently in force [...] 
Elections become a strategic issue for a deputy, especially for a case that has received 
so much publicity. [...] For example, all the Spanish deputies, 64 deputies, vote with me. 
In Spain magazines and newspaper publish what every deputy has done. Everyone voted 
with me, otherwise it would have been a scandal. 
In his speech at 3
rd
 parliamentary reading debate Cercas went further in trying to 
explaining the strong connection between parliamentarians and citizens: 
We often wonder why citizens are disaffected with our institutions, our elections or our 
political agenda. Today we have a clear explanation: you just have to look at the 
enormous gulf between the Council’s proposals and the views of 3 million doctors and 
all of Europe’s trade unions, representing 150 million workers. I hope you do not see 
this – Parliament’s opposition – as a setback, but rather as an opportunity to reconnect 
with citizens’ concerns, so that people can see that when we talk of Europe’s social 
dimension, we are not just uttering empty words or making false promises. 
The Working Time Directive sheds light on the, otherwise ignored, impact the 
electorate may have on the final legislation. In the negotiations the pressure of the 





public opinion. However, we did not find evidence that audience costs would have 
increase parliamentary success or not when the Conciliation Committee reaches the 
agreement. The reasons lie on the fact that not every dossiers is likely to be subject 
salient to the electorate, thus increasing audience costs for key negotiators. As Paolo 
Costa – chairman of the Transport and Tourism committee from 2003 to 2009 – pointed 
out: 
In the Transport committee issues are not politically high sensitive. I understand that 
for other dossiers it was risky […] that is to say you could be blamed in newspaper the 
day after […]. For example, we approved a regulation extending liability. In the 
maritime package there was liability of carriers of passengers. It is entering now into 
force, so it was not applied to Giglio’s affair only because it didn’t come into effect. It 
would have increased a lot of money for castaways. It was an epic battle, very 
important issues, but it was not important for public opinion: [it would have produced] 
no vote shift.  
6.5. Personality 
Many interviewees insisted on the negotiators’ skills as a means of influencing the 
legislative process. They comprise the ability of making “threats, commitments, or 
concessions, in deception or clarification, in gaining information about the opponent” 
(Snyder and Diesing 1977, 194). The influence of bargaining skills on the final outcome 
has not drawn enough attention, primarily because of the difficulty in measuring such 
skills (Bailer 2004, 2006; Tallberg 2008). However, it is worth noting that key 
negotiators emphasize some skills for both parliamentarians and member states 
representatives. The high-ranked bureaucrat of the parliamentary unit on Conciliation 
and Codecision stated that skills matter. 
It’s very difficult to say [who wins and who loses in the Conciliation Committee], 
because there is no unique answer to find. It depends very much on the individual 
setting […]. The most important for me is not from which party the rapporteur is 
coming, but who is the rapporteur. Because you have people that are more able to 
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negotiate, people that know better the file than others, independently from which party 
they come. 
Caroline Jackson illustrated the example of Karl Heinz Florenz to focus on several 
negotiating skills a key actor should develop: networking with lobbies and interest 
groups, experience and competence. She said: 
He had a big political party behind him, he seemed to be the voice of the industries and 
consumers, he knew the file very well, he was the former chairman of the environment 
committee and I think that big figures like that are more successful in leading the 
delegation in the trialogues than somebody that is inexperienced, because it is a very 
technical process.[…] He was a German, because Germans are pioneers in 
environmental legislations. Being in a rich society we are able to put into practice what 
environmental legislations propose. 
Marit Paulsen (ALDE, SE), who was the rapporteur of the 2002 proposal for a 
regulation on animal by-products, insisted on skills based on mutual trust and empathy 
with the other parliamentarians: 
All the compromise was not based on trading – I give you something and you give 
something – but on mutual respect, no matter you come from, which party you are from. 
The team – rapporteur and the shadow rapporteurs – worked together as a team during 
this 2 and half years. This helped us to reach a huge majority and to raise our voice 
against the Commission and the Council. Especially thanks to several informal meeting, 
in front a coffee, so we exploited all the time in order to reach compromise and we took 
a lot of time for discussions. 
Also within the Council, key players need to develop bargaining skills to be successful. 
A Council’s deputy permanent representative stressed.  
In the end, a bargaining depends a lot on the person’s quality and the country. That is, 
you are a good negotiator, no matter you come from a new member state, if you 
bargained in thousands and thousands of bargaining table before joining the Union. 
You are able anyway.[…] In my experience, personality counts very much, because 





possibilities. At that point, in short, [the result] depends on the insistence, perseverance, 
motivation [of the President]. 
Interviewees shed some light on the endogenous resources negotiators may rely on: 
individual characteristics, bargaining strategies, education and experience. These 
conclusions should be taken with caution. Evidence from studies on bargaining skills is 
contradictory, unsystematic and limited to bargaining within the Council (Bailer 2004, 
2006; Moravcsik 1998; Tallberg 2008).  
6.6. Cohesiveness 
In Chapter 3 I discuss on cohesiveness and how policy stability and the winset of the 
status quo increase as the cohesion of a collective veto player increase. However, to 
determine both the wincircle and the m-cohesion implies a speculation on the location 
of the status quo. On the contrary, interviews allow to gather information on the 
Parliament’s and the Council’s cohesiveness, and, most importantly, they highlights the 
reasons why cohesion affects the legislative outcome. 
Negotiations to reach a joint text are largely held in trialogues, but the whole 
Conciliation Committee matters. The two delegations are involved in an informal 
navette system. Key negotiators shuffle back and forth between the trialogues’ and the 
delegation’s rooms in order to update parliamentarians and state representatives on the 
negotiating developments. Conversely, the relay actors verify whether the proposal may 
be accepted, rejected or modified by their own delegations, and then they come back to 
the trialogues’ room to update the other chamber’s representatives. At this juncture, 
being a cohesive chamber may help a successful resolution of the deadlock. 
Interviewees emphasize the benefits from having a strong supporting majority in one’s 
chamber. A high representative of the Council affirmed that: 
You must rely on your unity, in the institution, because it is easy, also in the Council, to 
have different positions. But, […] one tries to undermine the unity of the party group, by 
presenting solutions to a political group and not another […]. In this way you [the 
Council] attempt to unhinge the counterpart’s cohesiveness. 
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Like in the Council, reaching a large majority in the Parliament’s delegation may 
resolve. Marit Paulsen, the rapporteur of the regulation concerning health rules on 
animal by-products, described: 
This [cohesiveness] helped us to reach a huge majority and to raise our voice against 
the Commission and the Council. 
Even the former chairman of the Transport and Tourism committee – Paolo Costa 
(ALDE, IT) – agreed on it: 
Of course the power of parliament was strong if and where you have built strong 
majorities […]. 
Cohesiveness is, in the interviewees’ opinion, a key factor determining conciliation 
outcomes and the success of either the Parliament or the Council. The more cohesive a 
delegation is, the more successful it is in the Conciliation Committee. Strong internal 
cohesion leads to success. Consequently, a key negotiator of the Council explained that 
one of the main goals is trying to break the counterpart’s unity, through informal and 
secret meetings between one representative and less cohesive parliamentarians. Some 
attaches may establish contacts with MEPs in order to find an alternative majority, in 
contrast with the official proposal presented in occasion of the informal navette system 
illustrated above.  
Empirical evidence supports König et al.’s (2007) findings that cohesion affects 
conciliation outcomes. Although König et al. (2007) find that higher parliamentary 
cohesiveness diminishes Council’s and increases Parliament’s success rates, my 
interview-based analysis investigates on an important tactics key negotiators have. Both 
Council’s and Parliament’s representatives may threaten the counterpart’s cohesiveness 
to extract concessions. 
6.7. The role of the Commission 
Let us consider the Commission. The Commission may substantially shape the 
negotiations throughout the legislative process and even at conciliation. Although the 





negotiations in the conciliation by rejecting parliamentary second reading’s 
amendments. In Chapter 3 I emphasize that the Commission, indeed, may reject 
Parliament’s amendments in order to signal its own preference and require unanimity 
voting in the Council. Moreover, the Commission may successfully extract concession 
by threatening to withdraw the proposal. As Cercas pointed out, the Commission is an 
informal agenda setter: 
The Commission does not play neutrally; the Commission opposes and helps in order to 
get unanimity in the Council. If the Commission rejects the Parliament’s position, the 
Council cannot approve it by majority, but by unanimity. So, the Commission plays very 
hard. […] The Commission has a very active role. The Commission can say “the 
conciliation is over”, because they withdraw the legislative proposal. The Commission 
can stop the match at any time.  
The role of the Commission is stressed also by König et al. (2007). The Commission 
may be able to exercise influence, since it enjoys informational advantages, also thanks 
to its broad network of non-legislative actors, and it aims at pursuing its political agenda 
(Pollack 1997). But, aside its mediating role, the Commission is directly involved in law 
adoption and implementation. Caroline Jackson – former ENVI committee chairwoman 
– illustrated very well these informal resources at the disposal of the Commission, in 
many occasions, both to find compromise and to pursue its own agenda. 
I want to emphasize in the trialogues the helpfulness of the Commission.[...] But 
actually was the Commission, the people who want to get the legislation through. It’s 
their baby and they want their baby through. And the Commission was particularly 
helpful on the environment issues. They gave us information about what the Council 
was thinking, they went in the Parliament delegation, explaining things to members 
where were not up to speed, what was going on. 
Interviewees, both from the Council and the Parliament, suggest that in many dossiers 
the Commission’s agenda setting has indeed affected bargaining outcomes, by 
exploiting the asymmetrical distribution of information between the Council’s and the 
Parliament’s delegations, and by elaborating compromise policy in the legislative 
158 
 
proposals [Pollack, 1997: 126]. The Commission played a very active role, since it had 
no neutral position, but clear priorities. Both a permanent representative of the Council 
and Costa emphasized this position. 
The Commission is a mediator, but its position is on one side, it proposes. 
Loyola de Palacio determined every trialogues, in the sense that she said what we 
should do and there were no room of compromise from what she proposed. It’s clearly 
visible that if the Council and the Parliament are stuck, where the Commission is, it 
decides. In the case of Loyola de Palacio, she decided all the times, otherwise there was 
no agreement. 
Interestingly, even though limited to specific bills, Paulsen and Cancian, the rapporteurs 
of the regulation on animal by-products and of the passengers’ rights, respectively, went 
even more explicit.  
The Commissioner, David Byrne, was very committed to reach this agreement. The 
White paper they produced outlined the crisis and the actions to solve it. […] They were 
proactive and they were always around to help for the legal text. 
You have the Commission’s solidarity for 95% of the process, then at the end also the 
Commission becomes a political actor, so it wanted to have results. It abandoned us. 
The Commission wanted an agreement […]. They suffered a lot because they wanted a 
regulation for each [means of transportation]. It’s a political message they would like 
to carry on. […] The commissioner has to produce some results, not only technical 
ones. 
The Commission matters in the decision making when it takes the side of one 
institution. Many interviewees stressed the direct role of the Commission in the 
negotiations, by exerting pressure and persuading other institutions to take its view. 
Traditionally, the literature on EU politics (Moravcsik 1998; Tsebelis and Garrett 2001) 
considers the Commission and the Parliament as the most pro-European institutions. 
These two ‘supranational institutions’, indeed, are the beneficiaries of more power at 
EU level. The Council, on the contrary, is traditionally conceived at the other side of the 





the Commission is likely to take the side of the Parliament because of its integrationist 
stances, as the interviewees emphasized. Vidal-Quadras pointed out the similarity of the 
Parliament’s and the Commission’s view in the majority of the twelve dossiers he 
followed as vice-President of the Parliament. 
And always they [i.e. the Commission and the Parliament] set up common instruments, 
European common lines of action and common policies. Then this, on one side, goes 
into conflict with some sectors of interests and also with the natural wish of the states, 
not to give up too much of their sovereign competences. And then the European 
Parliament, as general rule, takes the side of the Commission. So in general there is an 
alliance between the Commission and the Parliament in order to defeat resistance in the 
Council or interests from some sectors or stakeholders. Of course this is much more 
complex, because some members of the Parliament also try to defend interests of 
certain sectors, industrial and economic. And also some members of the Parliament are 
very receptive to their governments, when they press them not to support certain 
elements of the legislation that governments consider that go too far in the integration. 
More specifically, Caroline Jackson said that, in the thirty-eight dossiers she was 
chairwoman of the Environment Committee, the Parliament benefitted from the support 
of the Commission, and it was, therefore, more successful.  
The Commission has always been very close to EP, in a good relation with the 
European Parliament, because they encourage each other to move towards stronger 
European legislations. 
Even a representative of the Council, who followed three dossiers at conciliation, 
emphasized the Commission’s bias in favour of the Parliament. 
It [i.e. the Commission] is always on one side, especially with the Parliament, in the 
trialogues, in conciliations, in all negotiations between the Council, the Parliament and 
the Commission. Usually, on many issues, at least on the institutional ones, there is a 
Parliament-Commission axis […]. Obviously, the Commission is a mediator, but then 
we know that is closer to the Parliament, it is normal. 
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While some interviewees argued that there had been a close connection between the 
Parliament and the Commission, because of their common interests in favour of 
European integration, a high-ranked bureaucrat of the Parliament asserted that the 
Commission follows primarily its own policy agenda, which may not necessarily 
overlap with the Parliament’s.  
There if you want I see a change. At the beginning [i.e. when the Treaty of Amsterdam 
was enacted] the role of the Commissioner was much more important, now it’s not so 
important. […]. Now it has become a very political Commission that takes into account 
[the preferences of] the Council and [it] is careful not to upset it. The Commission 
works together with the Council. […] And if they [i.e. the Commission] have a dilemma 
which position to support I would say they will opt for the Council, while before they 
were much more defending the Parliament. And this could change the final outcome. 
He continued by making a reference to the Working Time Directive, and stated: 
From the Parliament’s point of view the Commission was not so helpful. The 
Commission was not trying to make a real comprise proposal, but was very much 
defending the Council’s position. We had expected a bit more help from the 
Commission, not necessarily that it would have helped, but you never know. There was 
at the end of the negotiations a final compromise proposal from Mr. Cercas, which was 
beyond […] what he had always maintained in principle, in order to get an agreement 
and we needed a little bit the help of the Commission to work on this proposal and to 
support it. They didn’t. 
For the Commission, the third way of getting involved is through implementation. As I 
discussed in Chapter 3, the Commission’s involvement in implementation varies across 
measures and mechanisms. When a measure prescribes implementation via national 
administrations, the Parliament and the Commission rely on legislative oversight of 
implementation (Franchino 2007). They therefore are more recalcitrant vis-à-vis the 
Council. The opposite occurs when the Commission is the main implementer. The 





likely to be biased in favour of the Parliament in the case of measures with greater 
involvement of national administrations 
However, my interviewees did not notice if either the Parliament or the Council is 
successful in different implementation paths. The only contrarian’s opinion was that of 
Costa, chairman of the Transport committee, who understand the different implications 
when the act has to be implemented. He did not consider how implementation may 
affect the legislative outcome, though. 
I enjoyed more the negotiations in case of regulation, because I knew we were putting 
on the legislation’s thinking cap on. On the contrary, with directives you never know 
when they [i.e. the member states] implement them [i.e. the directives]. For example the 
directive on railways. There is an infringement procedure, I think, for 25 out of 27 
countries, so we were wasting time. […] So, personally, I tried to push for regulations, 
to having more. 
Conclusion 
This analysis offers interesting contribution to the study on the Conciliation Committee. 
It has its own benefits as well as its drawbacks.  
The qualitative analysis nicely illustrates the working of some variables affecting 
legislative outcomes. First, disagreement value was tested in case of negotiation failure. 
Interviewees confirmed that disagreement value allows investigating that the Parliament 
is more likely to reject the counterpart’s proposal when it considers more beneficial the 
existing legislation.  
Second, consider the institutional framework. The Treaties place limitation to the 
negotiators’ moves, by favouring either the Parliament or the Council. Interviewees 
emphasized how article 290 of the Lisbon Treaty may strengthen the parliamentary 
power. However, since this prescription changes the former comitology procedure, the 
Council is still in a process of learning and adaptation to the new rules. Consequently, 
this may facilitate the Council in the short run period from the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty.  
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Third, consistent with my expectation in Chapter 3 the qualitative analysis illustrates 
how rapporteur coming from big party may strengthen the successfulness of the 
Parliament, especially thanks to her capacity of gaining support in the assembly 
(hypothesis 5b). 
Fourth, the qualitative analysis better fleshes out the connection between newer 
Presidency and low performance of the Council at conciliation, in terms that I do not 
emphasize in Chapter 3 (hypothesis 8). Interviewees stress that only experienced 
member state knows how much to put the counterpart against the ropes. The newer 
Presidency wants to build a good reputation in the Council and the Parliament in order 
to accomplish its agenda and avoid legislative failures.  
Fifth, negotiators agree on the political role played by the Commission and partially 
confirmed my expectation in Chapter 3. The qualitative analysis provides an extensive 
description of the Commission both in its informal and formal role (hypothesis 13). 
Interviewees shed lights on the multiple tasks and priorities this institution has, to 
understand how Commission may take one legislator’s side, especially the Parliament, 
to achieve its agenda, to be a mediator and to enact oversight on implementation. 
Finally, the qualitative analysis considers the bargaining process in broader terms. The 
analysis enriches the explanation of who gets what in conciliation highlighting the role 
of three elements: the electoral cycle (hypotheses 9a), the rapporteur’s personality 
(hypothesis 10) and the cohesiveness of the chamber (hypothesis 11). First, interviewees 
prefer explanations based on the impact the electorate have on the legislative outcome 
by exerting pressure on parliamentarians that have to face elections in short terms, 
rather than reputational incentives at the beginning of the mandate. I am not sure 
whether this is the case for every dossiers with salient issues for the audience, though. 
Second, negotiators confirm that the ability of the rapporteur to gain more in 
conciliation depends on her personality and bargaining skills. Third, cohesion matters in 
conciliation and key negotiators make use of tactics in order to exploit this mechanism. 
The analysis reports some drawbacks, because I cannot confirm several hypotheses. 
First, the institutional factors, namely the voting rule (hypothesis 2), the second version 
of the codecision procedure (hypothesis 3) and the size of the assembly (hypothesis 4), 





interviewees cannot notice the dynamics of veto threats, when rapporteurs either come 
from larger parties or are in a leadership position (hypotheses 5a, 6a). Negotiators, 
indeed, refer to these features as being part of the undistinguished category of 
bargaining skills and personality of the relay actors. Third, even the hypothesis on 
implementation (hypothesis 14) is tested only superficially. 
In conclusion, the qualitative contribution this Chapter offers does not provide to test 
alternative causal mechanisms, but rather illustrates the ways in which some parts of the 
factors operate and shape the legislative outcomes. In addition, it provides an 
empirically rich picture of the dynamics of negotiations occurring at conciliation. In this 







7. Modelling and analysing  
belief manipulation in conciliation 
Bargaining within the Conciliation Committee and the last legislative stage at third 
reading are strictly intertwined. The Council and the parliamentary delegation are 
convened to reach an agreement. When they design the joint text, they need to reach a 
compromise: they want to achieve their own objectives, but at the same time they know 
that the assembly votes such text under close rule. The Council and the parliamentary 
delegation need to take into account this third actor if they want the legislation to be 
enacted. However, according to formal rules analysed in the second Chapter, the 
delegation represents the Parliament in the Conciliation Committee. It knows the policy 
preferences of the assembly and may attempt to reach a more successful compromise 
for the parliamentary side vis-à-vis the Council. 
In this Chapter I introduce how belief manipulation drives the conciliation outcome. I 
develop a model of incomplete information that analyses decision making in the last 
two stages of the codecision procedure. The model starts by assuming that either the 
pivotal member state of the Council or the median delegate chooses a proposal in the 
policy space. The opposite delegation chooses whether to amend or not the proposed 
bill. After the approval of the joint text, the Parliament votes under closed rule and 
chooses either to accept or to reject the joint text. 
In particular, the final outcome depends on the information asymmetry among the 
actors. The delegation and the Parliament have complete information about the 
Council’s preferences. On the contrary, the Council is not sure about the Parliament’s 
type, but it has complete information about the parliamentary delegations’ preferences. 
In the first section I will illustrate the main assumptions, actors and payoff as well as the 
sequence of moves, leading to the policy outcomes. Then I will explain the four policy 
outcomes, given the actors’ preference distribution. In the third section, I will explore 
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the incomplete information of the Council and how correct and incorrect beliefs on the 
Parliament’s type affect outcomes. The fourth section is devoted to belief manipulation. 
Finally, on the basis of this simple feature of the model, I derive interesting predictions 
about policy outcomes, which will be then contextualized in an analytic narrative of the 
Telecom Package in the last section. 
7.1. A model of conciliation: players, action, information and 
assumption 
Actors. Assume the three relevant actors have ideal points in the last stage of 
conciliation: the Council (c), the parliamentary delegation36 (d) and the Parliament (p). 
As I discuss in Chapter two, once the Conciliation Committee is convened, the 
Parliament’s delegation and the representatives of the member states are in charge of 
reaching the joint text. Differences in the composition rule, in the voting rule37 and even 
in the amendment rule of the two delegations have been proved to bias the final 
legislative outcome. Nevertheless, it does not come at the expense of accuracy to treat 
the three actors as sharing equal bargaining power in the Conciliation Committee. 
Their most preferred policies are located in one-dimensional outcome space    , 
which may represent any dimension of conflict. The actors’ position on the bargaining 
space may change according to their proximity to the exogenous status quo or not. 
Actors have Euclidean preferences, with a single-peaked utility function for their own 
ideal point in the bargaining space. As a consequence, I do not assume that actors are 
distributed along the more-less integration continuum, as the literature on EU legislative 
politics does (Gabel and Hix 2002; Garrett and Tsebelis 1996; Berthold Rittberger 
2000) or along the left-right spectrum, as the oldest recognized national cleavage.  
                                                             
36 In this Chapter I refer to the parliamentary delegation as simply the “delegation”, while the Council 
delegation is the “Council”. 
37 I do not consider whether the Council decides under qualified majority voting or unanimity. In Chapter 
two I discuss how the core of the Conciliation Committee increases if the Council votes under unanimity, 
increasing its bargaining power vis-à-vis the Parliament. This expectation has been corroborated in 





Actions. The sequence of moves in the model of Conciliation entails two legislative 
stages. The first bargaining stage occurs within the Conciliation Committee and then it 
proceeds to the third reading of the Parliament as second legislative stage. 
In the first legislative stage the model shares a core of assumptions with the formal 
work of Rubinstein’s (1982) simple non-cooperative model of bargaining. The 
pioneering Rubinstein model requires that players alternate in making an offer on the 
proposed bill that the other side can accept or reject. If the offer is rejected, the other 
actor can then make a counteroffer the first actor has to accept or reject. Each offer and 
response is one round of bargaining. I assume Conciliation bargaining as alternating 
offers and counteroffer from the delegation and the Council in order to reach a 
compromise. Unlike Rubistein’s model, my model has a finite horizon since the 
legislators must reach an agreement before a strict deadline. Article 294 Treaty of 
Lisbon states that: “if, within six weeks of its being convened, the Conciliation 
Committee does not approve the joint text, the proposed act shall be deemed not to have 
been adopted.” Moreover, in conciliation the temporal aspect is not so fundamental that 
delegations are impatient and prefer reaching a bargain sooner than later. We also know 
that in practice the Council and the parliamentary delegation have to bargain in a rather 
limited and restricted time, most of the times during a night, and several rounds of 
bargaining alternate as quick as possible. It is reasonable to assume, then, that discount 
factor does not influence their utility functions. 
The second legislative stage is played out at the third reading of the Parliament. The 
assembly needs to accept or reject the joint text the two delegations have agreed on in 
the previous stage. If the Parliament accepts, the joint text is enacted, otherwise the 
legislation fails.  
 
Payoffs. Actors have quadratic utility functions that decrease with distance to the status 
quo. Let sq denote the status quo. If each actor has an ideal point i, she prefers the 
closest bill, either a proposal  ̂ or the status quo, to its ideal policy. This quadratic loss 
function captures the distributive component that the actor’s utility function decreases 
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−(  −   )  −( ̂ −   )
 
 
Therefore, the actor i accepts  ̂ if she gains more utility from it than from the status quo.  
In the case of the parliamentary delegation, its utility function is represented by the 
simple formula in equation below, which highlights that the delegation would prefer the 
adoption of the bill if it gains more benefit than in the case of the sq.  
  (  )    ( ̂)  
or 
−(  −   )  −( ̂ −   )
 
 
Two factors could work in defining the delegation’s proposal: its complete information 
on the Council’s and Parliament’s payoffs. The delegation considers that both the 
Council and the Parliament will accept the bill if they receive more payoff from the 
proposal than from the status quo. Similarly, the Parliament has the following utility 
function:  
  (  )    ( ̂)  
or 
−(  −   )  −( ̂ −   )
 
 
As it will be better explained below, the Council’s utility function is more complex, 
though. Two different types of preference distribution determine an important feature of 
the model. Under the first type of preference distribution the Council has complete 
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Under the second type of preference distribution the Council has incomplete 
information on the Parliament’s preferences and this must be incorporated in the 
Council’s utility. First, the Council does not know which Parliament is confronting, 
either a strongly (  
 ) or a moderately recalcitrant (  
 ) Parliament. Second, different 
types of the Parliament produce different payoffs for the Council. 
The incomplete information on the Parliament’s preferences defines the Council’s 
expected utility, such that: 
  (  )     ( ̂)  
or 




Where     ( ̂) is the Council’s utility it receives from the proposed bill, given a 
moderately recalcitrant Parliament, while      ( ̂) is the Council’s utility it receives 
from the proposed bill, given a strongly recalcitrant Parliament.  
 
I will use the utility functions of the three actors involved in the last stages of the 
codecision procedure as well as their ideal policies to predict the conciliation agreement 
and the codecision outcome. In doing so, I consider all the possible configurations of 
the three actors on a given bargaining dimension. 
 
Assumptions of preference configurations. In the last stages of the codecision, the three 
relevant actors – the Council, the delegation and the Parliament – may adopt sixteen 
possible preference configurations. Although the status quo may be located everywhere 
along the bargaining space, it is unlikely to be located in between two actors, otherwise 
negotiation will break down. Indeed, if the status quo is between the Council and the 
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delegation, the Conciliation Committee will fail, while if the status quo is between the 
delegation and the Parliament, legislation will be discharged by the plenary at third 
reading. I will disregard these distributions of preferences, because mechanisms of 
belief manipulation cannot occur38. Moreover it is unlikely that legislators would even 
proceed to conciliation in these circumstances. 
I derive two trivial conclusions from the actors’ location. First, symmetric 
configurations (e.g.    𝑐        is symmetric to       𝑐    ) are not 
                                                             
38
 Codecision may fail because negotiation breakdown in conciliation or third reading rejection. 
Differences on the rejection round depend on where the status quo is located. Whether the status quo is 
among the Council and the delegation, the winset of the status quo is empty at conciliation level and no 
joint text may be agreed on. Whether the status quo is among the delegation and the Parliament, the 
winset is empty at third reading level and the joint text will be discharged. The preference distribution 
[𝑐          ] exemplifies the circumstance of the joint text rejection at third. At conciliation, the 
delegation and the Council may find an agreement in the interval [   −   ,   ]. The bargaining outcome 
is biased in favour of the delegation because of its closeness to the sq. Having agreed on the joint text, the 
bill should receive the approval of the parliamentary plenary. But, the Parliament’s preferred set of bills 
are within the interval [     ]. As a consequence, any joint text approved in the Conciliation Committee 
does not receive the parliamentary confirmation, because the Parliament will always prefers the status quo 
to the Joint text. How is it possible that the joint text will be rejected by the Parliament? Why does the 
delegation bargain for a joint text, if it knew the bill would be discharged? The baseline assumptions of 
the delegation’s perfect information and representativeness still hold. However, contingent factors (as 
parliamentary turnover, public opinion pressure, demonstration of interests groups, international 
conventions and agreements with third countries, new scientific discoveries or economic shocks) may 
have changed the scenario and the preferences of the actors in the meanwhile. The Biotech directive 
(COD/1988/0159) illustrates the case. After the Conciliation Committee agreed the joint text, the 
Parliament vetoed at third reading. Was the delegation a runaway agent? Was it unaware of the 
Parliament’s preferences? The reasons for the parliamentary refusal was that deputies were subject to 
strong pressure by environmental interest groups and pharma lobbies, occurred on the voting day (1st 
March 1995) and in the days before, in order drive the MEPs’ voting behaviour.  
In the three models where the conciliation fails, the status quo lies in between the Council’s and the 
delegation’s ideal policy. The only compromise solution would be the maintenance of the status quo, 
either an existing European legislation or national laws. There is here no choice for the legislatures to find 
an alternative agreement to the status quo. The conciliation or the third reading fail because the winset of 






considered because they are redundant. Second, as Rasmussen (2005, 2008) shows the 
self-imposed rule of delegation’s representativeness by the Parliament is operating well 
without the risk of a runaway behaviour. Since the delegation bargains on behalf of the 
Parliament, I assume that the delegation is located closer to its parent chamber than to 
the Council. Consequently,    −        − 𝑐  .  
 
Information. As I mentioned above, my model of conciliation is based on the premise 
that under certain circumstances the EU legislators – the Council and the Parliament – 
do not have complete information. Since the Council is fully represented and each 
member state has its own delegates (either the Minister or the permanent 
representatives), the Parliament’s delegation has full knowledge about the Council’s 
preference. By contrast, the Council is not sure about which type of Parliament is 
facing. The Council is sure whether the Parliament is recalcitrant or accommodating on 
the Council’s proposals vis-à-vis the status quo, but it is uncertain whether the 
Parliament is strongly or moderately recalcitrant. In other words, assume that the 
Council is closer to sq than both the Parliament and the delegation. The Council can 
infer from the proposals of   that the Parliament is more reformist than itself. 
Uncertainty about the location of   will dissipate. These distinctions imply clear 
definitions of the preference distribution of the Parliament, its delegation and the 
Council. At first step, consider how close the Council is to the status quo: its ideal 
policy might be the closest point to    or not. In the former case with the preference 
distributions,    𝑐        or    𝑐       , the Parliament is 
accommodating, since it would prefer any Council’s proposal than the status quo. In the 
latter case with the preference distribution,          𝑐  or          𝑐 , 
the Parliament is recalcitrant, since it would prefer whichever bills rather than the 
Council’s ideal policy. This distinction is rather trivial and, as my analysis will shows, 
the Council may infer the Parliament’s preferences from its own position and the 
delegation’s proposal.  





Figure 7.1: Certainty and uncertainty of the Council 
 
However, when the Council has the rightest position along the bargaining dimension of 
conflict, it is uncertain over the types of recalcitrant Parliament is dealing with: 
moderately or strongly. The Council believes the Parliament is moderately recalcitrant 
with probability π if      , while it is strongly recalcitrant with probability 1-π if 
        
 
Solution concepts. In the two stages of the game, policy outcomes results from the 
combination of proposals and counterproposal, given the payoff actors realize. The 
intuition underlying these preference distributions is straightforward. The distance 
between the ideal points reveals the degree of compromise required to strike the deal. 
An actor whose ideal point is far from the closest actor to the    will have less 
bargaining power, because it will accept any policy rather than the status quo that the 
other actors offers.  
No matter of which scenario apply, in context of bicameral bargaining on one-
dimensional space is easy to deduce that the final agreement should be in between the 
two legislators’ ideal policy (Tsebelis and Money 1997). Consequently, the approved 
bill shall be a policy located in between the delegation’s and the Council’s ideal policy, 
bounded by the ideal point and the acceptance threshold of the closest actor to the status 
quo.  
𝑂𝑢 𝑐    [ in(𝑐       );     (𝑐       ) −   ] 
The result of this approach takes into account also the Council’s incomplete 
information, because of the supposed ideal point of the strongly and moderately 
recalcitrant Parliament. This model enables us to make prediction about the legislative 
p* sq c* d* 
(a) 






outcome in Conciliation Committee, since is driven by the Council’s position, 
preference and beliefs it has attached to the Parliament’s type. 
Let us analyse the four scenarios with the respective legislative outcome. 
7.2. Four distributions of preferences 
7.2.1. The Council’s advantageous position 
Extreme position of the Parliament (or    𝑐       ) 
Figure 7.2: Extreme position of the Parliament 
 
This preference distribution represents the traditional cleavage in the study of EU 
politics: actors are along the European integration dimension (Gabel and Hix 2002; 
Garrett and Tsebelis 1996; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007; Moser 1996; Scully 1997a, 
1997b; Tsebelis and Garrett 1997, 2000a). The Parliament is more pro-integration than 
the Council The status quo, if the legislation is not adopted, is less integrationist than 
the Council. 
The Council is in a strong bargaining position, because it is the closest actor to the 
status quo and is enforced by the highest disagreement value. Since the political 
composition of the delegation reflects the parliamentary assembly, the Council knows 
that the Parliament and its delegation are located close to each other and it is certain that 
the Parliament is accommodating. Uncertainty about the location of   hence becomes 
irrelevant. As a result, the Council’s proposal is 𝑐̂  𝑐 .  
The delegation, knowing the Council’s position, may amend the  ̂ up to  𝑐 −   , but 
the stronger bargaining power of the Council will force the outcome towards its ideal 
policy. Therefore, the Council and the delegation will bargain the joint text, located in 
𝑝  𝑠𝑞 𝑐  𝑑  
2𝑐 - 𝑠𝑞 
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the interval [𝑐 ;  𝑐 −   ]. The Parliament is forced to accept, because the new proposal 
gives higher payoff than that of the status quo. To sum up, the conciliation outcomes 
will be in the winset: 
𝑂𝑢 𝑐    [𝑐 ;  𝑐 −   ] . 
 
Extreme position of the delegation (or    𝑐       ) 
Figure 7.3: Extreme position of the delegation 
 
In this preference configuration, the Council is still in a powerful bargaining position, 
because it is the closest actor to the status quo and can infer the Parliament’s type as 
accommodating. Although the delegation – the furthest actor from the status quo – has 
to limit its amendments to take into account to the Parliament’s preferences, that  is to 
say, up to    −   , the policy outcome is biased in favour of the Council. The Council 
will propose its ideal policy, 𝑐̂  𝑐 , since it is preferred by both the Parliament and the 
delegation. The delegation would try to amend the proposal to    −    but it is aware 
that the Council would never accept a proposal on the right of  𝑐 −   . The 
conciliation will end with the joint text located in the interval [𝑐 ;  𝑐 −   ], and the 
Parliament would accept it, because it is far better than the status quo.  
As a consequence, conciliation outcomes will be the same winset as before: 
𝑂𝑢 𝑐    [𝑐 ;  𝑐 −   ] 
Both scenarios end with legislative outcomes biased in favour of the Council, since it 
will accept a proposal up to its threshold. No matter where the other actors are located, 
the Council will always achieve a policy as close as possible to its own ideal point. As a 
result, the status quo drives the bargaining solution in both cases: the Council may 
𝑑  𝑠𝑞 𝑐  𝑝  





achieve a better payoff than the Parliament and the delegation, and it establishes the 
threshold policy to bargain. To some extent, the Council has complete information 
thanks to its strong bargaining position. 
7.2.2. The Parliament in an advantageous position 
In the next two preference configurations the Council is in a weak bargaining position, 
since it is the farthest actor from the status quo. The Council is aware of being in the 
worst bargaining location but, because of incomplete information about the Parliament’s 
position, it cannot discriminate whether being in two different scenarios. In other words, 
the Council cannot distinguish with certainty between a strongly and a moderately 
recalcitrant Parliament. It believes the Parliament to be moderately recalcitrant (  >   ) 
with probability π and strongly recalcitrant (   <   ) with probability 1-π. 
Moderately recalcitrant Parliament (or          𝑐 ) 
Figure 7.4: Moderately recalcitrant Parliament 
 
In this scenario, the Council is in a losing position, because it is the farthest actor from 
the status quo. Its ideal policy, c*, is weakened by the counterproposal set by the 
delegation, while its bargaining power is hampered by the uncertainty on the 
parliamentary type. Having moderately recalcitrant position, the Parliament does not 
influence the final legislative outcome. The delegation’s location and acceptance 
threshold are common information, so the Council will try to obtain at least    −   , 




𝑐  𝑠𝑞 𝑑  𝑝  
2𝑑 - 𝑠𝑞 
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Presumably, the conciliation outcome will lie in the interval bounded by    and 
   −    and it is: 
𝑂𝑢 𝑐    [  ;    −   ] 
 
Strongly recalcitrant Parliament (or          𝑐 ) 
Figure 7.5: Strongly recalcitrant Parliament 
 
Giving that the Council is at the opposite extreme of the status quo, thus with limited 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the Parliament, this situation favours the Parliament as 
strongly recalcitrant type. At first, the Council may make a large set of proposals, 
comprised in the interval [𝑐    ], but knowing the delegation’s position, it proposes 
   −    (which gives it the best payoff, all things considered). Unlike the previous 
setting, the delegation does not accept Council’s proposal up to    −   , because it has 
to take into account the recalcitrance of its parent chamber (otherwise it may encounter 
a rejection of the joint text) and restrains the policy set. The Parliament forces its 
delegation to amend the Council’s proposal in its set of preferred policies [      −
  ]. Moreover, the delegation pursues its own interests, exploiting some degree of 
discretion with its parent chamber. 
The delegation would then amend the Council’s proposal with a counterproposal, which 
satisfies two requirements: 
i. It should be as close as possible to the delegation’s most preferred proposal, and 
ii. It should take into account the parliamentary acceptance threshold. 
 
 
𝑐  𝑠𝑞 𝑑  𝑝  





As a result, the conciliation outcome will be located in: 
𝑂𝑢 𝑐     [      −   ] 
Other alternative outcomes will be rejected at third reading by the strongly recalcitrant 
Parliament.  
The third section of this Chapter will investigate how negotiations occurs at conciliation 
in case of correct and incorrect beliefs and how belief manipulation by the delegation 
could take place when the Council is uncertain about the Parliament’s type. The 
parliamentary side, indeed, may benefit from manipulating its own type: the delegation 
and the moderately recalcitrant Parliament may be better off if the Council believes that 
the Parliament is strongly recalcitrant.  
7.3. Correct and incorrect beliefs 
In this section I study in details what happen when the beliefs of the Council about the 
Parliament’s type are correct or incorrect. Table 7.1 shows the four cases there can 
occur during bargaining in the Conciliation Committee. The Parliament is either 
strongly or moderately recalcitrant and the Council’s beliefs are correct or incorrect. In 
the next subsection I will analyse these four cases. 
Table 7.1: Correct and incorrect beliefs 
  
Council’s beliefs 








Correct (1) Incorrect (4) 
Moderately 
recalcitrant 





7.3.1. Correct beliefs 
(1) Correct beliefs with strongly recalcitrant Parliament  
Figure 7.6: Correct beliefs of strongly recalcitrant Parliament 
 
In this preference distribution, the Parliament is the most powerful actor, since it is the 
closest to the status quo, while the Council has a very far away position. The Council 
correctly believes that the Parliament is strongly recalcitrant. During conciliation 
bargaining, the delegation and the Council agree on a joint text that would be satisfying, 
given the Parliament’s preferences. If the delegation is on the left of the Parliament’s 
acceptance threshold, the best policy they can get lies in the interval [      −   ], 
while if the delegation is on the right, they can obtain at most    −   . The correct 
beliefs of the Council do not change policy outcomes, since all the actors know that no 
proposal is accepted farther than the Parliament’s acceptance threshold. 
(2) Correct beliefs with moderately recalcitrant Parliament 
Figure 7.7: Correct beliefs with moderately recalcitrant Parliament 
 
In this scenario, the Council is in a losing position and it believes that the Parliament is 
moderately recalcitrant. The delegation, on the other hand, is in a strong bargaining 
position and does not accept any proposal on the left of its its acceptance threshold. 
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Consequently, the Council realizes that the best payoff it could receive is when the bill 
corresponds to    −   .  
Both the delegation and the Council may issue a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the opponent 
chamber, with the risk of negotiation breakdowns. While the delegation may ask for its 
own ideal policy, the Council accepts only    −   . As a result, compromise policy 
may be reached in the interval [      −   ]. The role of the Parliament is crucial. The 
closer is to the delegation and the stronger is the delegation in asking for its own ideal 
policy. If the Parliament lies on the left of the delegation’s acceptance threshold (and 
the Council believes that the Parliament is there), the Council and the delegation may 
reach an agreement in the interval [      −   ], while if the Parliament is on the right, 
the Conciliation Committee may vote for a joint text that is in the policy outcome 
[      −   ].  
The delegation – in the former scenario – and the Parliament – in the latter scenario – 
may affect the policy outcome, by restricting the set of policies the actors may agree on. 
7.3.2. Incorrect beliefs 
(3) Incorrect beliefs with moderately recalcitrant Parliament 
Figure 7.8: Incorrect beliefs with moderately recalcitrant Parliament 
 
This preference distribution and the wrong beliefs of the Council illustrate the most 
interesting scenario that can occur in conciliation. In this circumstance, the Parliament is 
moderately recalcitrant, but the Council believes it is strongly recalcitrant. The 
supposed Parliament’s ideal point is identified as  ̂. What is the policy outcome under 
this circumstance? 
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The delegation knows that the policy outcome is located in the interval [      −   ], 
but the Council’s belief reduces the interval, because it believes that the interval of the 
feasible policies is in [     ̂ −   ].  
Bills located in such interval provide a higher payoff for the delegation as well as for the 
Parliament under certain cases. Consider the worst payoff they receive in case of correct 
and incorrect Council’s beliefs with moderately recalcitrant Parliament. On the 
delegation’s side, the worst policy it would agree is    −   , if the Parliament is 
believed to be moderately recalcitrant (correct beliefs), while it would agree   ̂ −   , if 
the Parliament is believed to be strongly recalcitrant (incorrect beliefs). Under incorrect 
beliefs, the delegation gets more utility as the bill is located at   ̂ −   , rather than at 
   −   . The Parliament, on the contrary, receives a better outcome when it is located 
on the left of the midpoint between the two relevant threshold, namely at      −   . 
Any point on the right of this midpoint will reduce the Parliament’s payoff.  
Since the delegation may develop interesting mechanisms of belief manipulation, I will 
analyse circumstances where the delegation manipulates the Council’s belief in the next 
section. 
(4) Incorrect beliefs with strongly recalcitrant Parliament 
Figure 7.9: Incorrect beliefs with strongly recalcitrant Parliament 
Under this preference distribution, the Parliament is strongly recalcitrant (  ), even 
though the Council believes to bargain with a moderately recalcitrant Parliament ( ̂).  
As a result of this incorrect belief, the closest bill the Council can get is located at 
   −   , because the delegation is supposed to have the strongest bargaining power. 
Actually, in section 1.2 I have shown that under a preference distribution as       
d  𝑐 , the strongly recalcitrant Parliament would bias the policy outcome in its 
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favour, namely  [      −   ]. The risk here is that the delegation needs to force the 
conciliation negotiations in order to achieve  [      −   ], but the Council does not 
want to accept any policy on the left of    −   . Unlike the Council, the delegation, 
indeed, is aware that any joint texts in the interval  [   −       −   ] will be rejected 
at third reading.  
In conclusion, under this scenario the conciliation bargaining may end up in two 
different policy outcomes: [      −   ] or  [      −   ]. In the former case, the bill 
will be then enacted, while in the latter case the bill will be rejected by the Parliament. 
To sum up, the winset in the four cases are reported in Table 7.2. 
Table 7.2: Policy outcomes 
 











[      −   ] 
 [      −   ]  
or  
 [      −   ] 
Moderately 
recalcitrant 
[     ̂ −   ] [      −   ] 
7.4. Belief manipulation 
In this section I analyse possible conciliation outcomes when the Council is subject to 
belief manipulation about the Parliament’s type.  
The previous section shows that incorrect belief about the strong recalcitrant type does 
not increase the Parliament’s payoff, but increases the risk of third reading rejection. In 
the case the Parliament is strongly recalcitrant, belief manipulation would not increase 
the Parliament’s payoff. 
Conversely, the delegation and the moderately recalcitrant Parliament may be better off 
if the Council believes that the Parliament is strongly recalcitrant. As Figure 7.8 
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reminds us, the bargaining space is reduced to the interval [      ̂ −   ], even though 
the actual one is larger, for instance [d   d −   ], giving a better payoff to the 
parliamentary side. This raises the possibility that the delegation might attempt to 
manipulate the Council’s beliefs about the Parliament’s type. Manipulation does not 
come so straightforward, though. 
Consider Figure 7.10. The Council believes that the Parliament is strong ( ̂), but in 
reality it is moderate, that is to say, it is located      .  
Figure 7.10: Belief manipulation 
 
Although Cameron and McCarty (2004) illustrates that a moderate actor may be better 
off if the opponent believes she is extreme, bargaining in the Conciliation Committee 
with three actors is peculiar and demonstrates that the actors may assume a whole array 
of moderate and strong positions. The Parliament, indeed, is not always better off if it 
tries to manipulate the Council’s beliefs.  
Three cases can be distinguished. First, the moderate Parliament may be located to the 
right of the delegation’s acceptance threshold, namely when       −   . In this 
circumstance, the Parliament gets better payoff if the Council believes it is moderate, 
because the final outcome is likely to be in the interval [      −   ]. Moreover, the 
Parliament would be better off if the legislation was at the delegation’s acceptance 
threshold, as compared to a bill close to the delegation’s ideal policy. In this case the 
Parliament would manipulate the Council’s beliefs so that it believes the Parliament is 
moderate with a position corresponding to the delegation’s ideal policy. Therefore, the 
highest utility the Council and the Parliament can obtain is when the legislative outcome 
is the delegation’s acceptance threshold.  
Second, if the Parliament lies in the interval [  ̂ −       −   ], the delegation may 
not propose a tough proposal in order that the Council believes the Parliament is 
𝑐  𝑠𝑞 𝑑  ?̂? 






strongly recalcitrant. On the contrary, the delegation may alternate policy concessions 
and refusals during the bargaining. The final outcome is located in the interval [  ̂ −
      −   ]  However, a responsible delegation would agree on a policy as close as 
possible to the Parliament’s ideal policy, while a runaway delegation would try to 
convince the Council that the Parliament is stronger, in order to maximize its utility.  
Third and most importantly, manipulation occurs when the moderate Parliament is 
located in the interval      ̂ −   . A Parliament located here (the shaded area in Figure 
7.10) has strong incentives for the delegation to make tough proposal during 
conciliation bargaining in order to manipulate the Council’s belief. Whichever proposal 
of the Council will be in the shaded area [     ̂ −   ], because it believes the 
Parliament is strongly recalcitrant and the delegation uses any efforts to strengthen 
those beliefs. In this circumstance, the Council proposes a bill that it finds less attractive 
but that the strong Parliament accepts, because it will get a higher payoff. The final 
outcome is in [     ̂ −   ].  
In conclusion, only in this last preference distribution, the delegation has incentives to 
manipulate the Council’s belief, while in the other two cases it should not be difficult 
for the delegation to persuade the Council that the actual position of the Parliament is 
     ̂ −   . Table 7.3 illustrates the winset of the status quo under the different 
positions the Parliament has when it is moderately recalcitrant. 
Table 7.3: Policy outcomes under belief manipulation 
Parliament’s position* Winset 
[     ̂ −   ] [     ̂ −   ] 
[  ̂ −       −   ] [  ̂ −       −   ]  
[   −    𝑐 ]    −    
* The Parliament has different moderately recalcitrant positions. 
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7.5. Analysing belief manipulation on the Telecoms Package 
In this section I study this dynamics with analytic narrative of a dossier. I highlight the 
importance of the institutional context and the actor’s utility function within the 
historical situations. First, I focus on the early stages of the draft directive on electronic 
communications networks and services, known as Telecoms Package. Second, I analyse 
the bargaining and belief manipulation occurred in the last legislative stages.  
There are two reasons why I select this case. First, according to Wordfish estimate the 
Parliament results to be in a successful position vis-à-vis the Council. The final 
legislative outcome is estimated to be more similar to the second reading of the 
Parliament than to the Council’s common position. Second, the Telecoms Package was 
a highly debated dossier in the public opinion. Deputies as well as consumers’ 
association monitored all the legislative stages and provided a lot of information on the 
formal and informal meetings between the two delegations in conciliation. The 
Telecoms Package might be not the only dossier which the Parliament and its delegation 
manipulate their reputation for, but it is certainly the most recent and which I can give 
detailed account of.  
7.5.1. Setting the ground 
In 2000 the European Council adopted in Lisbon a strategic plan in order to enhance 
European competitiveness in growth and productivity with other world-wide leading 
countries, such as Japan and the US. The main commitment of the Lisbon strategy was 
that the European Union needs “to become the most dynamic and competitive 
knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with 
more and better jobs and greater social cohesion, and respect for the environment”. In 
order to ensure the legal framework for electronic communications networks and 
services, the European Parliament and the Council adopted a package of measures in 
2002. The five directives39 defined a common set of rules for electronically transmitted 
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communications, whether wireless or fixed, data or voice, Internet-based or circuit 
switched, broadcast or personal. However, only in 2005 the Commission identified 
affordable and secure technological convergence of the telecommunications as key 
conditions for realising the growth and job creation in the European Union, and 
launched the i2010 initiative40. It recognized that the economic performances are 
different across industrialised countries because of the level of ICT investment, 
research, and use, and the competitiveness of information society and media industries. 
Such initiative required a substantive reform of the regulatory framework capable to 
harmonize national legislation towards a common legal approach across the European 
Union and to consolidate the internal market. A 2006 report of the Commission noted, 
indeed, that despite the international feature of technological markets and development, 
there was a fragmentation of national laws, which hindered investment and was 
detrimental to consumers and operators. 
On November 13, 2007 the European Commission presented three proposals41 to the 
Council and the Parliament to set up a new regulating scheme for electronic 
communications. The directives aimed at enhancing regulation for competitive 
electronic communications; completing the single market through the establishment of 
an independent European Electronic Communications Market Authority and a stronger 
role of the Commission; and improving consumer protection and user rights. Unlike the 
Access and Authorization Directive, the Framework Directive (COD/2007/0247) 
reached conciliation in order to be enacted. 
On 24 September 2008, the Parliament voted its first reading upon the report tabled by 
the rapporteur Catherine Trautmann (PES, FR). The report considered that the amended 
regulatory framework should also include: the promotion of consumer protection in 
terms of transparency of fees and charges; the recognition of consumer associations’ 
role in public consultations; and systematic and effective protection against electronic 
fraud through cooperation between national authorities and a Body of European 
Telecoms Regulators. However, the most important amendment, the so called 
Amendment 138, was presented in the plenary by Cohn-Bendit (Greens, D), Bono 
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(PES, FR) and Roithova (EPP, CZ) and prescribed that no restriction may be imposed 
on the fundamental rights and freedoms of end users, without a prior ruling by the 
judicial authorities, save when public security is threatened. The amendment was 
accepted by a large majority in the plenary and even the Commission issued a positive 
opinion. 
In February 2009 the Council unanimously agreed, with the abstention of Sweden, the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands, on the common position. It claimed that an 
update of the regulatory framework for electronic communication would produce 
benefits, but this could have been achieved by improving the existing arrangements 
rather than setting up an alternative mechanism. The member states changed the 
amended Commission proposal regarding the independence of the national regulatory 
authorities as well as the collaborating approach with the Commission on the possibility 
to issue decision on draft measures intended to be taken by such national authorities. 
Moreover, the Council rejected Amendment 138 outright excluding to mention it both 
in recitals and in articles. The main reason regards the legal basis of the amended 
proposal which does not allow forcing the member states into a particular judicial 
organization (European Parliament 2009c). 
Amendment 138 was the only one subparagraph remained controversial between the 
Parliament and the Council, that is to say the degree to which access to the internet is 
protected by EU law, as well as the procedural and judicial safeguards for internet users. 
It became the underlying issue of conflict both at second reading and in conciliation. 
Upon this issue, negotiators release several declarations of vote so that I am able to 
identify whether there were signals and misinterpreted information for belief 
manipulation at conciliation 
7.5.2. The belief manipulation on the Telecoms Package 
After the Council’s rejection, the Parliament reinstated amendment 138 at second 
reading by 407 votes to 57, with 171 abstentions (mostly from the EPP) on 6 May 2009. 





Applying the principle that no restriction may be imposed on the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of end-users, without a prior ruling by 
the judicial authorities, notably in accordance with Article 11 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union on freedom of 
expression and information, save when public security is threatened in 
which case the ruling may be subsequent. 
During the second reading debate the rapporteur, indeed, declared that: “This morning’s 
vote puts the whole package back on the drawing board. Either the Council pays heed to 
the EP’s vote and says what it never said and accepts the amendment, or the Council of 
Ministers, which alleged that the EP did not have the right to meddle in its jurisdiction, 
refuses, and the package goes to conciliation” (Vandystadt 2009b). Moreover, the 
Parliament knew that the Council, under the Czech Presidency, could never have 
accepted the amendment. At that time, a French law and a UK bill introduced a three-
strike rule, which could cut off Internet access without the intervention of the judicial 
authority, if the user were suspected of illegally downloading content. The rights 
protected by the draft amendment would have been meaningless, according to the 
Parliament, if such laws were allowed to be enforced at national level. 
It is from this point that the Parliament signalled incorrect information about its own 
type to the Council, in order to obtain more concession.  
Since the Conciliation Committee has been convened, long negotiations occurred in 
order to find agreement on the issue both within the parliamentary delegation and 
between the Parliament and the Council. In October 2009, during the several 
preparatory trialogues, the Parliament and the Council were involved in a truly 
sequential bargaining game, where each negotiator offered its proposal and 
counterproposal to the other. In addition, the Parliament showed a strong bargaining 
position and rejected accommodating compromise of the Council. The rapporteur 
undertook a meticulous work along with the Parliament’s Secretariat for Codecision and 
Conciliation as well as the Legal Service in order to find an acceptable formula for the 
member states. 
On the day before of the Conciliation Committee’s first meeting, deputies were deeply 
concerned that the Parliament’s delegation would not have been strong enough vis-à-vis 
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the Council to reach important clauses, such as presumption of innocence and the right 
to privacy. Catherine Trautmann (S&D, FR), the rapporteur, regretted that: “Can we 
knowingly take the risk of defending Amendment 138 to the finish while knowing that 
it might be declared inadmissible by the European Court of Justice and that internet 
users would then be defenceless?” (Vandystadt 2009a). According to Christian 
Engström (Greens, SE), the key parliamentary representatives (the rapporteur, the 
chairman and the vice-President) reported back that preparatory informal meeting with 
the Council were on the basis of the Council’s text (Engström 2009a). After tense 
discussion, the Parliament agreed on the key points which deputies could not give up. 
First, they pointed out to the Council that Amendment 138 was abandoned, because 
there would have been against the Treaty provisions and the European Court of Justice 
would have rejected it in the case of an appeal. Second, the Parliament did not renounce 
its demand on internet-users’ rights of access and, on 20 October 2009, the delegation 
met for the first time. Therefore, it showed up to be a strong negotiator, as the vice-
President responsible for conciliation, Alejo Vidal-Quadras, emphasized: “We go to 
negotiations with a compromising spirit but firm in our defence of the rights of the users 
and committed in the development of a regulatory framework that would incentivise 
investments and that would open the market.”(EPP group 2009). The Parliament was 
aware that their first proposal at the trialogues would have been considered as the least 
compromising position by the Council, since it provided for cutting off of users only 
after a prior rulings and under exceptional circumstances. It states: 
“3a. Measures taken by member states regarding end-users' access to or use 
of services and applications through electronic communications networks 
shall respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, as 
guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms and general principles of Community law.  
Any measures liable to restrict those fundamental rights or freedoms may 
only be taken in exceptional circumstances should and imposed if they are 
appropriate, proportionate and necessary within a democratic society, and 





European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and with general principles of Community law, including 
effective judicial protection and due process. In particular, any measures 
may only be adopted as a result of a prior, fair and impartial procedure 
ensuring that inter alia the principle of presumption of innocence and the 
right to be heard of the person or persons concerned be fully respected. 
Furthermore, the right to an effective and timely judicial review shall be 
guaranteed.  
This shall not affect the competence of a member state, in conformity with 
its own constitutional order and with fundamental rights, to establish a 
requirement of a judicial decision authorising the measures to be taken. ”  
On the other hand, the Council did its counterproposal, by deleting guarantees on prior 
trials (the part in the text that are crossed out) and adding provisions under which 
member states may adopt urgent measures (the text in bold). 
3a. Measures taken by member states regarding end-users’ access to or use 
of services and applications through electronic communications networks 
shall respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, as 
guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms and general principles of Community law. 
Any of the above measures liable to restrict those fundamental rights or 
freedoms may therefore only be taken in exceptional circumstances and 
imposed if they are appropriate, proportionate and necessary within a 
democratic society, and shall be subject to adequate procedural safeguards 
in conformity with the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and with general principles of 
Community law, including effective judicial protection and due process. In 
particular, any These measures may only be adopted as a result of a prior, 
shall respect the requirements of a fair and impartial procedure ensuring 
inter alia that the principle of presumption of innocence and including the 
right to be heard of the person or persons concerned be fully respected. 
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Furthermore, and the right to an effective and timely judicial review shall 
be guaranteed. 
This shall not affect the competence of a member state, in conformity with 
its own constitutional order and with fundamental rights, inter alia, to 
establish a requirement of a judicial decision authorising the measures to be 
taken and to adopt urgent measures in order to assure national security, 
defence, public security and the prevention, investigation, detection and 
prosecution of criminal offences. 
The parliamentary delegation did not to step back from its demand and rejected the 
offered proposal, setting firm conditions for agreement. The core of the article was “the 
prior and impartial procedure” that should be a guarantee for Internet end-users. The 
delegation demonstrated to be inflexible on certain central aspects of the ex-
Amendment 138 and it resulted to achieve more concessions than if it were adopting the 
accommodating stances the parliamentary relay actors considered to accept at the 
beginning of the conciliation negotiations.  
If we compare, indeed, the first reading amendment with the final act, the latter 
produces tougher provision asked by the Parliament. The Parliament did not give in that 
restricting measures must also be nothing but appropriate, proportionate and necessary 
within a democratic society. In particular, these measures must respect the presumption 
of innocence and the right to privacy. With regard to any measures of member states 
taken on their Internet access (e.g. to fight child pornography or other illegal activities), 
citizens in the EU are entitled to a prior fair and impartial procedure, including the right 
to be heard, and they have a right to an effective and timely judicial review.  
3a. Measures taken by member states regarding end-users’ access to or use 
of services and applications through electronic communications networks 
shall respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, as 
guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms and general principles of Community law.  
Any of these the above measures regarding end-user’s access to or use of 





liable to restrict those fundamental rights or freedoms may therefore only be 
imposed if they are appropriate, proportionate and necessary within a 
democratic society, and their implementation shall be subject to adequate 
procedural safeguards in conformity with the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and with general 
principles of Community law, including effective judicial protection and due 
process. Accordingly, these measures may only be taken with due respect 
for the principle of presumption of innocence and the right to privacy and 
shall guarantee shall respect the requirements of a prior fair and impartial 
procedure including the right to be heard of the person or persons 
concerned and the right to an effective and timely judicial review. This shall 
not affect the competence of a member state, in conformity with its own 
constitutional order and with fundamental rights, to establish, inter alia, a 
requirement of a judicial decision authorising the measures to be taken. 
The delegation made only one concession, that is it agreed to that even non-judicial 
authorities are entitled to adopt the limiting measure of end-users’ right to Internet 
access, following the deletion of the last paragraph. The Council was in the corner. 
Member states believed that the tough demand of the Parliament was their ultimate 
acceptance threshold, otherwise negotiations would have failed. Because the directive 
was considered as Europe’s best response to the economic and financial crisis, member 
states could not afford a failure. The Parliament, on the other hand, was certainly 
cohesive in the last stages of the codecision and, even though some deputies from the 
European People’s Party, the largest party group in the assembly, were initially not 
prepared to such a safeguard of fundamental rights also for the Internet’s users. 
The compromise text accepted even the ground instances of the most protectionists of 
net users, the Greens and the Swedish Pirate Party. It states: 
3a. Measures taken by member states regarding end-users’ access to or use 
of services and applications through electronic communications networks 
shall respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, as 
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guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms and general principles of Community law. 
Any of these measures regarding end-user’s access to or use of services and 
applications through electronic communications networks liable to restrict 
those fundamental rights or freedoms may only be imposed if they are 
appropriate, proportionate and necessary within a democratic society, and 
their implementation shall be subject to adequate procedural safeguards in 
conformity with the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and with general principles of 
Community law, including effective judicial protection and due process. 
Accordingly, these measures may only be taken with due respect for the 
principle of presumption of innocence and the right to privacy. A prior fair 
and impartial procedure shall be guaranteed, including the right to be 
heard of the person or persons concerned, subject to the need for 
appropriate conditions and procedural arrangements in duly substantiated 
cases of urgency in conformity with European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The right to an effective and 
timely judicial review shall be guaranteed. 
In substance, compared to Amendment 138 measures limiting end-users’ right shall be 
defined by administrative authorities, and not necessarily by the judiciary. At the same 
time, there are even more precise conditions in conformity with the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom and when 
there is urgency rights are protected and guaranteed by judicial appealing. The member 
of the Swedish Pirate Party, Christian Engström (Greens, SE), claimed that: “This is not 
a perfect text. It is not what I would have proposed if could write it myself, free from 
any political constraints. But it is good enough to be a step in the right direction.” 
(Engström 2009b). 
Even Lambert van Nistelrooij (EPP, NL) made a declaration of votes warmly 
supporting the text and pointing out that during the conciliation the rapporteur made 





to go that far”. The rapporteur, indeed, posed so many conditions that everyone in the 
plenary welcomed the text as an example of “a pièce de résistance of the art of 
negotiation”(European Parliament 2009b).  
By defending such strongly recalcitrant position, the Council considered the Parliament 
as such and that was the only compromise text the two delegations could have agreed 
on. All the parliamentary delegates voted in favour, even a MEP from the EFD, against 
the voting indication of its party. As a matter of fact, the Parliament voted almost 
unanimously at third reading, only 40 MEPs voted against the joint text42.  
The Parliament’s cohesiveness both in conciliation and in third reading sent strong 
signals to the Council: a large majority, formed by ALDE; ECR, EPP, Greens/EFA and 
PES, wanted outright the protection of fundamental rights for Internet users. 
Conclusions 
This Chapter has a double purpose: it combines analytic tools with the narrative 
exposition of one dossier. In the first sections I have developed a model of the 
legislative politics in conciliation. The primary objectives have been to investigate 
under which preference distributions belief manipulation may occur and which payoffs 
the delegation and the Parliament may achieve once they make tough proposals to the 
Council. In the last section I have tried to analyse these mechanisms of belief 
manipulation in a specific case. I paid close attention to accounts and context under 
which the Telecom Package was negotiated and then enacted. I suggested, through 
formal lines of reasoning, my interpretation on the events occurred in the Conciliation 
Committee and the alternating proposals and counterproposals in order to reach a 
compromise on Amendment 138. 
                                                             










The primary goal of this research was to shed light on the important, but rather 
neglected, topic of the Conciliation Committee. I investigated the balance of power 
between the Council and the Parliament within the Conciliation Committee and how 
they settle disagreements. This was accomplished through the application of bargaining 
theory and formal models on bicameralism as well as the rationalist accounts to EU 
politics. I have analysed the conditions under which the European Parliament is more 
successful in conciliation bargaining and I have dealt with two research questions. First, 
I focused on the extent to which legislative outcomes are biased in favour of one 
chamber instead of the other. Second, I was interested in the explanatory factors that 
may affect such conciliation bargaining and I formulated several hypotheses.  
My expectations were then assessed by three empirical analyses: a large sample 
analysis; an interview-based, qualitative study; and a formal analysis with a detailed 
case study. First, through Wordfish I conducted a quantitative text analysis estimating 
the similarity between the official documents of 179 dossiers that reached conciliation 
from the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht to 29 February 2012. The dataset 
covered almost all the dossiers the Council and the Parliament have agreed on. I used 
the data both to describe the extent to which the joint text is more similar either to the 
Council’s common position or to the Parliament’s second reading, as well as to 
statistically analyse the explanatory factors that influence parliamentary bargaining 
success. 
Second, for the qualitative analysis I conducted interviews with key negotiators, both 
from the Council and Parliament, about several dossiers that reached conciliation. It 
provides an in-depth contribution to the factors affecting legislative outcome for a broad 
array of cases. Furthermore, I used the qualitative analysis to enrich the theoretical 
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argumentation about the causal mechanisms of such variables and to discover 
additional, previously ignored, explanatory factors. 
Finally, I explored the dynamics of belief manipulation through the development of a 
spatial model, which was subject then to analysis via an in-depth narrative of a 
conciliation dossier. 
In this Chapter, I summarize the main findings and I consider whether and how far the 
results from the quantitative, the qualitative as well as the formal analyses may be 
reconciled. Finally, I explore avenues for further research. 
The findings 
The first research question is about the overall bargaining performance in conciliation. 
Although the Conciliation Committee is conceived as a unicameral body where equally 
represented delegations of the Council and the Parliament meet, the legislative 
outcomes it produces do not reflect balanced bargaining powers. Upon a closer 
examination, the institutional set-up of the committee is bias in favour of the Council. 
First, the composition rules establish that the Council’s delegation may rely on all the 
representatives of the member states, which are always involved during the 
negotiations, while the Parliament has currently twenty-seven delegates only. In other 
words, the Council delegation is the Council. Consequently, the amendment rule that 
each chamber employs to amend a proposal is different. Even though both chambers 
vote under open rule in conciliation, and under closed rule at third reading, each 
member state may amend the proposal during the conciliation negotiations. The Council 
and the Parliament vote under qualified majority and simple majority voting, 
respectively. The composition, amendment and voting rules determine that the member 
states are more constrained than the parliamentary delegations and they enjoy less 
proposal power than the parliamentary delegates. As expected, the results, indeed, 
indicate that the outcomes are biased in favour of the Council. Both the quantitative 
analysis and the interview-based research show that the Council has a structural 





The second question was related to the circumstances under which the Parliament is 
more likely to affect the legislative outcomes. Table 8.1 summarizes whether the 
hypotheses I formulated in Chapter 3 found substantial or preliminary evidences in the 
three empirical Chapters.  
Table 8.1: Hypotheses on parliamentary success and empirical evidences 















Hypothesis 1a: Conciliation outcomes are more 
likely to be biased against the Parliament when 
the Council is closer to the status quo than the 
Parliament. 
   
Hypothesis 1b: Conciliation outcomes are more 
likely to be biased against the Parliament when 
new legislation is under discussion. 
 x  
Institutions 
Hypothesis 2: Conciliation outcomes are more 
likely to be biased in favour of the Parliament 
under qualified majority voting of the Council, 
rather than under unanimity. 
   
Hypothesis 3: Conciliation outcomes are more 
likely to be biased in favour of the Parliament 
under the codecision version of the Amsterdam 
Treaty, rather than the early version of the 
Maastricht Treaty.  
   
Hypothesis 4: Conciliation outcomes are more 
likely to be biased in favour of the Parliament 
when the size of the assembly is reduced. 
x   
Uncertainty, veto threat and reputation 
Hypothesis 5a: Conciliation outcomes are more 
likely to be biased in favour of the Parliament 
when rapporteur comes from larger parties. 
   
Hypothesis 5b: Conciliation outcomes are more 
likely to be biased in favour of the Council when 
rapporteur comes from smaller parties. 
x x  
Hypothesis 6a: Conciliation outcomes are more 
likely to be biased in favour of the Parliament 
when rapporteur is in a leadership position. 




Hypothesis 6b: Conciliation outcomes are more 
likely to be biased in favour of the Council when 
rapporteur is not in a leadership position. 
x x  
Hypothesis 7: Conciliation outcomes are less 
likely to be biased in favour of the Parliament 
when rapporteur is from a party represented in 
the Council. 
x x  
Hypothesis 8: Conciliation outcomes are more 
likely to be biased in favour of the Parliament 
when the Presidency of the Council is from a 
new member state. 
   
Hypothesis 9a: Conciliation outcomes are more 
likely to be biased in favour of the Parliament 
when audience submits its costs. 
   
Hypothesis 9b: Conciliation outcomes are more 
likely to be biased in favour of the Parliament at 
the beginning, rather than at the end of the 
legislative term. 
x x  
Hypothesis 10: Conciliation outcomes are more 
likely to be biased in favour of the Parliament 
when parliamentary actors have more 
experience on the dossier and on how to 
conduct the negotiations 
  
 
Representativeness and cohesiveness 
Hypothesis 11: Conciliation outcomes are more 
likely to be biased in favour of the Parliament 
when the assembly voted cohesively.  
   
Hypothesis 12: Conciliation outcomes are more 
likely to be biased in favour of the Parliament 
when the delegation is recalcitrant instead of 
accommodating. 
   
Implementation 
Hypothesis 13: Conciliation outcomes are more 
likely to be biased in favour of the Parliament 
when the Commission gives positive opinion on 
the second parliamentary reading. 
   
Hypothesis 14: Conciliation outcomes are more 
likely to be biased in favour of the Parliament in 
the case of measures with greater involvement 
of national administrations. 
 ---  
 
Note:  
     significant corroboration of the hypothesis in the empirical analysis  
        partial corroboration of the hypothesis in the empirical analysis 







I will proceed by highlighting those factors the explanatory power of which is 
corroborated by both the large-N analysis and the interviews. 
First of all, in Chapter 3 I reviewed the literature on the disagreement value and how the 
proximity to the status quo may increase the chance of one chamber’s success. The 
quantitative analysis indicated that the Parliament increases its bargaining success in 
conciliation when acts amending previous EU legislation are negotiated. In this case, a 
negotiating failure is less costly to parliamentarians, because they attach a lower 
disagreement to the measure at hand than the one assigned by ministers. On the 
contrary, the qualitative analysis highlighted the impact of the disagreement value when 
withdrawals and rejections of dossiers occur. I illustrated, indeed, the more recent 
dossiers on which the Council and the Parliament did not find an agreement and I found 
that the Parliament is more likely to reject the joint text when it attaches a better utility 
to the existing legislation. 
Second, legislative outcomes are affected by rapporteurs that come from large parties. 
This result is in accordance with the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 3 and derived by 
veto-threat and preference-based explanations. The veto-threat argument considers 
rapporteurs as the leading actors capable of setting credible restrictions over the set of 
acceptable solutions. To some extent, rapporteurs coming from large parties may issue 
credible threats that the assembly will vote against the less preferred policies of the 
Council. Since these rapporteurs may extract more concessions from the other chamber, 
the final agreement results to be more similar to the Parliament’s position. The 
preference-based explanation puts emphasis on the large support these rapporteurs may 
receive in the plenary, because they are either more in touch with the view of the 
majority or they are more able to sanction defecting parliamentarians. Both explanations 
are corroborated, even though interviewees give more emphasis to rapporteurs as 
representatives than issuer of veto threats. 
Third, even the relay actor of the Council – the Presidency – affects bargaining 
outcomes. Because newer member states holding the Presidency may be more easily 
subject to belief manipulation and they face higher reputation costs, the conciliation 
outcome is likely to be biased in favour of the Parliament. This hypothesis was 
corroborated by the large-N as well as the interview-based analyses. The lower 
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Council’s bargaining success when newer member states chair the Presidency depends 
also by their limited ability to put the counterparts against the ropes, because they are 
more preoccupied to accomplish their six-month agenda than to be successful in 
conciliation. Moreover, these countries may rely on fewer top-level bureaucrats in the 
institutions and they have less access to information. 
Fourth, deputies have a five-year electoral mandate and their chance of being successful 
during conciliation bargaining depend also whether they are at the beginning or at the 
end of this mandate. The literature on bargaining offers two alternative explanations 
about how the electoral cycle may affect bargaining. On the one side, McCarty (1997) 
suggests that the parliamentary delegation may extract more concessions from the 
Council when they are at the beginning of the mandate, because of the greater need to 
build a reputation. On the other side, Groseclose and McCarty (2001) include the 
electorate as the third actor to which parliamentarians have to account of. Quantitative 
analysis showed weak evidence of the impact electoral cycle. However, it corroborated 
the second explanation, thus confirmed even by the interviews which consider the 
relations deputies have with their constituencies as well as the desire of being re-elected.  
The last factor both analyses agreed on is the role of the Commission. The Commission 
plays a facilitating role of proposing the compromise and may influence both formally 
and informally the conciliation outcome in favour of one chamber rather than the other, 
especially through the opinions they give to the Council’s and the Parliament’s prior 
positions. Both analyses strongly corroborated this expectation and in particular the 
increasing parliamentary success when the Commission takes its side. 
Unfortunately, other factors are corroborated only in one analysis. For example, the 
impact of constitutional reforms is strongly corroborated in the quantitative study. 
Indeed, the 1997 reform of the codecision procedure as well as the expansion of the 
qualified majority voting increase parliamentary success. I could not investigate these 
relations in the qualitative study, however, since no interviewees have an experience of 
such modifications. Also the expectation related to implementation was tested and 
corroborated only in the large-N study. When the measure prescribe implementation via 
national administrations, the Parliament and the Commission rely on legislative 





opposite it occurs when the Commission is the main implementer. As a result, the 
Parliament increases its bargaining success in conciliation in the former circumstance 
rather than the latter. 
On the contrary, the qualitative analysis shed light on several factors. First, interviewees 
confirmed that the ability of the relay actors to increase success of their parent chamber 
depends even by their personality: both bargaining skills as well as skills based on 
mutual trust and empathy. Second, cohesiveness of the chambers matters and 
negotiators make use of manipulating tactics in order to find alternative legislative 
outcomes that divide the other chamber. Although interviewees confirmed the influence 
of this factor, it is not clear whether it may favour one chamber or the other. 
Third, reforms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty may change the balance of power 
between the Council and the Parliament in conciliation. The Treaty changes the 
comitology system with the establishment of implementing and delegated acts. 
Although this seemed to have increased the bargaining power of the Parliament, in the 
short run after the entry into force the Council was recalcitrant towards the Parliament, 
negotiating the legislative outcome in favour of the member states. Last, parliamentary 
negotiators may exploit the different time horizons of parliamentarians and Council 
members. Interviewees, indeed, pointed out that the President is impatient due to its 
short mandate of only six months. 
The dynamics of belief manipulation by the Parliament may occur under specific 
preference distributions. I considered four preference distributions, based on the 
location of the Parliament, its delegation and the Council vis-à-vis the status quo: the 
extreme position of the Parliament, the extreme position of the delegation, the 
moderately recalcitrant Parliament and the strongly recalcitrant Parliament. Only in the 
last two cases, the Parliament may manipulate the Council’s beliefs in order to extract 
more concessions. However, the analysis highlights that when the Parliament is strongly 
recalcitrant, belief manipulation would not increase the Parliament’s payoff, but it may 
increase the risk of third reading rejection. On the contrary, when the Parliament is 
moderately recalcitrant, it may be better off if the Council believes that the Parliament is 
strongly recalcitrant. I analyse this latter case through a narrative of the Telecom 
Package. I interpreted the events occurred prior and at conciliation as a game of 
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alternating offers and counteroffers where the Parliament sought to manipulate the 
Council’s beliefs and finally it succeeded to extract an important concession on a 
controversial amendment on fundamental rights of end-users.  
Further research 
Overall, in the present analysis I have highlighted how the Conciliation Committee 
operates and assessed the bargaining power of the Council and the Parliament with a 
systematic analysis of almost all the dossiers that reached this dispute settlement body. 
The Conciliation Committee’s outcomes are preponderantly biased in favour of the 
Council, but the Parliament may adopt several weapons to increase its bargaining 
power, especially taking into account that bicameral setting is characterized by 
incomplete information and belief manipulation. In addition, the two legislative 
institutions may adopt more recalcitrant prior positions once they realize that their 
disagreement will be solved in the Conciliation Committee. The expectation that the 
Council and the Parliament have on the possible outcomes in conciliation may affect the 
parliamentary second reading and the common position. 
However, we need further analysis to examine more in detail the influence of some 
factors, using even different methodology. First of all, I noticed the difficulties in 
determining the nature of the parliamentary delegation. Representativeness seemed not 
to be a problem, since it is guaranteed by procedural rules. However, we need to know 
the composition of the parliamentary delegation in view of the Council’s position on the 
dossier at hand. Second, I devoted an entire Chapter to the influence that belief have on 
the final outcome. The analytic narratives tested when belief manipulation occurs, but a 
more systematic empirical analysis may be appropriate, even extended to the whole 







List of European parties and their abbreviations 
 Party Label 
EPP European People’s Party 
PES Party of European Socialists 
S&D Socialists and Democrats 
ALDE Alliance of Liberals and Democrats in Europe 
Greens/EFA Greens/European Free Alliance 
UEN Union for Europe of the Nations 
GUE/NGL European United Left/Nordic Green Left 
IND/DEM Independence/Democracy Group 
ECR European Conservatives and Reformists 
EFD Europe of Freedom and Democracy 
204 
 
List of member states and their abbreviations 
 Member state Label 
Belgium BE 
Bulgaria BG 
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